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AFTER ACTION REPORT

751ST TANK BN.

4 Mar - 9 Apr 43
Nov - Dec 43, Jan - July 44
3-19 Sept 43, 18 Feb thru 9 Apr 43
Sept 44 - May 45

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751ST TANK BN
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1945 LOCATION	BATTALION DESIGNATION AND TYPE	FORMED (SOURCE OF UNIT)/INACTIVATION *Active through 1946	AUGUST 1945 LOCATION
Germany	741st Tank Battalion	15 Mar 42 Ft George G Meade Md as Tank Bn, Medium / 27 Oct 45 Cp Kilmer N.J. NYPE: 20 Oct 43 England: 2 Nov 43 France-ETO: 6 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 NYPE: 25 Oct 45 (M-1 Sep 42; Tank Bn N-1 Dec 43; O-30 Apr 45)	Rosutka Germany
Austria	742nd Light Tank Battalion	1 May 42 Ft Lewis Wash as Tank Bn, Light / 15 Aug 44 Ft Ord Calif redes 742nd (J-20 Dec 43; X) Amphibian Tank Bn	
	743rd Tank Battalion	16 May 42 Ft Lewis Wash as Tank Bn, Light / 27 Nov 45 Cp Myles Standish Mass NYPE: 17 Nov 43 England: 25 Nov 43 France-ETO: 6 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 BPE: 26 Nov 45 (redes Tank Bn, Medium M-1 Oct 42; Tank Bn N-2 Dec 43; O-15 Apr 45) (partially configured as flamethrower in Nov 44)	Meltheuer Germany
Germany	744th Light Tank Battalion	27 Apr 42 Cp Bowie Tex as Tank Bn, Light / 2 Nov 45 Cp Patrick Henry Va BPE: 28 Dec 43 England: 9 Jan 44 France-ETO: 30 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 HRPE: 2 Nov 45 (Light Tank Bn J-8 Mar 44; K-24 Mar 45)	Olpe Germany
	745th Tank Battalion	15 Aug 42 Cp Bowie Tex as Tank Bn, Medium / 27 Oct 45 Cp Kilmer N.J. NYPE: 19 Aug 43 England: 25 Aug 43 France-ETO: 6 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 NYPE: 25 Oct 45 (M-1 Sep 42; Tank Bn N-2 Dec 43; O-30 Apr 45)	Chet Czechoslovakia
Germany	746th Tank Battalion	20 Aug 42 Cp Rucker Ala as Tank Bn, Medium / 26 Oct 45 Cp Shanks N.Y. NYPE: 29 Jan 44 England: 9 Feb 44 France-ETO: 6 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 NYPE: 25 Oct 45 (Tank Bn N-22 Oct 43; O-30 Apr 45)	Gaimersheim Germany
Philippines	747th Tank Battalion	10 Nov 42 Cp Bowie Tex as Tank Bn, Medium / 14 Jul 45 Germany redes 747th Amphibian NYPE: 11 Feb 44 England: 23 Feb 44 France-ETO: 7 Jun 44 - 26,30,32,34 (Tank Bn N-22 Nov 43; O-15 Apr 45) (partially configured as Flamethrower, Nov 44) Tank Bn	
wa	748th Tank Battalion	20 Aug 42 Cp Rucker Ala as Tank Bn, Medium / 19 Sep 45 Cp Patrick Henry Va NYPE: 31 Mar 44 England: 6 Apr 44 France-ETO: 18 Jul 44 - 25,26,32,34 HRPE: 19 Sep 45 (redes Tank Bn, Medium [Special] under G-20 Apr 43 PP: Medium Tank Bn, Special under H-8 Feb 44; Tank Bn under N-31 Oct 44; O-16 May 45) (assigned 6th Armd Div 19 Jul 45)	Hart Germany
erg Germany	749th Tank Battalion	2 Dec 42 Cp Bowie Tex as Tank Bn, Medium / 19 Sep 45 Cp Shanks N.Y. NYPE: 11 Feb 44 England: 23 Feb 44 France-ETO: 6 Jun 44 - 25,26,30,32,34 NYPE: 18 Sep 45 (Tank Bn N-22 Nov 43; O-30 Apr 45) (assigned 6th Armd Div 12 Jul 45)	Langenbourg Germany
awa	750th Tank Battalion	1 Jan 43 Ft Knox Ky as Tank Bn, Medium / 16 Dec 45 Cp Kilmer N.J. BPE: 15 Sep 44 England: 22 Sep 44 France-ETO: 3 Oct 44 - 25,26,34 NYPE: 14 Dec 45 (Tank Bn N-18 Oct 43; O-30 Apr 45)	Bernburg Germany
tingen Germany	751st Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Ft Benning Ga as Tank Bn, Medium / 1 Oct 45 Italy NYPE: 5 Aug 42 England: 17 Aug 42 N.Africa: 15 Jan 43 Italy: 9 Sep 43 - 24,29,31,33,35,38 (Tank Bn under N-5 Dec 43 Biardo Italy; X)	Prato Centenaro Italy
	752nd Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Ft Lewis Wash as Tank Bn, Medium / * NYPE: 5 Aug 42 England: 18 Aug 42 N.Africa: 17 Jan 43 Italy: 12 Jan 44 - 29,31,33,35,38 (M-1 Oct 42; Tank Bn under N-18 Jan 44; O-20 Jun 45) (known as 2642nd Armored Replacement Battalion 21 Mar 43-18 Jan 44 - per 3rd Ind Hqs Fifth Army which GO# 31 inactivating Tank Bn was rescinded)	Bolzano Italy
ao Mindanao less Co B at cajalar Bay and Co C at Iloilo	753rd Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Ft Benning Ga as Tank Bn, Medium / 15 Jan 46 Cp Patrick Henry Va HRPE: 24 Apr 43 N.Africa: 26 May 43 Sicily: 10 Jul 43 Italy: 9 Sep 43 France-ETO: 15 Aug 44 - 25,26,29,34,35,36,37 (M-9 Sep 42; Tank Bn N-29 Mar 44; O-20 Apr 45)	Kaufbeuren Germany
Swift Tex	754th Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Pine Camp N.Y. as Tank Bn, Medium / 31 Dec 46 Korea NYPE: 23 Jan 42 New Caledonia: 12 Mar 42 Guadalcanal: 14 Aug 43 (Co C arrived Guad 4 May 43) Bougainville: 1 Jan 44 Philippines: 9 Jan 45 - 14,16 (redes Tank Bn [Light] 15 Jan 42; I-7 Nov 42; Tank Bn under N-15 Nov 43; O-9 Feb 45) (attached Americal Div 24 May 42-3 Apr 43)	Manila Philippines less Co D at Bagabag Philippines
uhltruff Germany	755th Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Cp Bowie Tex as Tank Bn, Medium / 8 Sep 45 Italy NYPE: 6 Aug 42 England: 17 Aug 42 N.Africa: 17 Jan 43 Italy: 3 Nov 43 - 29,31,33,35 (Tank Bn under N-10 Jan 44; O-24 Apr 45)	La Marchesa Italy
addeckensted Germany	756th Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Ft Lewis Wash as Tank Bn, Light / 8 Feb 46 Cp Kilmer N.J. NYPE: 13 Jan 43 N.Africa: 25 Jan 43 (Cos A.C in N.Africa-8 Nov 42 Italy: 17 Sep 43 France-ETO: 15 Aug 44 - 23,25,26,29,34,35,37 NYPE: 7 Feb 46 (I-21 Aug 42; redes Tank Bn St Agata Italy under N-15 Dec 43; O-20 Apr 45)	Salzburg Austria
	757th Tank Battalion	1 Jun 41 Ft Ord Calif as Tank Bn, Light / 8 Oct 45 Italy NYPE: 5 Mar 43 N.Africa: 18 Mar 43 Italy: 28 Oct 43 - 29,31,33,35 (L-19 Mar 42; Tank Bn under N-12 Jan 44; O-18 Apr 45)	Manzano Italy
			Bassina Italy

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ARMY GROUND FORCES BOARD
MTOUSA

Report No. 343

16 March 1945.

REPORTS OF ACTION OF THE 751ST TANK BATTALION

(Reported by Colonel T. Q. Donaldson, Jr., Cavalry)

Observer's note: 1. Attached as Inclosures 1 and 2 are reports of action of the 751st Tank Battalion in support of attacks launched by the 10th Mountain Division of the IV Corps on 19 February and 3 March 1945.

2. These reports were prepared by Major C. J. Madden, commanding the 751st Tank Battalion, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and were obtained by Colonel T. Q. Donaldson, Jr., Cavalry, Army Ground Forces Board Observer.

3. Major Madden describes quite vividly the close support given the infantry by tanks and tank destroyers during these engagements which were outstanding examples of mountain combat in this theater.

4. The Army Ground Forces Board observer, Colonel Donaldson, was present with the 10th Mountain Division during the first three days of the attack on Mt. Belvedere, and witnessed the magnificent cooperation and coordination of all arms--tanks, tank destroyers, artillery and air (Rover Joe) with the infantry.

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H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO # 464
U. S. ARMY

REPORT OF ACTION--MT. BELVEDERE ATTACK

'D' Day for the attack against the Mt. Belvedere--Mt. Della Torracchia Ridge was set for 19 February, but the big plan in which this battalion participated was put into effect on 18 February, or 'D' - 1. The preliminary portion of the main attack was made against the Pizzo Di Campiano--Mt. Serraticcia Ridge in order both to unbalance the enemy's defenses and to gain the high ground for observation during the attack against Belvedere itself.

Troops of the 10th Mountain Division, in conjunction with Brazilian forces of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF, carried through the principal offensive, but the action on 'D' - 1 was exclusively the work of the 86th Mountain Regiment, 10th Mountain Division. Throughout both periods, all armor supporting the infantry was under the direct command of Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion.

On 'D' - 1, one platoon of medium tanks with 76-mm guns, plus one platoon of Tank Destroyers from Company "A", 701st TD Battalion, formed fire support for infantry troops assaulting the Mt. Mancinello--Pizzo Di Campiano area. Tanks were in positions at L482142, L473138, and L471133; the TD's at L493141 and L488152. At the completion of this mission, the platoon of TD's remained in that area, but the platoon of tanks returned to the control of its parent company (Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion), preparatory to supporting the infantry attack scheduled the next morning against Mt. Belvedere.

In addition to the entire battalion strength of tanks, Company "A", 701st TD Battalion was attached to this headquarters to be used as a supplement to the supporting role the tanks were to assume. For the action to be opened on 'D' Day all the armor was broken down into five (5) different forces, each of which was to be employed in a different sector of the front and in support of different infantry elements. The 'Froman Force', under the command of 1st Lt. Floyd N. Froman, Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion, consisted of two (2) platoons of medium tanks from Company "B", and one platoon of light tanks from Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion. This force was to support the attack of the 87th Mountain Regiment in such a manner as to permit one platoon of mediums and the platoon of lights to be used in firing on the C. Florio (L505174), C. Valle (L502178), Polla (L508176) line, while the other platoon of mediums was held in reserve, to be used when the infantry moved into Valpiana (L518183). This reserve platoon of medium tanks was the same platoon that had supported the assault on Pizzo Di Campiano and it had moved to positions in the vicinity L471141 - L472137 to prepare for its new mission. At the same time, the 3rd platoon, Company "B" had moved into firing positions at L508166, from where sufficient fields of fire could be obtained to provide adequate support to the advancing infantry. The 1st platoon, Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, the platoon of light tanks attached to the Froman Force, was stationed in the vicinity of Querciola (L512162) to act as

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outpost until such time as the attack moved through it.

The second force, under 1st Lt. Thomas J. Murphy of Company "D", was composed of the 2nd platoon of medium tanks from Company "B" and the 3rd platoon of light tanks of Company "D", supporting the attack of the 85th Mountain Regiment in its advance across the high ground from Mt. Belvedere (L523177) to M. Della Torraccia (L558203). These platoons assembled in the vicinity of Querciola, but moved with the advance of the infantry to L520170 as progress was made toward the peak of Mt. Belvedere on the first day of the attack.

A third force consisting of the 1st and 3rd platoons, Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion and the 2nd platoon, Company "D", commanded by Captain Alan R. Guttridge was placed in support of the 86th Mountain Regiment, to fire upon order of this battalion headquarters on positions along the Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Castello ridge. The 1st platoon had firing positions at L565158, the 3rd platoon at L548167, and the 2nd platoon, Company "D" at L546182.

The fourth and fifth forces were both under the operational control of Captain Lee E. Neville, Company "A", but the fourth was commanded directly by Captain Ira P. Harrington of this battalion and was comprised of the 2nd platoon of Company "C" and one platoon of TD's from the 701st TD Battalion. The mission of this group was to support the attack of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF against Mt. Castello (L567192) from firing position at Bombiana (L585183). The fifth force was made up of the three platoons of tanks of Company "A", with the same mission as the fourth group, but firing from Riola (L650198).

All assault guns of the battalion, formed into a single platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Joseph W. Lengyel, were utilized in an artillery role at L611166 under the direction of 424 Field Artillery Group. The mortar platoon was not employed as a unit.

Such were the positions of all units assigned and attached to this battalion at 'H'-hour 'D'-Day, 19 February, 1945.

As the attack advanced in the left sector, the 3rd platoon, Company "B" and the 1st platoon, Company "D" were not called upon to move from their previously selected supporting positions. However, on 20 February, the 1st platoon, Company "B" was required to move through Corona toward Valpiana (L519983) in order to reinforce the infantry troops occupying the latter town. In process of making this move, the platoon encountered extensive mine fields in the vicinity of Corona. Though such a situation had been contemplated and sweeping by engineers had been effected previous to the tanks' advance, it proved impossible to detect and remove all the mines. The result was that two tanks from the 1st platoon were damaged. When the road had been sufficiently swept for the tanks to continue their advance, the platoon proceeded to Valpiana, occupied good defensive positions, and assisted the infantry in consolidating the newly-won ground.

To the immediate right of this sector, the Murphy Force had been reduced to one platoon of medium tanks, the 2nd platoon of Company "B". The 3rd platoon of Company "D", originally a part of this group, was transferred to the control of the Guttridge Force on 20 February and moved to the vicinity of

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Gaggio Montano (L551167). The same change was made in the status of the 1st platoon, Company "D" when it was removed from the control of the Froman Force, after the attack had been mounted.

As the 2nd platoon of Company "B" moved up the slopes of Mt. Belvedere, its progress was seriously hampered by mines, even more thickly planted than those found in the vicinity of Corona. The platoon leader's tank was totally destroyed, but the platoon succeeded in gaining the top of the mountain and went into position east of the peak at 212200A, at points immediately behind infantry front-line posts.

As the 86th Mountain Regiment progressed in its attack across the ridge from Mt. Belvedere toward Mt. Castello, the Guttridge Force was ordered to move from its original firing positions to Cappella Di Ronchidos (L544186). It was necessary that extensive work be done by engineers of the 10th Mountain Division, but with their aid, the vehicles succeeded in fulfilling a seemingly hopeless mission. Contact was made with the infantry in its advance and the tanks were able to reinforce the forward positions against inevitable counterattacks.

Forces Harrington and Neville played no part in the initial stages of the attack. The 1st Infantry Division, BEF did not inaugurate its advance until the American units had reached Hill 1053 (L548189). Then both these groups of armor were prepared to lay defensive fires in case of counterattack and to engage targets of opportunity upon call or observation. When the Brazilian troops had occupied Mt. Castello, the 2nd platoon, Company "C" moved from its firing position in Bombiana to Abetaia (L577190) to act as a roadblock against possible counterattack. In so doing, one tank struck a mine and was partially damaged. In subsequent action against their positions, the tankers of this platoon were credited with taking six (6) prisoners.

Throughout the action engaged in by these five forces of armor, the chief obstacles to advance proved to be mines. In view of the fact that the enemy had had at least three (3) months to prepare his defensive positions, he had organized his terrain thoroughly. In the vicinity of Corona and Mt. Belvedere, box, Teller and Toff mines were utilized with a diabolical cleverness seldom before encountered by this unit. In addition, across the high ground of the ridge, anti-personnel stake mines were prepared in such an intricate pattern that advance by the infantry was practically impossible without constant resort to bangalore torpedos and other demolitions requisite to clearing a path of advance. In many instances, these stake mines were found planted at intervals as small as five (5) feet. In the right sector--that is, around Abetaia--a variation of the Toff mine, composed wholly of pressed papier-mache and glass, with only a small piece of metal used as a detonating fuze, was met for the first time by this battalion.

After having taken their positions along the crest of the high ground of the Belvedere Ridge, the tankers utilized their excellent observation to the utmost advantage and gave splendid accounts of both their ability and their weapons. Besides firing unnumberable missions on observed enemy activity and personnel, they were credited with silencing a battery of 88's and with the destruction of two (2) identified Mark IV tanks. At times, targets were observed that could not be reached by the weapons available on the tanks; so,

tank personnel observed and adjusted artillery fire that resulted in the destruction of more enemy materiel.

Communications during the operation followed the routine procedure within the battalion net, but it was imperative that the various groups of armor maintain constant contact with the infantry troops they were supporting. This necessitated the employment of SCR's 300 in order that a common frequency might be found between the infantry and the tanks. It has been only recently that tank units were authorized these SCR's 300. Previously, having only the standard SCR 508, 528, or 538, tank units were seriously handicapped by a lack of tank-infantry communications. Even though it has been impossible to obtain the full quota of SCR's 300 now authorized the battalion, the few with which the tank companies have been equipped have proved of inestimable value. At such time as full issue is received, there will be a sufficient number of sets to provide seven (7) for each of the four (4) line companies. At present, only half that number is available.

In addition to radio contact, the commander of each armored unit maintained personal liaison with the infantry headquarters he was supporting. This battalion headquarters had a representative at the command post, 10th Mountain Division, with which wire communication was, of course, constant.

The problem of supply was aggravated by the inaccessible positions in which the tanks were placed. Before the platoons of Company "C" and Company "D" could be supplied at Cappella Di Ronchidos (L542187), it was necessary to obtain fifteen (15) mules to provide transport from the last point approachable by vehicles. Constant deterioration of ground due to thawing created an increasing problem, so that the 2nd platoon of Company "B", atop Mt. Belvedere, had to call for mules to bring its supplies, also. With these exceptions, supply procedure remained normal.

Maintenance was left at the disposition of the integral company maintenance sections. When the two tanks of Company "B" were lost to mines at Corona, they were evacuated by battalion maintenance, but there was no other instance that the companies were not able to handle.

Personnel losses were light, considering the action in which the unit was employed. When the platoon leader's tank, 2nd platoon, Company "B" was destroyed by mines on the approach to Mt. Belvedere, the platoon leader and one member of his crew were blown clear of the vehicle, but the remaining three crew members were killed. Otherwise, the majority of personnel losses were occasioned by artillery fire, after the tanks had gained their final positions. It was in this manner that the battalion executive officer was killed during an inspection of forward positions. Supervision by officers of supply and organizational maintenance was close at all times and injuries were suffered by both the Battalion S-4, Captain Wendell M. Moyer, and 1st Lt. James S. Rowley, Maintenance Officer, Company "C". At the beginning of the attack, the assigned strength of the battalion was slightly less than that authorized, but the casualties sustained did not critically affect its combat efficiency.

It is felt that concerted action between the infantry and armored units reached a high standard during this operation. At no time were the foot troops left without armored support during the approach to the objective.

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Once the objectives were obtained, and the tanks were placed in vulnerable forward positions, they always had close-in protection provided by the infantry.

/t/ C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding.

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H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

REPORT OF ACTION - CASTEL D'AIANO

There was only one way to get to Castel d'Aiano and the road led through a narrow corridor at the end of which lay the objective. The necessity of occupying high ground to protect the flanks of any advance has become probably the basic premise of operations in Italy, and so it was here. But there was an added difficulty. Before the advance could even be undertaken, the approaches had to be cleared, and the Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Castello Ridge dominated the entrance into the valley before Castel d'Aiano. The single road passed sinuously through a precipitous gap at Malandrone - L571197 - and as long as the enemy occupied the high ground looking directly into the gorge, it was only a matter of pulling the lanyard to pour murderous fire onto the road. The battle for Castel d'Aiano really began on 18 February when the assault against Mt. Belvedere was launched.

'D'-Day was scheduled for 1 March 1945; 'H'-Hour was to be at 0700A. The 10th Mountain Division, with supporting armor and artillery, was to attack two regiments abreast astride the road. The artillery was to open a 20-minute preparation preceding 'H'-Hour. The armor - Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C", 701st TD Battalion, and Company "D", 126th Engineer Battalion, all commanded by Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion - was to jump off with the infantry at 'H'-Hour. Air support was to be directed against specified targets consisting of road junctions, bridges, known enemy emplacements, and motor transport. But things didn't go that way, for the attack was twice postponed, and finally materialized on 3 March.

The plan of operations required that the tank and TD companies be broken up into two different forces. The Commanding Officer, Company "B", 701st TD Battalion was given control of one platoon of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion in addition to his own company and placed in support of the 86th Mountain Regiment, attacking on the left of the road. The force on the right consisted of two platoons, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion and Company "C", 701st TD Battalion, supporting the 87th Mountain Regiment. The Commanding Officer, Company "C", 701st TD Battalion led this group. For the sake of clarity, we'll call the one on the left the "Ault Force", and the one on the right the "Patch Force". In addition, there was a base of fire formed at Casa Di Bombiana - L587190 - by the 2nd platoon, Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion and the 1st platoon, Company "A", 701st TD Battalion. An excellent field of fire lay before them and they could cover the movement of the first units across the Line of Departure. It wasn't until the infantry had secured the objectives that these positions lost their advantage and the platoons were moved.

It was not contemplated that the "Patch Force" be committed to action until the infantry had occupied and secured objectives, at which time a platoon of tanks was to join an infantry company in forming a roadblock at Pietra Colora - L596221. Company "C", 701st TD Battalion was employed as artillery prior to the opening of this action, and stayed there on an alert

status, prepared to move out on two-hour's notice. When the time arose, its mission would be to drive into Castel d'Aiano itself with the 85th Mountain Regiment. The "Ault Force", however, was prepared to move in conjunction with the infantry from the very beginning of the attack, leap-frogging from position to position, constantly over-watching, prepared always to engage any targets delaying the advance of the foot troops.

Captain Ault moved his force and the two platoons of tanks that were to go with Captain Patch into an assembly area at L573175 at 0130A on the morning of 3 March. From this area, the TD's, preceded by two platoons of tanks, moved out the next morning in plenty of time to be at the Line of Departure by 0700A. As the infantry moved forward, so did the armor, but the nature of the terrain forced the vehicles into canalized positions on the road. Because of continued close-in reconnaissance made right behind the infantry's front line, the armored vehicle commanders were able to find excellent positions from which comprehensive fields of fire could be obtained. It was in this manner that the infantry had constant and immediate support while still on the move, and that the tanks and TD's were able to move quickly into supporting defensive positions, once the objectives were occupied and consolidation of positions was begun.

The attack had an ominous beginning, for during the march to the Line of Departure, before even starting through the artillery bull's-eye that Malandrone had turned out to be, a tank of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion ran off the road, threw a track, and was out of action at once. The remaining four tanks continued the march, and fortunately this proved to be a case when a bad beginning means a good ending.

The infantry's first objective was Mt. Terminale and the strongpoint at Iola - L566218 - both of which had to be cleared before objectives could be taken. Soon after the advance began, the remaining four vehicles of the leading tank platoon left the road and started across the ridge toward Mt. Della Vedetta - L585223. It was an unfortunate move, for the terrain was definitely not suitable. One tank got as far as L572209, another went on to L574208, and two even climbed to L579217, but the result was that three vehicles threw tracks and were immobilized for a good portion of the day. Due to remarkable work by the tank company's maintenance section, the vehicles were back in action in record time, but valuable fire power had been lost for several hours. The one tank still mobile was taken by Captain Visher, Commanding Officer, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, to accompany him as he led the advancing armored column.

Meanwhile, the infantry at Mt. Terminale had been held up by determined resistance from Iola - L566218. The Germans had barricaded themselves in the cellars and were firing from houses that had been converted into forts-in-miniature. The presence of armor was needed urgently; so, the platoon of TD's that led the advance moved up to road junction 908 - L569216 - where they could actually gain entry to the town and clear it of enemy. Once the immediate job was completed, the platoon remained in town until it was called the next afternoon to take defensive positions along the infantry line atop another objective.

During the fight for Iola, progress was going well on the right. The infantry of the 87th Mountain Regiment had occupied one objective and was far along the way to another. Since the armor had been unable to follow them across the ridge, the foot troops moved alone onto M. Della Vedetta and into the town of Pietra Colora - L570221. A roadblock was established there and was intended to be reinforced by a platoon of tanks that had been moving north from the Line of Departure since 0930A. It takes only a short time to tell, and opposition from the enemy was not intense, but the terrain was grueling for the doughboys and it was late afternoon before they could enter Pietra Colora and were in need of the extra protection tanks would give their forward positions. The tanks were not moving too rapidly, either, for to get to Pietra Colora, they were forced to go north all the way to the road junction at Canevaccia - L587236 - and then turn back southeast toward Pietra Colora.

Securing the high ground around the crossroad and making that junction tenable was a job that lasted the rest of the day. When night came, there was a platoon of TD's in Iola, and two other platoons with a platoon of tanks, south of the crossroad, unable to do anything but wait. That night, the infantry was in Pietra Colora and wanted tank support for their roadblock, but the tanks could not get there. Even after they were able to go on to Pietra Colora, they were again stopped short of their goal, this time by demolition and mines. Engineers went to work immediately, but it was a big job and took time. Before the platoon could move forward, its mission was changed, and it was ordered to L600237. The 1st Infantry Division, BEF, had attacked in conjunction with the 10th Mountain Division, occupying S. Marie Villiana - L610215, and they were such a short distance from Pietra Colora that the need for an armored roadblock had been eliminated.

The attack continued at 0800A, the morning of 4 March, with Mt. Acidola - L597231 - and Bacucco - L605244 - as the immediate objectives. In preparation for the breakthrough that was hoped for that day, Company "C", 701st TD Battalion was moved before dawn from its artillery positions to the assembly area at 571176, and readied to drive all the way to Castel d'Aiano if possible.

Mt. Acidola was occupied by 0900A, clearing Canevaccia sufficiently for the crossroad to be used, and the company of TD's could continue toward Castel d'Aiano. One of the roads radiating from Canevaccia went to Montese, a known center of enemy activity, and it was imperative that the approaches to it be controlled by fire. Two platoons of TD's from Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, left the main supply road in the vicinity of Sassomolare - L585242 - with the intention that one of them should continue to Hill 788 - L588600 - while the other occupied vantage points in Sassomolare proper. They marked time there until Hill 788 was in our hands, then the vehicles started the climb. But once again, terrain proved the deciding factor and it was not long before maintenance crews were busy replacing thrown tracks and getting vehicles back into action. It was a time-consuming delay that proved an all-night job, and the next morning, the platoon was back at L588242, the point from which it started.

The terrain was proving rough going for the infantry and on the morning of 4 March, it was obvious that the attack would not be far enough advanced by night to permit the armor's entry into Castel d'Aiano. The "Patch Force"

continued north, firing at houses, flushing enemy infantry from cover, and providing countless prisoners for our own doughboys, and made its plans to take position at Maddona Di Brasa - L600247 - in sufficient strength to cover thoroughly the town and all approaches to it.

The movement north, even on the road, was slow. Engineers had to sweep constantly to clear a path free from mines, and at L596246 they found a blown bridge that delayed the column all night. The job was too big for the engineers working with the tanks to handle on the spot, and assistance was requested. It was slow in coming, and the tank dozer of Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion was sent to the scene. The road was hard-surfaced, though, and the tank dozer could do little by way of breaking it and filling in the blow. Regular engineer equipment was needed; so another urgent request was made, and work finally began. The next morning, at 0800A, a message was received from the Commanding Officer, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, that four tanks had finally been able to enter Maddona Di Brasa and occupy good firing positions.

At the end of the second day, the platoon of tanks originally bound for Pietra Colora was at Sprilla - L600237, and the platoon of TD's that occupied Iola had moved to L558225, the northernmost point of objective. From there it could move into firing positions on the crest of the ridge and fire both into Maserno - L551229 - and Montese - L558245. One platoon of tanks and the company of TD's trying to get into Maddona Di Brasa were deployed in the vicinity of the main supply road between the demolition at L596245 and the crossroad at L586236. One platoon of tanks and two platoons of TD's were in positions in the vicinity of L588242, from where they had been covering the advance of the "Patch Force" as it moved north.

That night, the 85th Mountain Regiment got set to by-pass Castel d'Aiano the morning of 5 March and to attack objectives. They would be supported by fire from vehicles of Captain Patch's group, and once all the high ground had been secured, one battalion of the 87th Mountain Regiment and the armor would enter Castel d'Aiano and consolidate it within roadblocks on all entries into town.

At 0800A, following the usual 20-minute artillery concentration, the infantry jumped off and occupied objectives against opposition that was considerably more intense than that encountered during the previous two days. They did not know it at the time, but that morning they were hitting elements of the 29 PG Division, quite different from the 232rd Infantry or 114th Jaeger Division. Difficulty was met on the approach to the objective, at the village of Famaticcia - L611262; so, tank and TD fire was placed on the target, successfully reducing it. The platoon of tanks on the extreme right at Sprilla began moving at dawn through Pianestrina - L610238 - and then north to join Company "C", 701st TD Battalion at Castel d'Aiano. When it had passed Pianestrina, a call came from the infantry requesting fire on strong points barring their advance on M. Della Castellana. The mission was completed and the platoon continued, but for the second time, this platoon's mission was changed and it was ordered to remain at Pianestrina to act as security over the road leading into Castel d'Aiano from the southeast.

The situation at Castel d'Aiano had opened so that Captain Patch found

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he could take some of the vehicles in with little opposition. His command destroyer and the command tank of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, with a platoon of TD's, entered at 1100A and proceeded to clear it as much as possible. Of course, infantry was requested immediately, but the battalion that was to occupy did not move out until 1400A, and then was delayed by resistance at L607254. By 1630A, it was clear that troops would not be available to outpost the armor that night. Enemy infantry was seen on the hill to the rear of town, and the vehicles had to withdraw to their former positions at Maddona Di Brasa. Somehow, somewhere along the line, an excellent chance to destroy or capture enemy personnel and materiel had been lost, because the infantry was unable to follow up an opportunity presented by an armored penetration.

As the infantry improved its positions the morning of 5 March, a platoon of TD's from Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, moved to Le Borre - L573230 - and waited there at the infantry battalion commander's request, before moving onto the top of the ridge after dark. However, the division commander ordered the platoon into position during the afternoon; so, at 1600A it proceeded to the vicinity of L570235. Another change was made when the platoon moved to the vicinity of Chirichella - L584237 - to form a road block toward Montese. The platoon of tanks originally near Sassomolare remained in place.

As the third day closed, the position of the armor was little different from that existent at the end of the second day. "Patch Force" was still south of Castel d'Aiano. One platoon of tanks was at L609244, near Pianestrina, and other in over-watching positions at L587242. Two platoons of Company "B", 701st TD Battalion were in defensive positions at L570235 and at L584237. The other platoon planned to move the morning of 6 March back into Iola - L567219, because its firing positions atop the ridge had become inaccessible and the vehicles were desired in a more mobile location.

During the night 5 - 6 March, infantrymen had entered and cleared out Castel d'Aiano. The town was under intense artillery and mortar fire, but was securely held and it was imperative that road blocks be formed on the west, north, and east sides of town. "Patch Force" moved in on the morning of 6 March and set to work, with the help of engineers, to make the place impenetrable by road. Their mission had been completed.

That is the story of the operational execution of the plan. It was successful; thoroughly so, but there is another fact that must be understood before the degree of success can be appreciated. It is necessary to recall once more the attack against Mt. Belvedere.

The 232nd Infantry Division had held the high ground from Belvedere to the east for many months. It had resisted our patrols and small shifts of position stubbornly, with no intention of giving up without a fight. But it was due for relief and our attack was timed, either intentionally or inadvertently, when one regiment of the 232nd was actually being replaced by the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jaeger Division. The new regiment had marched from the east for approximately a week. The men were tired, supply was poor; morale was low. The unit was thrown into the line as reserves, without any opportunity for orientation. The result was that defense from ground positions fell to pieces.

History repeated itself at Castel d'Aiano. After the attack finally began, a very good reason appeared for its having been postponed. Whether it was the principal reason cannot be said. Somewhat less than 48 hours before our attack on 3 March, the 721st Regiment of the 114th Division had arrived in the sector to relieve additional elements of the 232nd Division. This second offensive of ours almost developed into a complete rout among enemy infantry, and once again ground defense collapsed. The first two days, prisoners streamed in by the hundreds, only too willing to surrender. The situation on the third day was an utter reversal.

Just as though it were two different battles on two different fronts, the nature of opposition changed. Troops from the 29th PG Division had arrived at the scene and entered the fight. Their resistance was stiff, but it was too late. By that time, we were so concentrated around our objective that they could not prevent our success.

Armor was spotted the first day of the attack as our forward elements approached Canevaccia. Three tanks were reported retreating north, but circumstances later indicated that they were assault guns from the 914 Assault Gun Battalion. Two extended columns of armor were reported on the night of 4 - 5 March, approaching from the northeast, but no attack developed. At the time of this writing, there is no indication that the enemy intends to commit his armor in a large scale counterattack. Not even small scale threats have been manifested. Anti-tank fire was received in one or two isolated cases, but throughout the attack, the main opposition was from intense artillery and mortar fire, and the newly-won positions are now being harassed constantly. As usual, aside from the eternally restrictive terrain, the armor was delayed by mines and demolition.

Once again, the necessity for constant liaison between infantry and supporting armor was obvious. Whereas, during the Mt. Belvedere action, a few vehicles of this battalion had SCR's 300 and could contact the infantry, in this last mission, the armor was not so equipped. The results was that this headquarters was called upon to furnish liaison officers. One was at division headquarters, which is normal, but when the 85th Regiment prepared to attack, two additional officers were requested, one for each of the assault battalions. It was impossible to comply, and one officer from this headquarters to the regiment had to be substituted. This arrangement was far from satisfactory, because of the delay occasioned in clearing requests for fire from the battalion to regiment, then to the armor for execution. In one case, by the time the request could be filled for fire on 3 targets, the infantry had occupied the first two and only the third could be engaged. With radio contact directly between the infantry and armor, the situation would have been alleviated 100%.

Supply and maintenance were normal. The two companies of 701st TD Battalion were serviced by their parent unit, and simple arrangements were made whereby this headquarters supplied Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion.



As in the last instance when this headquarters supported the 10th Mountain Division, coordination and cooperation were of a high standard. A platoon of division engineers was an integral part of each of the two armored

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groups, and a third platoon was occupied constantly on the main supply road. They suffered high casualties, but the support they gave enabled the armor to go where it would otherwise have been halted. The work of the three armored companies involved was admirable. Though directed by a headquarters entirely foreign from their own, and one with no troops involved, the commanders bent every effort to accomplish their mission, and did so with commendable spirit. No vehicles were lost; personnel casualties were negligible. Their performance was admirable indeed.

/s/ C. J. Madden (by JNO)
/t/ C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding.

WD 13



4 Mar - 9 Apr 43

105-69.2

751ST TANK BATTALION (M)

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Johnson, C. M.
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE. *10 July* 1945

1860

THE 34th DIVISION

Incl 14

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION (M)
APO #302
U. S. ARMY

30 April 1943

36114

SUBJECT: Reports of actions with enemy.

TO : The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, dated 18 Nov 1929, as amended by Changes #2, AR 345-105, dated 15 Jan 1943, the following report of actions with the enemy during the period 4 March - 9 April 1943, is submitted:

a. Map reference: Tunisia, 1:500,000, G.S. G.S. 4225, or 1:200,000, G.S. 4227.

b. General.

(1) On February 18, 1943, this unit, commanded by LT. COL. LOUIS A. HAMMACK, O17696, Inf., was relieved from assignment to the 1st Tank Group, and assigned to II Corps, U. S. Army. On that date it began movement by water, rail, and road from a bivouac near ST. LOUIS, ALGERIA, to KHROUB, a distance of about 600 miles. On 25 February the battalion was reassembled. On 27 February, the battalion moved by road into the II Corps sector, where it was attached on 1 March to the 34th Infantry Division and occupied a bivouac in the vicinity of point at O-097203, a distance of about 160 miles.

(2) The 34th Division, until 27 March, executed a defensive mission in the vicinity of ROHIA (O-186204) and SBIBA (O-219078). In conformity therewith, the mission of the battalion was one of delay and counterattacks, for which plans were submitted.

c. PICHON.

(1) On 4 March, the battalion was a part of a task force, under the command of BRIGADIER GENERAL GAFFEY, 34th Infantry Division, which was to make a demonstration against hostile forces in and about PICHON (O-750226) for the purpose of drawing enemy troops from the British sector on the north.

(2) The battalion moved from the above bivouac area at 2200 hours, that date, and marched approximately 30 miles in the direction of PICHON to an assembly area. Company "A" was placed under the command of COLONEL ROBERT W. WARD, 135th Infantry, the battalion, less one company, remaining in reserve under the task force commander.

(3) During 5 March, the Reconnaissance Platoon was used to assist other elements in protecting the right (south) flank of the force, and, late in the day, Company "A" was employed by COL. WARD to cover his withdrawal. During the night 5-6 March, the entire force withdrew. This battalion closed in its original bivouac at 0400 hours, 6 March. One man was killed and two were wounded; one half-track vehicle was destroyed by fire.

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Ltr Hq. 701st Tk Bn (M), 30 Apr 1940, Cont'd.

d. DJ TOUILA.

(1) During the night 26-27 March the 34th Division assumed the offensive with the mission of seizing the high ground south of FONNDOUK EL OKBI (O-825159). The battalion moved on that date from a bivouac at (O-223076), near SBIBA, to (T-646924), south of HADJEB EL AIOUN, then on 27 March to (O-710003), northeast of HADJEB.

(2) On 30 March the battalion commander received orders from the Division commander to clear the enemy from the slopes northwest of DJ TOUILA (T-788982). He was to employ one company of tanks, the assault and mortar platoons, one company of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one company (motorized) of the 109th Engineer Battalion. In this hill mass on the right flank of the Division, hostile forces had artillery batteries, machine gun and mortar emplacements, observation posts, and riflemen.

(3) The attack was launched at 0800 hours from an assault position at (O-763023). Within the zone were wadis, which it had been impossible to reconnoiter, and which impeded the advance of the tanks. The force received fire from weapons mentioned above and was dive bombed. However, hostile forces were cleared from the area, and it was believed that an imminent enemy attack from that direction had been frustrated.

(4) Two tanks were immobilized in wadis, and set afire by the enemy. One man was wounded.

e. FONNDOUK EL OKBI (1st attack)

(1) On 8 April, the Division, after a brief period in a defensive role, reassumed the offensive with the mission of securing DJ EL HAOUAREB (high ground immediately south of FONNDOUK) as its first objective, and the hills to the southeast thereof as its second objective.

(2) DJ EL HAOUAREB is a hill about 200 feet in height and 2500 meters in length. The line of departure for the infantry was a wadi running approximately north, and about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of the first objective. The intervening ground was generally flat, partial concealment being provided by patches of cactus, and partial cover by occasional sand hummocks. Having observation from the objective and other hills north and south thereof, the enemy placed artillery fire upon all of this ground. The gap at FONNDOUK was further defended by anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, well dug-in and camouflaged machine guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars. Batteries emplaced in the high ground north of FONNDOUK placed enfilade in front of the objective and along the HADJEB EL AIOUN-FONNDOUK road.

(3) The infantry attack, launched at 0530 hours, that date, had failed to secure the first objective. At 1400 hours the battalion was ordered to support the 133d and 135th Infantry Regiments in another effort to take the hill. Complete as to tank strength (54), and with the assault gun platoon, the battalion left the reservecing point (O-749048) at 1440 hours, arrived in the assault position (O-770108) about 1520 hours, passed through the infantry, and arrived on the ground in front of the objective at 1600 hours, at which time a 15-minute artillery concentration lifted. Companies "A" and "B" were in the assault, "A" on the right, each with two platoons abreast in inverted wedge, and the third platoon in line in support. Company "C" followed in the same formation 300 yards in rear of the center. The battalion commander was in the center of the entire formation, between the assault and support companies.

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Ltr. Hq., 751st Tank Bn (M), 30 Apr 1943, Cont'd.

(4) The tanks, not being able to move onto the objective because of its height, remained in front thereof for about ten minutes, firing on suspected hostile installations and receiving fire from all of the above-mentioned weapons. Since only the infantry on the right followed the tanks, the latter returned to the rallying point (same as the assault position). The riflemen who did follow the tanks to the foot of the objective fell back when the tanks left. The latter returned from the rallying point to the reservicing point.

(5) Six tanks struck mines, and a track of a seventh was broken by an AP projectile. Three of the above were set afire by AT fire, and the remainder later retrieved. One officer and four men were killed, and six men wounded.

f. FONNDOUK (2d attack)

(1) At 0715 hours, 9 April, the battalion (less one company) was again ordered to support the infantry in another attack on the same objective. Thirty-one tanks and the assault gun platoon left the reservicing point at 0755 hours, reached the assault position about 0840 hours, attacked, and reached the objective at 0900 hours. Companies "B" and "C" were employed abreast, "C" on the right, each with its platoons as in the previous attack.

(2) They passed through the infantry and remained on the ground immediately in front of the objective for fifteen or twenty minutes, again firing on suspected emplacements and receiving hostile fire. Two tanks of the right company collided, each bending a sprocket and did not reach the objective. No friendly artillery concentration had been ordered. Since the riflemen did not follow, the tanks returned to the rallying point, leaving four damaged by mines. All were later retrieved. An engine oil line of another tank was broken, probably by shell fragments, but the tank returned under its own power. One man was killed and four wounded.

g. FONNDOUK (3d attack)

(1) At 1120 hours, a third attack was ordered by the Division commander, this time with the main effort in the left (north) half of the zone of the right (133d) regiment. The twenty-six remaining tanks moved from the assault position at 1215 hours, one company penetrating the gap in the center of the objective. The tanks remained on that ground for about ten minutes, and since the infantry again did not take the objective, they returned to the rallying point by division order. Of two tanks hit by anti-tank gun fire, one returned to the rallying point. The engine of a third was set afire, probably by plunging tracer or incendiary bullets. A fourth had a mechanical failure, and a fifth was immobilized in a wadi. All five were later retrieved. One officer and four men were killed, and one man wounded. By division order, the remaining tanks returned to the reservicing point.

It was learned later that the first objective was taken at 0715 hours and the second at 1020 hours the following day, 10 April.

Louis A. Hammack

LOUIS A. HAMMACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Bn (M),
Commanding

9 Incls.

- #1-S-3 Journal for 4 Mar 1943
- #2-S-3 Journal for 5 Mar 1943
- #3-S-3 Journal for 6 Mar 1943
- #4-S-3 Journal for 30 Mar 1943
- #5-S-3 Journal for 31 Mar 1943
- #6-S-3 Journal for 7 Apr 1943
- #7-S-3 Journal for 8 Apr 1943
- #8-S-3 Journal for 9 Apr 1943
- #9-Maps Tunisia: 1:50,000, GS GS 4225, Sheets 62, 63, 70 and 71

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION (M)
APO #306
U. S. ARMY

JCA
28 Sept 1943

Approved

27 Sept. 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy, 3 September 1943 through 19 September 1943.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., U. S. A.
(Thru) Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, APO #36, U. S. Army.

I In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, as changed by Changes #3, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of actions with the enemy during the period 3 September - 19 September 1943, is submitted:

Map references: ITALY, 1:50,000, G.S. G.S. 4229.

1. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division for the operation "Avalanche" the personnel of the 751st Tank Battalion (M) with all its equipment and material embarked in the harbors of MERS EL KABIR and ORAN, ALGERIA, on 3 September 1943. All the necessary preparations and plans were made long before the hour set for embarkation. Vehicles and crews were divided into "D" Day, D + 2, and D + 7 groups and divided among twelve transports.

The voyage was uneventful from the start. As yet the personnel aboard were not informed of our destination; this much awaited information came the next day while we were at sea.

The news of the capitulation of ITALY reached our convoy a few days later and all began to speculate on the type of reception awaiting us in ITALY. This was not long in coming. On 8 September at about 2300 B we arrived in the transport area and dropped anchor in the calm sea off the West coast of ITALY between SALERNO and AGRIPOLI.

2. Company "A" of our battalion was attached to the 141st Infantry Regiment for this operation. In accordance with the plan the first platoon of the company was scheduled to disembark before day-break on "D" Day (9 September) and support the infantry in a "flying column" movement with view of entering AGRIPOLI from the East. The LCM's carrying the tanks of this platoon after two unsuccessful attempts to land on the "Blue" beach managed to land one (1) tank at 1500 B and four (4) tanks at 1730 B on the "Red" beach. This was accomplished only because of the undying spirit of our men who would allow nothing to stop them in attaining their objective. Next our tanks were ordered to move into the assembly area approximately four hundred (400) yards from the "Red" beach.

The second platoon landed one (1) tank on "Red" beach at 0830 B and one (1) at 1100 B. Both of them went into action assisting the infantry working toward the "Yellow" beach. Another tank was landed at 1000 B and was immediately commandeered by a general officer to provide transportation for him. The remaining two tanks were landed the next day 10 September and proceeded into the company assembly area.

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AUTH: CG. 36th INF. DIV.

INITIAL: *NO. 1*

DATE: *2 October 1943*

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RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 36, U. S. ARMY

OPERATION "AVALANCHE"

9 - 21 SEPTEMBER 1943

ANNEX #27

751ST TANK BATTALION (M)

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The third platoon landed all its tanks on the "Blue" beach. One (1) at 0930 B which proceeded inland destroying two (2) MK 4 special tanks and one (1) AT gun. However, as it approached a main highway it was destroyed by an AP shot in the turret, fired from an MK 4 tank concealed off the road. This was our first set-back. The radio tender gunner, Private 1st Class Robert L. Mendenhall of Indianapolis, Ind. was killed. Sergeant Tomas M. Glasheen of Fulerton, California, tank commander and three (3) other members of the crew, Tech. 5th Gr. Norbert J. Anchulis of Cleveland, Ohio, Private Hugh A. Asunto of Ironwood, Michigan, and Private George A. Zilka of Lakewood, Ohio, were wounded. The second tank landing at 1330 B moved into a defiladed position near the highway and later joined Company "C" tanks. The remaining three (3) tanks reached land during the night of 9 and 10 September and moved into the bivouac area occupied by the 1st platoon.

3. In the plan for operation Company "B" was attached to the 142nd Infantry Regiment and was to have joined that organization on "D" Day; one (1) platoon before daylight. However, due to insufficient number of landing barges it disembarked on the afternoon of "D" Day and moved into the battalion area in vicinity of N-856072.

4. The remainder of the battalion scheduled to land on "D" Day landed on the afternoon of that day and during the night of 9 and 10 September. It was attached to the 143rd Infantry Regiment for the landing operation and immediately proceeded into the assembly area in the vicinity of N-856060. At 2030 B, VCG, 36th Infantry Division were received:

1. To detach one (1) company to the 141st Infantry Regiment to proceed to CR at N-859013 for further instructions from CO, of 141st Infantry Regiment reporting there before daylight 10 September; 2. To defend the beach head from positions vicinity N-816068; 3. The remainder of the battalion to occupy defensive positions East and West of the highway at N-858072. At 2340 B five (5) tanks of Company "B" left for area N-816068. At 2330 B Company "C" moved to CR at N-859013 to occupy defensive positions on the East and West sides of the main road to defend this section from a possible armored attack from the South. At 2345 B the remainder of the battalion moved into ordered positions and established its CP at N-856072.

5. On the morning of September 10th Company "C" while in its defensive location along the South of the road from S-873989 to S-878989 furnished artillery support for the 141st Infantry in its attack on the hills to the South. After completion of this mission our tanks rallied in the Southern half of the S-8799 grid square to await further orders. On the same morning at 1030 B Company "C" moved out Southeast to search for snipers and machine gun emplacements which were harassing our infantry. Returning at 1300 B to its former rallying position and taking up defensive positions in order to protect against armored attack from the South, South-west and East.

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Members of the Company other than the tank crews were engaged in reconnaissance and demolition work to the South.

On 13 September 1800 B the CO of Company "C" received orders to report to the CG, 36th Infantry Division for instructions and was ordered to move his company and occupy defensive positions vicinity N-922072 and N-922077 to defend them against an expected armored attack from North and East. While in these positions a constant contact was kept with the 504th Airborne Infantry.

6. At 0230 B, 11 September VCOG, 36th Infantry Division were received ordering the Battalion Commander to send one (1) company to report to Brigadier General O'Daniel not later than 0600 B for an Amphibious operation. A guide was to meet them at RJ N-848032. "B" Company was ordered to undertake this mission and left 0300 B to execute the order. At 0400 B they were joined by five (5) tanks which were relieved from their defensive mission vicinity N-816068. For this operation in addition to the tanks four (4) 2½-ton trucks of Service Company and one (1) half-track ambulance of the Medical Detachment were attached to Company "B".

At 1105 B 16 September a verbal report from Company "B" reached the Battalion Headquarters stating that they had been attached to the 1st Ranger Force from 0300 B 11 September to 0200 B 13 September; attached to British 10th Corps 0200 B 13 September to 1200 B 14 September and were then attached to the 141st Infantry Regiment which was attached to the 45th Infantry Division. The following defensive positions were occupied by the Company: Three (3) tanks at N-780182, seven (7) tanks at N-805169, five (5) tanks at N-804187, Company CP two (2) tanks at N-788164. The company held these positions until relieved from attachment to the 45th Infantry Division at 1500 B 19 September returning under battalion control. During this mission Company "B" did not engage the enemy in action and suffered no casualties or losses.

7. On 12 September at 1030 B VCOG, 36th Infantry Division were received attaching the battalion less Company "B" and Company "C" to the 143rd Infantry Regiment with orders to proceed to vicinity of N-940135. At 1130 B the battalion less detachments proceeded to the designated positions.

The road in vicinity of N-935095 was discovered to be mined. Due to the difficult nature of the surrounding terrain the main body of troops were ordered to go to the main road junction about two (2) miles Northwest of ROCCA D'ASPIDE (O-01037) and then Northwest thru ALBANELLA (N-945092). A few hundred yards away from ALBANELLA while passing over a twisting mountainous road our convoy was strafed and bombed by American A-36 planes. This was purely accidental as the nature of the immediate terrain made recognition doubly difficult both for us and the Air Force. Two (2) men received superficial burns and no serious damage of equipment occurred.

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Our first units arriving at RJ (N-923117) discovered that the road to the North was heavily mined and that the bridge located at this strategic position at N-924122 had been destroyed by the retreating enemy and the stream-bed mined. Further reconnaissance revealed mine fields on all the available alternate routes and the battalion was forced at 1615 B to take positions shown in the vicinity of N-917121-918117 and 921113. Shortly after our arrival in these positions the CO of 143rd Infantry Regiment visited our area and ordered us to reconnoiter for positions in the general area N-932130 to 930134. This reconnaissance was carried out by the battalion Commanding Officer, S-2 S-3, and the Officers of Company "A" from 1900 B to 2005 B. At 2400 B the positions shown were occupied by the tanks of Company "A" and Battalion Headquarters. The Headquarters Company CO accompanied by Assault and Mortar platoon leaders reconnoitered for positions also and by 0430 B of the next day we were in positions shown on the map.

On 13 September at 1000 B the battalion CO, CO of Company "A" and the third platoon of Company "A" were entrusted with a mission of driving out the enemy infantry from our artillery positions located Southeast of our area. No enemy troops were discovered in the vicinity. Revealing their location they at once drew heavy artillery fire on themselves and on our artillery. Our tanks returned to their former positions but continued to draw artillery fire for the rest of the day. The enemy also shelled the bridge at N-918117 and the road to the North. There were no casualties among our forces as a result of this action.

At 1800 B the battalion CO and Company "A" left their positions to attack the enemy around the West and North slopes of the hill on which ALTAVILLA (N-955147) is located. Since this attack was launched without warning orders no reconnaissance was permitted. In addition before the execution of the planned tank attack the battalion CO was ordered to cut off the enemy infantry which was moving from ALTAVILLA into the draw at N-954143. Our tanks approaching this draw from the West reported friendly infantry moving thru it toward the South. As twilight was rapidly approaching and we were in a strange and unreconnoitered territory our tank crews found it almost impossible to maneuver. One (1) tank of the second platoon fell into a tank trap coming to rest on its side making it an excellent stationary target for the enemy. It was hit by enemy artillery and burned. Another tank was wedged between two banks and since it was impossible to retrieve it, it was abandoned. The third tank developed clutch and transmission trouble and was ordered to return to its previously occupied defensive position. Early next morning it was hit and destroyed by enemy tank fire.

8. At 0130 B 14 September WOCO, 143rd Infantry Regiment were received ordering the battalion minus "B" and "C" companies to return to its former position vicinity N-856072. This was completed at 0445 B where it was discovered that Company "C" had moved into positions in vicinity of N-921072.

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9. At 0510 B VCGG were received ordering one (1) company to occupy positions in the vicinity of N-888116 and to defend these positions from an armored attack from the North. The designated positions were occupied at 0530 B at 1000 B three (3) tanks of Company "A" and one (1) tank of Battalion Headquarters moved into position in the vicinity of N-873116 while six (6) tanks of Company "A" moved into positions in the vicinity of N-896117. There they repulsed the expected enemy tank attack disabling eight (8) enemy tanks five (5) of which were observed burning. This action fought so well against a superior number of enemy tanks cost us one (1) tank which was destroyed by AP shot in the side of the hull and set on fire. The Tank Commander, Sergeant Samuel W. Allan, Jr., of Hudson, Ohio, was seriously wounded. Three (3) other members of the crew received second degree burns. Upon the satisfactory completion of this action the tanks returned to vicinity N-861070 for reservicing. Due to the condition of personnel and equipment of Company "A" they relieved Company "C" with nine (9) serviceable tanks at 1430 B and went into positions in the vicinity N-921072. The three (3) remaining tanks of Company "A" joined the Company that evening.

10. Company "C" having been relieved by Company "A" was being guided into positions in the vicinity of N-905126. While enroute they were fired upon at N-887114 by enemy tanks which were maneuvering around the flank of our Tank Destroyers forces. The enemy tanks had advanced to approximately N-887127 before they opened fire on Company "C". The Company Commander ordered a counterattack and drove the enemy North into the concealment of a wooded area. Upon completion of this mission Company "C" contacted the Battalion CO and the adjacent Tank Destroyer and infantry units and under cover of darkness went into defensive positions from N-898127 to 886123. In this action we suffered no losses of personnel or equipment.

The next morning 15 September at about 0730 B enemy artillery started shelling Company "C" positions while enemy tanks started working toward our tank positions from the North. The artillery fire was returned and enemy tanks were engaged; One (1) MK special tank was destroyed. The enemy withdrew and the artillery fire ceased at about 0900 B. Although heavily shelled from 1500 to 1900 B Company "C" did not suffer any casualties or damage. On the 16th and 17th September Company "C" was shelled by the enemy both day and night intermittently. They remained in position however and returned fire although adjacent armored units withdrew and were later ordered to return to their positions. On 16 September four (4) men were wounded by shell fragments, none seriously, one (1) of whom has already returned back to duty. On 17 September while attempting to perform necessary maintenance on their tanks Sergeant Victor Jones of Snoclimish, Washington and Private 1st Class Joseph Megarowski of Buffalo, New York, were killed, while Corporal Stanley J. Kolebuck of Toledo, Ohio, was seriously wounded.

On 18 September at 1330 B Company "C" moved into a servicing area in the vicinity of N-876110, and having completed their reservicing

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at 1720 B they moved to their formerly occupied positions leaving two (2) tanks in reservicing area; one (1) for maintenance and one (1) for crew replacement. The one (1) left out for crew replacement returned that evening. The company moved to new positions at 0730 B in the morning in the vicinity of N-913146. At this time the Tank Warning CP which had been established at N-898142 on the previous day by elements of battalion reconnaissance was withdrawn. While in the reservicing area on 18 September Company "C" was fired upon by enemy artillery, one (1) enlisted man being slightly wounded.

11. Company "A" saw no action other than intermittent harassing artillery fire while occupying the defensive positions in the vicinity of N-921072. One (1) enlisted man was slightly wounded by a shell fragment. This was the only casualty.

12. On 19 September 1820 B Company "B" was relieved from attachment to the 45th Infantry Division and directed by the CG, of the 36th Infantry Division to report to the Battalion CO. The battalion was relieved from attachment to the 36th Infantry Division at 2200 B on 19 September by VOCCG, VI Corps and attached to the 3rd Infantry Division. Companies "A" and "C" reported to battalion area vicinity N-856072.

13. During all these operations the Service Company of this battalion performed its duties in an excellent manner. The combat elements were always supplied with ammunition, rations, and other necessary supplies which were available at the dumps. During the entire operation the company was bivouaced in the vicinity of N-856060. Battlefield supply was carried on at night and the necessary maintenance was performed when required. Both of these operations drew artillery fire and the battalion maintenance officer was slightly wounded by shell fragments. One (1) truck driver was slightly wounded by falling anti-aircraft shell fragments in the company area. The company suffered no other losses in personnel or equipment.

Louis A. Hammack

LOUIS A. HAMMACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion (M),
Commanding.

2 Incls.







- #1 - Overlay of Operations (Sheets 198 III and 198 IV, 1:50,000 Map of Italy, G.S. G.S. 4229).
- #2 - S-2, S-3 Journal, 1 Sept. through 19 Sept. 1943.

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OVERLAY - SHEETS - 198 IV - 198 III
ITALY - 1:50,000 - G.S.G.S. 4229
TO ACCOMPANY REPORT OF ACTION
AGAINST THE ENEMY 3 THROUGH 19 SEPT.

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**HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION (M)
APO #306
U. S. ARMY**

4 December 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy, Month of November 1943.

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
(THRU) The Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO #3, U.S. Army.

Map Reference: Map of Italy, 1:50,000, G.S. G.S. 4229, Sheets No. 172
IV, 161 III, and 160 II.

1. During the entire period covered by this report the 751st Tank Battalion (M) was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division. - At the opening of the period, Company "C" was attached to the 15th Infantry Regiment and supporting them in an attack on the high ground West of PRESENZANO (H-063082). Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Company "A" were in bivouac at N-157978, Company "B" was in bivouac H-085003, and Service Company was at N-143965. Company "C" received artillery fire in its position in the vicinity of H-080068 during the night 1 - 2 Nov without any loss and the next morning reconnoitered for stream crossing and went into positions at H-087073. During the afternoon the first platoon, Company "C", moved to H-0405 to support 15th Infantry in an attack to Northwest, but upon reaching H-052054 was stopped by impassable terrain. On 3 Nov the Battalion, less Service Company and Company "C" moved to bivouac in the vicinity of H-070080 and Service Company moved to bivouac at H-086003. Engineers were employed to assist the advance of Company "C", and during the night 3 - 4 Nov, Battalion Reconnaissance was used as a screen for Company "C" to protect them from enemy patrols. Company "A" moved to relieve Company "C" on 4 Nov. Three (3) Company "C" tanks had advanced to H-002071. One (1) tank of Company "C" hit a mine on 4 Nov while attempting to cross a sunken road Northeast of H-016071. The platoon leader, 2D LT ALFRED BELANGER, was directing the tank from a dismounted post to its front and was severely wounded by the explosion. He died of these wounds on 12 Nov. Sgt. John M. Clark and Pvt. Richard J. Rojas were wounded less severely by the same explosion, Pvt Rojas remaining on duty. The tanks of Lt. Belanger's platoon, Company "C", which had succeeded in getting across the sunken road, gave excellent support to the infantry attack. Company "A" reached positions on 5 November from which it was able to cover main road in the vicinity of RJ (G-988078) to prevent its use by the enemy. During the night of 5 November, Company "A" withdrew to a reservicing area at G-995075 where it received artillery and mortar fire without loss. Company "B" moved to furnish artillery support for the advance of the 15th Infantry on 6 November and joined Company "A" in the vicinity of G-997097 that morning. On the afternoon of 6 November, Company "A" moved north about one-half mile and supported the attack of the 15th Infantry on the high ground to the west. Each of these tank actions were described by the infantry commander as "a good job". Two (2) men of Company "A", Sgt. Elwood W. Moore and Pvt. John O. Mc Cauley, were wounded by artillery fire in this action and hospitalized.

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CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
FROM READING COMMITTEE

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2. Company "B" received enemy artillery fire in its position at G-997097 on 7 November during which Tech. 5th Gr. Marion R. Sciance was killed, and Cpl. John L. Kosegi and Pvt. 1cl Shannon L. Gardner were wounded and hospitalized. On 8 November, Company "B" assisted in artillery preparation for an attack on Mt. ROTONDO (G-982138) from 0900A to 0915A and thereafter fired on identified targets of opportunity. One (1) platoon of Company "B" supported the infantry attack on the southeast slopes of Mt. ROTONDO engaging enemy machine gun positions during the afternoon. Company "B" was then ordered to send one (1) platoon to G-986138 and the remaining platoon to the vicinity of G-982130 to join the other platoon there. In this action No. 1 tank was destroyed by a charge which blew the turret off of the tank. The crew members, Staff Sgt. Joseph A. Falka, Sgt. Warren K. Haag, Cpl. Walter J. McGaff, Tech. 5th Gr. James R. Kendell, and Pvt. 1cl Delmar J. McCarty, were all reported killed by the explosion. These men were not the regular crew of this tank. One (1) other tank was hit by shrapnel on the 75 MM gun and evacuated.

3. Company "A" was forced by the rains to move to higher ground on 8 November. The Company was located in firing positions at G-996096. Two (2) tanks and the retriever of Company "A" were stuck in the mud. Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company area received enemy artillery fire from 2330 to 0100 on 8-9 November with only slight equipment damage. Company "C" was alerted and moved from its bivouac in the vicinity of H-070080 to the vicinity of G-990122. During this move one (1) tank of Company "C" hit a stack of mines, reported to be American, while attempting to turn around. The tank was destroyed by fire and one crew member, Pvt. Richard L. Reynolds, was injured. On the morning of 10 November Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved to bivouac area at H-017084. On the morning of 10 November, Company "B" was in bivouac at H-001102, Company "C" at G-990122, Company "A" (-3rd Platoon) at G-982095, and the 3rd Platoon, Company "A", was attempting to move north in the valley north of Company "A" area, but was held up by natural obstacles of terrain. On 10 November a foot reconnaissance was made of the pass east of Mt. ROTONDO, and engineers were informed of what was needed to make same passable for tanks. Company "C" received heavy artillery fire while in position at G-990122 and one (1) man was slightly wounded. The Battalion Command Post area was shelled on the morning of 11 November during which two (2) men were slightly wounded.

4. Company "A", less the 3rd Platoon, was in bivouac at G-994083, and the 3rd Platoon, attached to the 7th Infantry, was maneuvering to get in position at G-975112. Engineers worked continuously constructing tank routes across wadis and ravines. The remainder of Company "A" received intermittent artillery fire in its area at G-994083 wounding four enlisted men, two of whom were hospitalized. On the afternoon of 12 November, Company "A" (-3rd Platoon) received an artillery barrage in its area, causing them to move to G-994075. The 3rd Platoon, Company "A", after traversing considerable difficult terrain, gained its position at G-975112 on 13 November and fired on targets of opportunity on the nose of the high ground to the west. One (1) tank of this platoon hit a mine as it went into position and was disabled. Hard rains made it impossible to reach this platoon with vehicles and the platoon was not able to get out of the small valley in which it was located.

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5. On the afternoon of 11 November, Company "C" moved back to positions at H-~~000108~~. Company "B" kept one (1) platoon in firing and observing position at G-994124 on 12 and 13 November with the remainder of the Company in bivouac at H-~~001102~~ alerted for action. The Battalion Commanding Officer and Officers of Company "C" made a reconnaissance of the pass east of Mt. ROTONDO and found same passable for tanks, but difficult. On 14 and 15 November, Company "C" sent one (1) platoon each day to relieve the platoon of Company "B" at G-994124. During the four days on which these platoons were in position, no enemy movement was observed. Each night harrassing artillery fire was placed on ST. Pietro and the roads leading thereto.

6. On 15 November, orders were received relieving 751st Tank Battalion (M) from its present positions, and on 16 and 17 November, the battalion moved to bivouac at N-133960, east of RIARDO for rest, receipt of replacements, and training for the remainder of the period. The 3rd Platoon, Company "A", attached to 7th Infantry, was unable to leave its positions until 20 November on account of mud and soft ground caused by heavy rains.

Louis A. Hammack

LOUIS A. HAMMACK
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion (M)
Commanding


- 3 - Incl.
- 1 - Map, Italy, 1:50,000, G.S. G.S. No. 4229, Sheets 172 IV, 161 III, 160 II.
- 1 - Report of Casualties for Month of November, 1943.
- 1 - S-2, S-3 Journal for Month of November, 1943.

HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION (M)
APO #306, U. S. ARMY

1 December 1943

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion (M) from 1 November 1943 through 30 November 1943:

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA Hospitalized</u>	<u>WIA Not Hospitalized</u>
Headquarters Co.	0	0	0	0	2
Service Co.	0	0	0	0	0
Company "A"	0	0	0	4	3
Company "B"	6	0	0	2	0
Company "C"	0	1	0	2	2
BATTALION TOTAL	6	1	0	8	7


ALFRED A. JAMISON,
1st Lt. 751st Tank Battalion (M),
Unit Personnel Officer.

Encl #2

4

HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION (M)
APO #306, U. S. ARMY

1 December 1943

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion (M) from 1 November 1943 through 30 November 1943:

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Killed in Action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

Harkins, Charles P.	32068074	S/Sgt	11 November 1943
Zehnder, Gottlieb A. Jr.	35014796	Pvt 1cl	11 November 1943

SERVICE COMPANY

Killed in action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in action (Hospitalized)

None

Wounded in action (Not Hospitalized)

None

COMPANY "A"

Killed in Action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

McCauley, John O.	16152034	Pvt	6 November 1943
Moore, Elwood W.	35260176	Sgt	6 November 1943
Latuff, Michael J.	37095928	T/5	10 November 1943
Nelson, Glenmar L.	35021191	Cpl	12 November 1943

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion (M) from 1 November 1943 to 30 November
incl. (Cont'd).

COMPANY "A" (CONT'D)

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

Meisky, Richard D.	0410273	1st Lt	4 November 1943
Lerschen, Wilfred F.	37095518	Cpl	12 November 1943
Sandhope, Herman W.	32138683	Cpl	12 November 1943

COMPANY "B"

Killed in Action

Science, Marion R.	35031536	T/5	7 November 1943
Palka, Joseph A.	35021718	S/Sgt	9 November 1943
Haag, Warren K.	35155619	Sgt	9 November 1943
McGaff, Walter J.	35260185	Cpl	9 November 1943
Kendell, James R.	35260092	T/5	9 November 1943
McCarty, Delmer J.	35260121	Pvt lcl	9 November 1943

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

Kosegi, John L.	35021118	Cpl	7 November 1943
Gardner, Shannon L.	37101683	Pvt lcl	7 November 1943

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

None

COMPANY "C"

Killed in Action

None

Died of Wounds

Belanger, Alfred	01014913	2nd Lt	12 November 1943
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Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

Clark, John M.	7080231	Sgt	4 November 1943
Reynolds, Richard L.	14040280	Pvt	9 November 1943

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

Dudick, John P.	35014909	Cpl	10 November 1943
Rojas, Richard J.	19108022	Pvt	4 November 1943

HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #306
U. S. ARMY
Lieutenant General
John A. ...
4 January 1944
COMBAT 4 July 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of December, 1943.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.
(THRU) Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO #3, U. S. Army.

Map reference: Map ITALY: 1:25,000, Sheets 161 III N.W. & 161 IV S. W.
Map ITALY; 1:100,000, G.S. U.S. #4180, Sheets 161 and 172

370.2

1. General.

a. During the period 1 - 10 Dec the 751st Tk Bn ⁽¹⁾ was attached to 1st Tk Gp and sub-attached to 3d Inf. Div. and was engaged in resting and training while in bivouac in the vicinity of N-142967, East of RIARDO, ITALY.

b. Under provisions of General Orders Number 100, Hq. Fifth Army, dated 5 Dec 1943, the 751st Tank Battalion, Medium, was redesignated the 751st Tank Battalion and reorganized under T/O and E 17-25, dated 15 September 1943, with Changes No. 1, dated 2 October 1943. The period 10 - 21 Dec was allotted by Hq. Fifth Army for the completion of reorganization and training and was used for that purpose.

c. During the period 22 - 31 Dec the 751st Tank Bn was attached to VI Corps and 2nd Tank Gp. At 1700A on 22 Dec the battalion departed bivouac area east of RIARDO and closed in bivouac S.E. of POZZILLI (Bn C.P. at H-054223). at 2400A hours. This area was unsuitable for a tank battalion and needed for other purposes, and on 23 Dec. the battalion moved to bivouac areas as follows: Bn. Hq, Hq Co, and Serv. Co. at H-076222; Cos. "A" and "C" at H-078236; Co. "B" at H-073233; and Co. "D" at H-078229. On 24 Dec a Prov. Rifle Co. was organized in accordance with FO #2, this headquarters, dated 24 Dec, and moved to an assembly area at H-025201 prepared to effect the relief of the 3d Bn, 180th Inf. in its front line positions. Upon arrival in the assembly area the Prov. Co. was attached to 45th Inf. Div. The Assault Gun and Mortar Platoons moved into position at H-039181 and H-024205 respectively in support of Prov. Rifle Co. The remainder of the battalion remained in the bivouac areas occupied on 23 Dec for the remainder of this period.

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2. OPERATIONS OF THE PROV. RIFLE CO. (751ST TK BN) (ATTACHED 45TH INF. DIV.)

a. At 1200A on 25 Dec the Prov. Rifle Co. organized by the 751st Tk Bn began its march by infiltration to occupy the positions then held by the 3d Bn, 180th Inf. At 1600A hours on the same date all troops were in position and by

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Report of Action ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0800A on 26 Dec. all elements of the 3d Bn, 180th Inf. had been relieved. Co. "B", 84th Chem Bn. was attached to the Prov. Co., and Btry "A", 171 F.A. Bn, and Rcn. Co., 645th T.D. Bn were in support of the Prov. Co.

b. The mission of the Prov. Rifle Co. was to hold the high ground on which it was located, establish an OPL as indicated on the enclosed overlay, and conduct contact patrols to adjacent units and reconnaissance patrols to the front. One platoon of the Prov. Co., under 2D LT HOWARD C. SHAMBLIN, and a detachment from Bn. Rcn. Plat. under 2D LT. FRANCIS A. HERNANDES occupied the town of CONCACASALE (H-004215) from which point the reconnaissance patrols operated.

c. On 26 Dec. patrols captured one (1) prisoner near CONCACASALE at 0930A, and at 1330A a reconnaissance patrol encountered and captured a machine-gun nest at H-007215; two of the enemy crew were killed. At 1730A on the same day LT. HERNANDES and LT. SHAMBLIN were wounded by an S-mine near Hill 870 (G-997212) and evacuated to hospital.

d. On 27 Dec at about 1130A a two (2) man patrol from Prov. Co. was fired on by enemy rifleman near G-995230, and PVT WINEFIELD was wounded by enemy rifle fire. The other member of the patrol fought with sub-machine gun and grenades until he was forced to withdraw and abandon PVT. WINEFIELD. After several unsuccessful attempts by patrols to locate the wounded man, a patrol led by Staff Sergeant CHESTER P. GARRISON recovered PVT WINEFIELD, at about 0900A on 29 Dec, whereupon the wounded man was hospitalized.

e. Patrol activity was continued during the remainder of the period by the Prov. Co. All observed enemy movements and fires were located and reported to Hq, 45th Inf. Div. On 30 Dec a reconnaissance patrol captured one (1) prisoner at about 0700A.

3. COMMENTS.

a. The organization and employment of a Prov. Rifle Co. by a tank battalion is a most unusual mission requiring highly trained specialists to be employed on a mission for which they are not well trained or armed. Although the tactical situation probably required the organization and employment of a provisional rifle company by the 751st Tk. Bn., this source of troops to fight as infantry should not be used except in case of absolute necessity.

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Report of Action for Dec, Cont'd.

b. The supply of the Prov. Rifle Co. and its attached and supporting troops presented a complex problem. Supplies were delivered to a dump near the Company's rear C.P. by truck, where they were picked up by a pack train consisting of ten (10) mules. The pack train delivered the supplies as far forward as practical to a point near the forward C.P. of the Company. At this point carrying parties took over and delivered the supplies to the platoons. A total of about fifty (50) enlisted men were needed to operate this supply system.

Louis A. Hammack
LOUIS A. HAMMACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding

- 5 Incls.
- Incl #1-Unit Journal, 211200A-312400A Dec '43
- Incl #2-Battle Casualty Report, Month of Dec '43
- Incl #3-Map, Italy, 1:25,000, Sheets 161 III N.W. and 161 IV S.W.
(Enlarged from 1:50,000 Map, G.S. G.S. #4229)
- Incl #4-Map, Italy 1:100,000, G.S. G.S. #4180, Sheets 161 & 172.
- Incl #5-Unit Journal, Prov. Rifle Co. (751st Tk Bn), 24 - 31 Dec '43

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #306, U. S. ARMY

5 January 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 December 1943 through 31
December 1943:

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DCW</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u> <u>Hospitalized</u>	<u>WIA not</u> <u>Hospitalized</u>
Headquarters & Headquarters Co.	0	0	0	2	0
Service Co.	0	0	0	0	0
Company "A"	0	0	0	0	0
Company "B"	0	0	0	1	0
Company "C"	0	0	0	0	0
Company "D"	0	0	0	0	0
BATTALION TOTAL	0	0	0	3	0

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RESTRICTED

**HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #306, U. S. ARMY**

5 January 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 December 1943 through 31 December 1943:

HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Killed in Action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

Hernandes, Francis A.	01016506	2nd Lt	26 December 1943
Winefield, Harry A.	16145500	Private	27 December 1943

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

None

SERVICE COMPANY

Killed in Action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

None

COMPANY "A"

Killed in Action

None

Missing in Action

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)

None

RESTRICTED

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 December 1943 through 31 December 1943 (cont'd.).

COMPANY "B"

Killed in Action
None

Missing in Action
None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)
Shamblin, Howard C. 01013256 2nd Lt 26 December 1943

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)
None

COMPANY "C"

Killed in Action
None

Missing in Action
None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)
None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)
None

COMPANY "D"

Killed in Action
None

Missing in Action
None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized)
None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized)
None

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**DOWNGRADED TO:
CLASSIFICATION RESTORED**

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BY AUTHORITY OF TAG CWYB

HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO 7306
U. S. ARMY

DIV
314

13 Feb 46 HSJ
Date Initials

5 Feb 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for Month of January 1944.

TO: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington 25, D. C.
(INFO) Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO 33, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with AF 315-145, report of operations for 751st Tank Battalion is submitted for the month of January 1944.

2. Summary of Operations.

a. At the beginning of the month of January the 751st Tank Bn was attached to 2nd Tank Group, which was attached to VI Corps. The Provisional Rifle Company, which was organized on 24 Dec and relieved the 3d Bn, 180th Inf, in a defensive position west of YVES, ITALY, on 25 Dec, was still in the positions originally occupied and attached to the 180th Inf. The remainder of the battalion was in bivouac as follows: Bn. Hq, Hq. Co. and Serv. Co. at H-376222, Co. "A" and "C" at H-376236, Co. "B" at H-376233, and Co. "D" at H-376229.

b. During the period 1 - 3 Jan 1944 the Prov. Rifle Co. continued to conduct active patrolling in front of its positions, capturing three (3) prisoners on 1 Jan in the vicinity of CANTONIA (H-604215). On 3 Jan relief of the Prov. Co. was completed and they returned to battalion control.

c. At 0900 hours on 4 Jan the 751st Tank Bn was relieved from attachment to 2nd Tank Grp, and in compliance with orders from CG, VI Corps, moved to a bivouac area at H-145500, five (5) miles west of YVES, at 0930A, the same day and was attached to the 3d Infantry Division. Preparations were immediately begun for the landing on the BEVERLY beachhead. These operations consisted of a vigorous training program in which infantry-tank exercises were conducted, tanks were used for range practice by infantry AF Co's using sub-caliber mounts, and tank landings from LVT's were practiced. Details of the actual landing (Operation "Bible") were planned by a representative with the 3d Inf. Div. Planning Board at Hq. Fifth Army, and those vehicles scheduled for the landing were waterproofed.

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Rpt. of Action Against Enemy for Jan 1944, Cont'd.

d. On 19 and 20 Jan the one hundred and twenty (120) vehicles and drivers of this battalion which had been prepared for the operation were loaded on seven (7) LST's and six (6) LCT's, and on 20 Jan the remainder of the personnel for the operation were put aboard the ships carrying their vehicles. At about 0500A on 21 Jan the convoy departed on its way to the beach near NETTUNO, ITALY (F-880180).

e. H-Hour, D-Day was set at 0200A hours, 22 Jan. At 0210A Co. "A" of this battalion landed from three (3) LCT's, one platoon attached to each of the three (3) regimental combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division. Assistance was very light and the advance was made according to the plans of F. O. #1, Hq. 3d Inf. Div. Co. "B", Mortar Platoon, and elements of Bn. Reconnaissance, with attached medical personnel, landed from three (3) LCT's at 0700A hours on D-Day and proceeded to previously selected positions. Route and site reconnaissance was immediately initiated to the north and northwest. Shortly after noon the remainder of the battalion had completed an uneventful landing. The disposition of the battalion was as follows: Bn. C. P. - F-928183; Co. "A" - 1st Plat. attached 7th Inf., 2nd Plat. attached 15th Inf., 3d Plat. attached 10th Inf.; Co. "B" - F-928202; Co. "C" - F-911203; Co. "D" - F-911200; Assault Plat. - F-987189; Mortar Plat. - 986188. This battalion suffered no casualties on D-Day, 22 Jan.

f. During the period 22 - 25 Jan the battalion was used in close support of the infantry and assisted in securing control of bridges across the Mussolini Canal. On afternoon of 23 Jan the 3d Plat., Co. "A", attached to 15th Inf., supported an attack by one battalion of the 15th Inf. in the 0-0003 grid square and killed about fifteen (15) enemy infantrymen with MG and 75mm gun fire. On the morning of 24 Jan, the 3d Plat., Co. "C", attacked in support of the 50th Prcht. Regt. and regained control of Bridge #2 at 0-006184; 4 enemy captured and estimated more than fifty (50) enemy killed. On the afternoon of 24 Jan and on 25 Jan Co's. "B" and "C", attached to the 30th and 15th Inf. respectively, supported attacks by the 30th and 15th Inf. toward GI-TERRA DI LITTORIA (0-025385). These attacks were turned back by stubborn enemy resistance and our troops withdrew to a line along the MUSSOLINI CANAL. During the period 22 - 25 Jan Spt. John P. Dadiak was killed in action; 1st Lt. JAMES E. HECKMANN, 2d Lt. HOWARD N. HOPKINS, Cpl. Floyd G. Long, Cpl. Alfred Diamond, Tech. 5th Gr. Garrett T. Newman, Pvt. Richard J. Nejan, and Pvt. David Goldberg were wounded in action and evacuated; and Sgt. Albert S. Kavazos, Cpl. Kenneth F. Jones, Tech. 5th Gr. Harold E. Tappend, and Pvt. Louis F. Sulcher became missing in action. Six (6) medium tanks were lost due to enemy action.

Rep of Action Against Enemy for Jan 1944, Cont'd.

g. At 0930 on 26 Jan VOOI, 3d Inf. Div., were received ordering movement of this battalion, less Cos. "B" and "C" and two plat. of Co. "A" to bivouac vic. 972195 and attached 7th Inf. This move was in anticipation of a counterattack from the east across the MUSCOLINI CANAL, which did not materialize and on the afternoon of 27 Jan movement was made back to former positions with Co. P. at 7-92025. At noon of 26 Jan one platoon of Co. "D", attached 15th Inf., in position at 997269 engaged enemy infantry retreating to N. W. part their positions with M2 and N. E. fire. Houses occupied by the enemy were shot up and several casualties were inflicted. At 0700A hours on 27 Jan another platoon of Co. "D" had relieved the plat. at 997269 and they engaged three (3) enemy vehicles which broke through on the road to the east and were proceeding N. from R.J. 994260. One (1) enemy tank and one (1) half-track were hit and burned. The other vehicle got away. Co. "B", attached 30th Inf., had the 1st Plat. in position at 7-949236 covering a road block for Co. "L", 30th Inf., and it knocked out an enemy supply truck at 947298 and fired on suspected M3 or sniper nest at 945335. The 2nd Plat., Co. "B", in position at 980294 covered a road block for 1st Co, 30th Inf. The remainder of the Co. was in regimental reserve at 935234. On 27 Jan S/Sgt Luther Dale was wounded by enemy artillery and evacuated.

h. On 28 Jan the 3d Plat., Co. "D", att. 30th Inf., attacked on right flank of infantry along road north of Bridge #8 (992253) to about 000278, engaging enemy infantry in fanfolds, inflicting many casualties. Co. "B", attached 30th Inf., fired on houses reported by infantry to be enemy outposts at 952294, results not observed.

i. On the afternoon of 29 Jan orders were received for an attack on GISTERNA DI LITTORIA. Co. "D" remained attached to the 15th Inf., Co. "B", less two (2) platoons, and the 1st Plat., Co. "A", were attached to the 30th Front Inf. Regt. Co. "A", less the 1st Platoon, was in division reserve prepared to move at dawn to G-500000. The 1st Plat. of Co. "B" was attached to 15th Inf., and the remainder of the battalion was attached to the 7th Inf. and moved at 0600 hours, 30 Jan, arriving at the line of Departure at 0600A hours prepared to move out on order from GO, 7th Inf. The 3rd Plat., Co. "B" moved at 0730A to conduct the assault wave of 7th Inf., was held up at R.J. 974277, and was proceeding "back-country" N. W. of above R. J. On the morning of 30 Jan the 1st Plat., Co. "A", attached 50th Front. Regt., knocked out 3 anti-tanks, 7 vehicles, and assisted in capture of 60 PW's, and during the afternoon of the same day continued to support the attack, destroying a village and inflicting several casualties on enemy infantry. Co. "C", att. 15th Inf., knocked out an enemy O. P., destroyed communications to it, and captured one suspect, and furnished arty. support for the infantry advance with good effect.

Part of Action Against Bremer for Jan 19th, Cont'd.

j. On 21 Jan Co. "9" and 2nd Platoon, Co. "8", continued to support the attack of the 7th Inf., engaged enemy tanks at 007000 and cleared an houses occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of 903000. Co. "4" (-2nd Platoon) engaged enemy tanks in the vicinity of 020000, destroyed enemy motor transport and gas equipments. Three (3) of the enemy tanks, two (2) ammo. trucks, and one (1) 20mm gun were destroyed by the 2nd Platoon of Co. "9" and Co. "4" (-2nd Platoon). The 3d Platoon, Co. "9", in support of the Rangers, overran an enemy platoon post near P-987267 and flushed approximately one hundred (100) PW's which were captured by the Rangers. Co. "9", attached 15th Inf., drew heavy artillery fire on 21 Jan. Cpl. Harry O. Bennett and Cpl. Bernard J. Slater were killed in action; Sgt. A. O. Jones, Sgt. Robert E. Emdale, Techn 1st gr J. D. Sealy, Cpl. Howard W. Nelson, and Cpl. William K. Lang, Jr. were wounded in action. On 20 and 21 Jan Sgt. Elmer H. Taylor and 2D Lt. EYING LITTLE of Co. "4" were wounded in action by sniper's bullets. On 21 Jan Pvt. Donald E. Westerland became missing in action. On 20 Jan 2D Lt. FRANKLIN O. ROBERTSON was wounded in action while on a hostile reconnaissance in the 7th Inf. sector and evacuated. 1st Lt. FREDIE E. PIPP was wounded in action and evacuated on 21 Jan while leading a route reconnaissance, dismounted, after the enemy had blown a bridge supporting the railroad viaduct by P-987100 to his platoon approached it in three attempts ahead of the 1st Bn, 7th Inf. Techn 5th gr George E. Hefesham, Cpl. "9" was wounded in action on 21 Jan and evacuated.

3. Situation at end of Period.

a. At the end of the month of January 19th the 751st Tank Bn was in support of the 3d Inf. Div. (Reinf.) on the HERTON beachhead. Co. "1", 1stst Bn Platoon, was in 1st Bn, Rangers, Co. "9", plus 3d Platoon, Co. "9" was attached to 1stst Bn, Co. "9", 1stst 2 Platoons, and 1st Platoon, Co. "4" were attached to 1stst Bn. Regt., and the remainder of the battalion was attached to the 7th Inf.

h. Status of Personnel and Material.

a. Personnel.

(1) The replacement of properly trained personnel was not effected as promptly as the replacement of lost tanks, which caused this battalion to have six (6) tanks without crews at the end of the period.

Report of Action Against Enemy for Jan 1944, Cont'd.

b. Material.

(1) Tank Status.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Being Repaired</u>	<u>Lost to Date</u>
Med. Tks	90	4	23
Light Tks	17	0	0

(2) Vehicles not yet arrived from Naples Area:

3 - Trucks, 2 1/2 ton Cargo, 6 x 6
1 - Car, 3/4 ton, 6 x 4, 4 x 4
1 - Truck, 1/2 ton, 4 x 4

(3) Vehicles authorized but not assigned:

1 - Truck 1/2 ton, 4 x 4
1 - Truck, 2 1/2 ton Cargo, 6 x 6

5. Comments and Lessons Learned.

a. The light and medium tanks operating in conjunction with each other proved to be a very effective team over this terrain since the light tanks could maneuver over some of the ground that would not support medium tanks and made them road bound.

b. This operation has proved that proper infantry-tank cooperation cannot be obtained without continuous communication by radio between the infantry and tank commanders. The SCR 509 at the Infantry C. P. has proved satisfactory.

c. Tanks, even of platoon strength, should not be attached to units lower than the Inf. Co. due to the fact that the commanders below the Inf. Co. are inexperienced in handling armor and also that they cannot communicate with the tanks properly. However, visual signals should be arranged between the infantry company and platoon commanders and the tank commanders.

d. In terrain where it is impossible for tanks to leave the road they should follow the infantry. This is due to their vulnerability to anti-tank guns when the tanks are unable to maneuver.

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List of Actions Against Enemy, 1st Jan 1944, Cont'd.

LOUIS A. HARGACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding.

1 Encls.

Encl #1-Map Italy, 1:50,000 G.S. G.S. 1229, Sheets 198 I, II, III, IV
and 1:100,000, G.S. G.S. #4280, Sheet #184

Encl #2-Unit Journal, January, 1944

Encl #3-Battle Casualty Report, January, 1944

Encl #4-Unit Journal, Prev. Rifle Co, 1-2 Jan 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #306
U. S. ARMY

7 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of February 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, #25, D. C.
(Thru) Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, APO #3, U.S. Army.

1. In compliance with AR 345-105, report of operations of the 751st Tank Battalion is submitted for the month of February 1944.

2. Summary of Operations.

a. At the beginning of the month of February the 751st Tank Battalion was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinf) on the Nettuno beachhead and was disposed as follows: Bn. C.P. - F957282; Co. "A" (-1 Flat.) in Division Reserve at F998275; 1st Flat. Co. "A" (Att. 50th Preht Regt) at G030272; Co. "B" (Att. 7th Inf) C.P. F963294 1st Flat. at F989238; 2nd Flat. at F999304; 3rd Flat. at F997312; Co. "C" (Att. 15th Inf) C.P. at 989238; 1st Flat. at F991252; 2nd Flat. at F992207; 3rd Flat. at G037284 and G022278; Co. "D" C.P. and 1st Flat. at G040258; 2nd Flat. at F999304; 3rd Flat. at G014260 (Att. 15th Inf.); Service Co. and trains at F928184.

b. On 1 Feb. Co. "B" and 2nd Platoon Co. "D" supported the advance of the 7th Infantry and engaged enemy tanks at G007318 and fired on houses occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of F983326. During this advance 3 enemy tanks, 2 ammunition trucks and 1 20MM gun were destroyed. At about 0900A, 1 Feb., 2D LT. YARBOURGH was killed in action by enemy sniper. 1st Flat., Co. "A" engaged enemy tanks in the vicinity of G020296 and destroyed an enemy M/T and several enemy gun emplacements. The 3rd Flat., Co. "D" overran enemy infantry pockets of resistance in support of the 4th Rangers Battalion flushing approximately 100 enemy that were captured by the Rangers and killed many of the enemy infantry in the vicinity of F987287. At 1800, 1 Feb. Battalion C.P. moved to new location at F988237. On 2 Feb. 1st Flat., Co. "A", supported the 50th Preht. and destroyed two enemy O.P.'s. and an undetermined no. of enemy infantry at G048263 and F035282. 3rd Flat., Co. "A", and 1st Flat. Co. "B" effectively broke up counterattack and mopped up enemy infantry in front of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Inf. and 97 PW's taken. Location of units of the battalion at 1200A, 3 Feb. was as shown in Annex #1.

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c. On 5 Feb. the Assault Plat. moved into position in support of 39th F.A. Battalion and the remainder of the battalion less detachments assembled in Division Reserve, as shown Annex #2, prepared to counterattack to the N., NE or E in that priority on Division order. At 051900A the 2nd Plat., Co. "D" moved to vicinity F984293 and contacted the CO, Co. "K", 30th Infantry for operations and made plans to counterattack upon receipt of orders. At 052200 3rd Plat., Co. "B", withdrew to positions near RJ at F997297 because the infantry withdrew and did not give the Platoon leader instructions. They were immediately ordered to return to former position near PONTE ROETTO (Vicinity F998313). On the night of 5-6 Feb., the 3rd Plat., Co. "A" and 1st Plat., Co. "B" moved to the vicinity of F988316 and took up a defensive mission. LT. ROBERT C. MCLONEY was wounded in action and hospitalized. At 061415A, VOCC, 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Plat., Co. "A" from Division Reserve moved to vicinity of F914290 attached to 509th Prcht. Battalion. 3rd Plat., Co. "A" attached to 30th Infantry and moving into position along road North of RJ F981297. The Mortar Plat. supporting Co. "D" fired on enemy installations from position at G043267 with observed good effect. On the night of 6 Feb. the 1st Plat., Co. "B" attached to 30th Infantry was given the mission of occupying a defensive position in the infantry front line in the vicinity of F983325. Two tanks of this platoon were knocked out by enemy anti-tank fire in the vicinity of F977317. Pfc Samuel P. Chiacchio is missing in action and Sgt. Howard J. Fogle and T/4 Howard L. Wade were wounded in action and hospitalized. 1st Plat., Co. "A" and 1st Plat., Co. "D" supported the 504th Prcht. in repelling enemy counterattack vicinity of G045262 at 2230A night of 7 Feb. On 8 Feb. the 3rd Plat., Co. "A" and 2nd Plat., Co. "B" supported elements of the 15th and 30th Infantry in a limited attack on PONTE ROETTO and the Mortar Plat. fired on enemy targets East of Canal Mussolini, from their position at G043267, relieving fire of snipers active against 504th Prcht. and also destroyed two enemy mortar positions to the North East.

d. On 9 Feb., VOCC, Co. "D", 191st Tk Bn. was attached to the Battalion and moved to vicinity of CONCA and was placed in Division Reserve. At 101325A, VOCC, 3rd Infantry Division, ordered Battalion to post one (1) light tank at each of the following bridges at dark, night of the 10th, and each night thereafter: Bridge #6 (G011240) #8 (F991253), #9 (F982253), #12 (F951278), #13 (941279). Tanks to act as Bridge Guard. At 151530A Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion was relieved as Bridge Guard, replaced by medium tanks from this Battalion. On the morning of 16 Feb. enemy attack in the vicinity of F980324 with armor. This attack was met by the 1st Plat., Co. "B"

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and 3rd Plat., Co. "A", and was stopped with five (5) enemy tanks and one (1) Half-track knocked out. One tank of 1st Plat., Co. "B", was hit and knocked out by A.P. shot. 2nd Plat., Co. "D" supported Co. "C", 7th Infantry in a counterattack to restore position in vicinity of F982313. Many enemy infantry were killed. The 3rd Plat., Co. "C" knocked out an enemy Half-track near house at 0025283 from their defensive position on 161600A.

e. At 0030A on the 18th Feb. received Operations Instructions No. 5 which directed that necessary plans and reconnaissance be completed at once to adjust our defense to positions to be known as "King Position". Immediate action was taken to prepare for the occupation of the "King Position". To assume "King Position" 2nd Plat., Co. "D" withdrew to positions vicinity F951280; 1st Sect., 3rd Plat., Co. "B", withdrew to positions vicinity F961293; 2nd Sect., 3rd Plat., Co. "A", takes up positions vicinity F965294; 1st Plat., Co. "B" takes up positions along bank running West from RJ at F980298; 1st Plat., Co. "A", takes up positions by houses astride road running West from G030248; 1st Plat., Co. "D", takes up positions by houses astride road running North from G032248; remainder of Battalion to remain in present positions. (Annex #3).

f. On 191300A received Operations Instructions #6, 3rd Infantry Division which directed that necessary plans and reconnaissance for the adjustment of defenses to positions to be known as "Queen Position" be completed by 20 Feb. Plans and reconnaissance of positions for effecting "Queen Position" were immediately completed and coordinated by units with regiments to which attached. "Queen Position" is shown in Annex #4.

g. On 19 Feb., 3rd Platoon, Co. "B", engaged enemy tanks from defensive position vicinity of F964315. Two of our tanks were knocked out by enemy A.P. shot. Sgt. George A. Pierce was killed in action. Cpl. John L. Wallen, Pfc Rodney M. Rosenkranz and Pvt. Louis E. Nedelsky were wounded in action and hospitalized. 2nd Plat., Co. "A", was attached to the 509th Prcht. on 19 Feb. and closed in night position vicinity of F9430 at 1900A. The night of 23-24 Feb., two tanks of 3rd Plat., Co. "A" (Att. to 509th Prcht.) moved into dug-in positions on the Northwest side of GARAND (F938313 and F938314) so as to have a good field of fire to the Northwest, West, and Southwest. At 261500A, VCOG ordered knocked out tanks to be placed along roads at the following points: F940281; F954280; F964271; F971260; F980262; F994259 and G017250. In the event of a withdrawal these vehicles

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will be pulled across the road and set on fire. This order was accomplished on the night of 26-27 Feb. At 0800A on 29 Feb., 2nd Flat., Co. "D", moved into position in the vicinity of F944303 to support the 509 Prcht. The 2nd Flat., Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion (Att. to 751st Tank Battalion) in Division Reserve moved to position vicinity of F961294 and was attached to the 7th Infantry. At the close of the period the enemy had launched an attack with armor along road running South from CISTERNA against our positions vicinity of G008293 and along road running Southwest in the vicinity of PONTE ROTTO (F998314). One tank was knocked out vicinity F986304 by A.P. shot from Mark VI enemy tank. One tank knocked out vicinity of G006293, hit by A.P. shot from enemy tank. T/5 Alvin G. Probasco was killed in action, Sgt. Adam J. Stenger and Pvt. William R. Wirsig are missing in action. 2D LT. DORRIS L. HOGA, St. Sgt. James J. Teichman, Cpl. Leo J. Frits, Pfc Shamon L. Gardner and Pvt. Edgar F. Frederick were wounded in action and hospitalized. On 29 Feb., tank of the 3rd Flat., Co. "A" in a defensive position at CARANO, knocked out two enemy Mark IV tanks and one enemy Mark III tank in the vicinity of F935311. During the period 5-29 Feb. the Battalion maintained prescribed defensive positions in the Division Sector and the Assault Flat. fired in support of the 39th F.A. Battalion.

3. Situation at end of period.

a. At the end of the month of February 1944 the 751st Tank Battalion (Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion attached) was in support of the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinf.) on the Nettuno Beachhead. Co. "B", less 2nd Plat. and plus 2nd Plat., Co. "A", 2nd Plat., Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion was attached to the 7th Infantry, Co. "C" plus 2nd Plat., Co. "B" and 1st Plat., Co. "D" was attached to the 15th Infantry, Co. "D" less 1st and 2nd Platoons plus 1st Plat., Co. "A" and Mortar Platoon was attached to the 504th Prcht. Regt., 3rd Flat., Co. "A" and 2nd Plat. Co. "D" were attached to the 509th Prcht. Battalion, and the remainder of the Battalion was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinf.).

4. Status of Personnel and Material.

a. Personnel.

(1) The loss of experienced men through sickness and result of wounds received in action and the receipt of untrained and unqualified replacements has caused the Battalion to be very short on qualified men notably Tank Commanders and Platoon Leaders.

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There were three officers and twelve enlisted men transferred from this Battalion for Rotation to the United States. We have received as replacements for this rotated personnel, two (2) officers replacements, both of which were officers without any previous Armored Command training or experience and six (6) enlisted replacements two of which had previous Armored Command experience and four (4) without Armored Command experience.

b. Material.

(1) Tank Status.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Runners</u>	<u>Being Repaired</u>	<u>Lost to Date</u>
Medium Tanks	43	5	29
Light Tanks	17	0	0
Light Tanks (Att. fr 191st Tank Bn.)	18	0	0

(2) Vehicles not yet arrived from Naples Area.

- 2 Trucks, 2½-ton cargo, 6x6
- 1 Car, 3/4-ton, C & R, 4x4
- 1 Truck, ½-ton, 4x4

(3) Vehicles authorized but not assigned.

- 2 Trucks, ½-ton, 4x4
- 1 Truck, 2½-ton cargo, 6x6

5. Comments and Lessons Learned.

a. On the defense, tanks should not be used in the outpost line, but should be held in a position where the tanks can maneuver and be committed at the point needed in mass formation.

b. Tanks should not be employed in defensive positions solely as anti-tank guns.

c. The tanks must have infantry protection at all times when occupying defensive positions.

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Louis A. Hammack

LOUIS A. HAMMACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding.

4 Incls.

- #1 - Map Italy, 1:50,000, G.S.G.S. 4229, Sheets 158 I, II, III and IV.
- #2 - Annex I, II, III, IV.
- #3 - Unit Journal, February 1944.
- #4 - Battle Casualty Report, February 1944.

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #306
U. S. ARMY

5 April 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of March 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington #25, D. C.
(Thru) Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO #3, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with AR 345-105, report of operations of the 751st Tank Battalion is submitted for the month of March 1944.

2. Summary of Operations.

a. At the beginning of the month of March the 751st Tank Battalion (Company "D", 191st Tank Battalion attached) was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinf) on the NETTUNO beachhead and was disposed as follows: Bn C. P. at F-988237; Co. "A" C. P. at F-988247, 1st Platoon (att. to Co. "D") at G029262, 2nd Platoon (att. to Co. "B"), 1st section at F975298, 2nd section at F984300, 3rd Platoon, (att. to 509th Prcht.), 1st section at F941286, 2nd section at F939311; Co. "B" (att. to 7th Inf.) C. P. at F960283, 1st Platoon - 1st section at F981296, 2nd section at F961278, 2nd Platoon (att. to Co. "C") at G005293, 3rd Platoon at F961312; Co. "C" (att. to 15th Inf.) C. P. at F999257, 1st Platoon at F996297, 2nd Platoon at G028279, 3rd Platoon (Division reserve) at F985235; Co. "D" (att. to 504th Prcht. Regt.) C. P. at G011230, 1st Platoon (att. to Co. "C") at G013263, 2nd Platoon, (att. to 509th Prcht. Bn.) at F944303, 3rd Platoon - 1st section at G041254, 2nd section at G032248; Assault Platoon at F981246, Mortar Platoon (att. to Co. "D") at G020246; Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion C. P. at F974232, 1st Platoon, Division Anti-Prcht. guard at F995247, 2nd Platoon, (att. Co. "B") at F961293, 3rd Platoon at 974233; Service Co. and trains at F928184.

b. At the beginning of the period the attempt of the enemy to push armor into our positions in the vic. of Isola Bella and Ponte Rotto had been stopped. At 0430A the morning of 2 March the 1st section, 2nd Platoon, Co. "B", was given the mission of supporting an infantry combat patrol in taking house at G010293. The tanks advanced North from F009288 on unimproved road to a point about 400 yards from the objective, received direct heavy anti-tank fire and withdrew to daytime position at G000275. On the afternoon of 2 March at 1530A the 1st Platoon of Co. "A" from positions in the vic. of G038272, with the right flank covered by smoke screens, fired on enemy occupied house astride

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Cisterna di Littoria-Borgo Piave highway between G037275 and G032295, road running Southeast to Northwest from G047279 to G043285, and road running Southeast to Northwest from G052275 to G050280. Many enemy infantry were flushed from the houses and several were killed. A Volkswagon was knocked out in the vicinity of G037281 and a Flak Wagon or half track was knocked out in the vicinity of G033296. On the afternoon of 3 March, 2nd Plat., Co. "A" fired in support of "L" Co., 7th Infantry in the vicinity of F994314. The 3rd Plat. fired on houses in the vicinity of F964315, that the enemy was using as OP's. The 2nd Plat., Co. "B" fired on groups of enemy infantry in the vicinity of G0031. On 042350A, a tank of 1st Plat., Co. "B" was knocked out and burned while in defensive position vicinity of F987314. 1ST LT. ALLEN M. HOBBS, Cpl. Columbus M. Bell, were WIA and hospitalized. Sgt. Everett L. Daniels was WIA but was not hospitalized. During the period 1 - 10 March the defensive positions occupied by the 1st Plat., Co. "C" received intermittent enemy artillery concentrations. The Bn. remained in prescribed defensive positions as shown in Annex #1, and the Assault Plat. fired in support of the 39 FA Bn.

c. On 10 March 1944, 2nd Plat., Co. "D", 191st Tank Battalion was relieved of Division Anti-Parachute Guard by the 2nd Plat., Co. "D", 751st Tank Battalion. The relief was completed at 2200A. The Platoon Leader's tank at F960244 and the remainder of the platoon at F9649239. 102400A March, Co. "D", 191st Tank Bn. relieved from attached. The afternoon of 11 March the 2nd Plat., Co. "B", fired on enemy occupied house in the vicinity of G000314 with effect unobserved. At 1520A, 12 March, the 3rd Plat., Co "B", fired indirect fire on enemy occupied houses in the vicinity of F972322. An ammunition dump was set on fire and a self propelled gun probably hit. The following morning at 0830A the 3rd Plat., Co. "B", knocked out an enemy mortar position in the vicinity of F9732. On 13 March at 0045 A received Field Order #7, Headquarters, 3rd Inf. Div. Necessary plans were completed for compliance with contents of the above field order. At 0400A, 15 March, two tanks of 3rd Plat., Co. "A", moved into position with one tank at House #2 (F935313) and the second tank at House #3 (F933316) to support attack by the 30th Inf. and 509th Prcht. Bn. The Mortar Plat. moved two mortars into position at G029235. During the afternoon of 15 March the 3rd Plat., Co. "B", fired indirect fire on mortar position, enemy infantry and probable OP in the vicinity of F970330. At 0630A, 16 March, the Plat. Leader of 3rd Plat., Co. "A" moved his tank from position at House #3 up road to the Northwest to fire on enemy occupied houses. The tank hit a mine at F930317 and was disabled. At 0400A, 17 March, one tank of 3rd Plat., Co. "A", moved up Northwest road from Carano to disabled tank at F930317 and fired on houses #7 (F925319) and #8 (F924322) firing 60 rds, and as the tank was returning to Carano, it hit mines at F935314, both tracks were broken and the tank disabled.

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d. During the period 16 - 25 March the Bn. continued to occupy pre-scribed defensive positions as shown in Annex #2. The assault platoon fired in support of the 39th F.A. The mortar platoon fired harassing fire on enemy targets in the vicinity of Sessano. The 3rd Plat., Co. "A", was relieved by a platoon, 191st Tank Bn. and closed in new area vic. G012220 at 250030A March. At 0630A and during the afternoon of 25 March, a tank in defensive position at G015294 received enemy artillery concentration and some direct anti-tank fire, was knocked out by a AP shot penetrating the left final drive. At 0900A, 28 March, the 34th Infantry Division relieved the 3rd Infantry Division and assumed command in this sector. The Bn. remained in position and was attached to 34th Inf. Div.

3. Situation at end of Period.

The situation at the end of the period was very stable. The Battalion was disposed as follows: Bn. C. P. at F988237; Headquarters Co. C. P. at F933221; Assault Plat. at F981246 (supp. 39th FA); Mortar Plat. at F977234; Co. "A" C. P. at F988247 (att. to 133d Inf.); 1st, 2nd and 3rd Plat. at F972219; Co. "B" C. P. at F960283 (att. to 135th Inf); 1st Plat. at F983300, F948292, and F990279; 2nd Plat. at F962277; 3rd Plat. at F964268; Co. "C" C. P. at F999257 (att. to 168th Inf.); 1st Plat. at F998267; 2nd Plat. at G029262 and G031258; 3rd Plat. at G016262; Co. "D" C. P. at G011230; 1st Plat., at F995262 (att. to Co. "C", 751st Tk Bn); 2nd Plat. at F970270 (att. to Co. "B", 751st Tk Bn); 3rd Plat. at G020245 (att. to Co. "C", 751st Tk Bn); Service Co. and trains at F928184.

4. Status of Personnel and Material.

a. Personnel.

(1) During the first two weeks of March 1944 the morale and health of this Battalion declined. This was chiefly caused by the accumulative effect of the crews having to stay in the tank for long periods of time. The tanks were placed in front line defensive positions for over a month and were subjected to continual artillery and small arms fire thus making it impossible for the crews to get out or stay out of the tank any appreciable length of time. However, with the extension of a quota at the 3rd Inf. Div. Rest Center and the removal of the tanks from positions in the front lines to positions where the men are more free to move around and rest has greatly improved this situation

(2) The grade of enlisted replacements received had been superior to those received in previous months. Adequate officer replacements have been received.

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b. Material.

(1) Tank Status.

Type	Runners	Being Repaired	Lost to Date
Medium Tanks	53	1	32
Light Tanks	17	0	0

(2) Vehicles not yet arrived from Naples Area.

- 1 Truck - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton
- 1 Car - C & R
- 1 Truck - $\frac{1}{4}$ 4 x 4

(3) Vehicles Authorized but not assigned.

- 2 Trucks - $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton 4 x 4
- 2 Truck - 2-Ton Cargo 6 x 6

5. Comments and Lessons Learned.

a. Under the present T.O. & E. under which this Bn. is operating, each crew member of the tank crew is armed with a Thompson Sub-machine gun. The crowded condition of the crew compartment is further aggravated by the five Thompson Sub-machine guns and when the crew has to abandon tank they generally do not have time to get their weapons. It is recommended that the Tank Commander be armed with the sub-machine gun and the other members of the tank crew be armed with the pistol or not armed at all.

b. There is definite need for the very close cooperation between the infantry unit commander and the tank unit commander regardless of the size of the unit. The two commanders must immediately acquaint each other with the situation, disposition of our troops and of enemy troops and installations, and make concrete plans for all probable courses of action. They must continually keep each other informed and work as a team.

c. The following notes on the employment of small groups of tanks with infantry ~~are~~ presented:

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(1) When used in small groups a great deal of planning between the infantry and tank commander is necessary. The tank commander must know your plans, give him all the information you have about the enemy as well as your own troops. Ask the tank commander for his ideas before issuing orders. Give him all the support you can with your mortars and assault guns by firing on known and suspected anti-tank guns. Never employ a tank alone, use as much mass as possible, and always protect the tanks with infantry. Use prearrange visual signals, during the attack, so the tank commander will know where you want his fire. Work together as a team.

(2) Tanks must have maintenance and be reserviced. Do not hold your tanks on the objective any longer than is necessary for you to get organized. HMG's and anti-tank guns must secure the objective soon after the assault troops have reached it to provide security ~~for~~ the infantry and tank reorganization.

(3) Use your artillery to assist the tanks in reaching their objective and to deny approaches to your position when the objective is taken.

(4) When the ground is unsuitable for tank employment and tanks are road bound or when the enemy has extensive minefields and strong anti-tank defenses the infantry should precede the tanks. Engineer troops with suitable equipment are often necessary to assist the advance of the tanks.

(5) In the defense do not put your tanks in the front line where they have no defilade and where they cannot move. A well-dug-in and well camouflaged anti-tank gun will serve the purpose better and you will have your tanks to counter-attack when you need them.

Louis A. Hammack

LOUIS A. HAMMACK,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding

4 Incls.

Incl #1 -Map Italy 1:50,000 G.S. G.S. 4229, Sheets 158 I, II, III & IV. 1:25,000
G.S. G.S. 4228, Sheets 158 I, II, III & IV. NE, NW, SE & SW

Incl #2-Annex I, II.

Incl #3-Unit Journal March 1944

Incl #4-Battle Casualty Report - March 1944.

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

1 May 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of April.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C., U. S. Army
(THRU) Commanding General, 34th Infantry Division, APO #34, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, as changed by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of April is submitted:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
Summary of Our Operations
I - 30 April 1944

1. Note:

This period opened with the 751st Tank Battalion still in the line in close support of the infantry after 70 consecutive days in action on the Anzio Beachhead. When the Third Infantry Division was relieved by the 34th Infantry Division on 28 March, the 751st Tank Battalion remained in place and passed to the tactical control of the 34th, and operated with the 34th throughout the month. In general, the 34th used the tanks in reserve roles, for harassing and interdiction direct fire missions and, during the latter part of the period, for tank-infantry raids on enemy outposts. The assault platoon, with line company assault guns attached to make a total of six guns, continued to operate effectively with the 39th F. A. It fired a total of 54 missions, 1579 rounds.

2. Daily Summary:

Noon 31 March to noon 1 April - Component units disposed as follows: Mortar platoon 977234; Assault platoon 981246, supporting 39th F. A; Co "A" (CP 988247) 1st, 2nd, 3rd Plts. at 972219 in support of 133rd Inf. Regt., 34th Division; Co. "B", with 2nd Plt. Co. "D" attached, supporting 135th Inf. Regt. (Co. CP 960283, 1st Plt. at 983300, 948292, and 990279, 2nd Plt. 962277, 3rd Plt. 964268, 2nd Plt. Co. "D" 970270; Co. "C", with 1st and 3rd plts. Co. "D" attached, supporting 168th Inf. Regt., Co. CP 999257, 1st Plt. 998267, 2nd Plt. 029262 and 031258, 3rd Plt. 016262, 1st Plt. Co. "D" 995262, 3rd Plt. Co. "D" 020245. Headquarters tanks used as bridge guards at 014240, 951277, 941278. Missions of companies supporting infantry regts. to give close direct support to infantry and to provide counterattacking force in case of enemy breakthrough.



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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April), Cont'd.

Noon 1 April to noon 3 April - No change in disposition or mission.
No action.

Noon 3 April to noon 4 April - One tank Co. "B" fired 82 rds. H. E. from position 964294 on house "Y" at 983315 between 1930 and 2000A hrs, results satisfactory. Co. "B" fired 4 rds. H. E. vic. 000330, results unobserved.

Noon 4 April to noon 5 April - Two tanks Co. "B" fired on houses 4 and 5 vic. 998303, 55 rds. good effect.

Noon 5 April to noon 6 April - Assault Plt. fired 46 rds. H. E., 2 WP. Two tanks Co. "B" fired 75 rds fr vic. 980296 on house 5 vic. 998303, very good effect; on house Y vic. 982312, 55 rds., very good effect.

Noon 6 April to noon 7 April - Two tanks Co. "B" fr 972291 fired 92 rds. on target 009318, 47 rds. on target 978319, observed fire at second target.

Noon 7 April to noon 8 April - One tank Co. "B" fired fr position 977296 on targets vicinity La Villa, 28 rds. H.E., started fire vic. 1945. One tank Co. "B" fr. 972291 fired 42 rds. H.E., 6 rds. AP on target vic. 978319, results unobserved because of enemy smoke.

Noon 8 April to noon 9 April - Assault platoon fired 36 rds. H.E. One tank Co. "B" at 967294 fired 6 rds. H.E. on house, results unobserved. One tank Co. "B" at 963291 fired on target vic. 968348, 2 rds. H.E., 10 rds. AP; from same pos. fired 52 rds. on gun position and house, scored 9 direct hits; one tank Co. "B" fired 25 rds. H.E. vic. 968348. One tank Co. "B" fired at tower North of RR vic. 962362, 20 rds. One tank Co "B" at 967294 fired 6 rds. H.E. at house, effect unobserved.

Noon 9 April to noon 10 April - Two tanks Co. "B" fr pos. 978292 fired 25 rds. AP in support of inf. patrol, effect unobserved. Assault platoon fired 26 rds. H.E.

Noon 10 April to noon 11 April - Assault plt. fired 109 H.E., 2 WP. One tank Co. "B" positions 972293 to 98336 fired 4 AP, 29 H.E. on house, observed dust around target. One tank Co. "B" from 972293 fired on gun position vic. 998335, 3 AP, 21 HE, unobserved after 2nd round because of en. smoke.

Noon 11 April to noon 12 April - Assault platoon fired 2 c/b missions, 42 rds. HE. 1st Platoon Co. "C" moved from 998267 to 998260.

Noon 12 April to noon 13 April - Assault platoon fired 4 c/b missions, 78 HE. Tanks "B" Co. fired 68 rds. vic. 996313, 58 HE, 3 AP, 7 WP. One tank Co. "B" fr. 980295 fired on houses vic. 995312, 80 rds., results satisfactory.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April), Cont'd.

Noon 13 April to noon 14 April - Assault plt. fired 6 missions, 136 rds. 133rd Inf. Regt. completed relief of 168th Inf. Regt. Co. "C" 751st Tank Bn, with 1st and 3rd Plts. Co. "D" remained in place, passed to control of 133rd. Co. "A" relieved Co. "B" in place. Co. "B" to div. reserve, attached 168th Inf. Regt.

Noon 14 April to noon 15 April - Assault platoon fired 3 c/b missions, 60 rds. HE. One tank Co. "A" fired 28 HE, 5 AP at house 992342, 15 hits. Co. "C" CP moved to 005255. 2nd Platoon Co. "D" moved to 970267, attached to Co. "A".

Noon 15 April to noon 16 April - Assault platoon fired 2 c/b missions and one mission on Cisterna di Littoria, 43 rds. HE. One tank Co. "A" fired fr. 966292 on trenches at 968320, 7 Smoke, 50 HE, 25 AP. 30 hits. Rear echelon Co. "A" moved to new location at 958240.

Noon 16 April to noon 17 April - Assault platoon fired 4 c/b missions, 74 HE. One tank Co. "A" fired from 966292 on trenches at 968320, 35 rounds at 161630 and 60 rounds interdictory on same target from 2400 to 0430B.

Noon 17 April to noon 18 April - Assault platoon fired 2 c/b missions, 1 mission on mortar pos., 1 mission harassing, total 189 HE.

Noon 18 April to noon 19 April - No action to report. 1st Plt. Co. "A" moved to 979266, 2nd Plt. Co. "D" moved to 970267.

Noon 19 April to noon 20 April - Two tanks Co. "A" fired from pos. 972284 at target 970324, 6 rds. 1 hit. Received counter-battery fire, 30 rds. 150 mm. Mortar plt. moved to 977218.

Noon 20 April to noon 21 April - Assault platoon fired 2 missions, 24 rds.

Noon 21 April to noon 22 April - Assault platoon fired 2 missions c/b, 48 rds. Company "B" moved into position for attack on houses at 036282 and 032284 in conjunction with 3rd Bn, 168th Inf. Regt. 1st Platoon 018274, 2nd - 023273, 3rd - 029268. At 220500B, one section 3rd platoon moved to 036275, where one tank hit mine, blocking road. Mission was to destroy houses in vic. 036282. At 220600B, one tank 2nd platoon moved to 030283 and fired 48 rds. HE at house 032284, destroyed house and returned to original pos.

Report of Action Against the Enemy (April), Cont'd.

Noon 22 April to noon 23 April - Assault platoon fired 1 c/b, 1 registration mission, 43 rds. HE, 1 WP. One tank Co. "B" fired 3 rounds at M/G behind enemy-held house at 036283, results unknown. 2nd Plt. Co. "A" moved to reserve area for raid practice with inf.

Noon 23 April to noon 24 April - Assault platoon fired 2 c/b, 1 registration missions, 47 rds. HE, 1 smoke. Two tanks 3rd Platoon Company "B" participated with infantry in attack on house vic. 036282 (on road to Cisterna di Littoria), firing 90 rds. HE and 5 rds AP at houses. Enemy pill box destroyed at close range during advance and house demolished at range of 25 - 75 yards. Lead tank struck enemy mine 25 yards from objective and was disabled. No casualties. Several enemy machine gun and mortar positions knocked out.

Noon 24 April to noon 25 April - Assault platoon fired 3 registration, 1 c/b missions, 43 rds. HE, 6 smoke. One tank Co. "A" fired from pos. 965276 on enemy trenches, 43 HE, 8 smoke, A.P.C., with good coverage of target area.

Noon 25 April to noon 26 April - At 260100, seven tanks Co. "A" moved to assembly area for raid on enemy-held house "Y" vic. Ponte Rotto. Two tanks fired 15 rounds at objective, then returned to bivouac area. Four tanks with infantry soldiers riding on decks moved rapidly toward the objective, firing all weapons. The infantrymen jumped off the tanks and assaulted the house from a short distance. After taking 6 PWs, the raiding party withdrew. One tank hit a mine in enemy territory and was disabled. The crew continued to fire until all ammunition was expended, then abandoned and destroyed the tank. No casualties. Assault platoon fired 1 TOT, 1 rolling barrage, 3 c/b missions, total 382 rounds.

Noon 26 April to noon 27 April - Assault platoon fired 1 personnel, 2 c/b missions, 90 rds. HE. Four tanks Co. "A" fired 76 rounds from 957283 on area target 965337.

Noon 27 April to noon 28 April - Assault platoon fired 2 c/b missions, 36 rds. HE. Co. "B" relieved Co. "C" in place at 271200B attached to 133rd Inf. Co. "C" reverted to division reserve, one platoon began tank-borne infantry raid practice.

Noon 28 April to noon 29 April - Assault plt. fired 1 c/b mission, 15 rds. HE. Co. "A" passed to control of 168th Infantry when that unit completed relief of 135th at 290130B.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April) Cont'd.

Noon 29 April to noon 30 April - Assault platoon fired 1 c/b, 1 registration mission, 33 rds. HE, 3 Smoke. One light tank of Co. "D" at 020245 knocked out by direct hit at 300200 April. No casualties.

With the end of the month, the 751st Tank Battalion had completed 100 days of continuous combat duty, beginning at 220200 January 1944 when the beach-head was begun.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 30 April 1944

1. General.

Enemy activity directly affecting this organization was negligible during the period, except for harassing and interdictory artillery fire. On 19 April, two of our tanks firing from 972284 into enemy territory drew intense heavy caliber counter-battery fire, 30 rounds of estimated 150mm. On 16 April one man was seriously wounded and a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck damaged when an artillery shell struck in the mortar platoon bivouac area near Conca.

Anti-tank defenses encountered by elements of this battalion in two actions consisted of road craters and mines. One of these was a tank infantry raid on an enemy outpost, the other a limited objective attack. No anti-tank fire was encountered, which may be accounted for by the fact that both actions took place at night. Three (3) of our tanks were disabled by enemy mines and one of these was destroyed and abandoned. The other two are in now friendly territory and may be recovered with engineer assistance, when available. Anti-tank mines were found as deep as five feet, which makes detection difficult for the engineers. Anti-personnel mines were found scattered near anti-tank mines.

Heavy artillery and mortar fire was directed at the tanks taking part in both raids, but without effect.

The enemy used tanks as self-propelled guns in several instances in scattered sectors of the division front. Movement of his tracked vehicles, like ours, was for the most part restricted to roads.

Enemy propaganda leaflets were picked up in several areas occupied by our tanks 20 - 21 April.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April) Cont'd.

SECTION III - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Operations during the past month consisted mostly of occupying defensive positions. However, tanks were used in several raids to capture prisoners and destroy enemy held houses. At times they were called on to do harassing indirect fire.

It becomes more evident as tanks and infantry work together that much planning ahead of time is necessary for the operation to be successful. The tank commanders must make reconnaissance of the forward areas. We must have reports of mines; both enemy and our own. (It has been found that Jerry is placing his A/T mines up to 5 feet deep and mine detectors fail to pick them up.) Tank commanders should be made familiar with the infantry plan of attack. The tank commander should be able to get engineers on quick notice. One way to accomplish this is to have the tank commander call into tank liaison at infantry Bn. C. P. and ask for the engineers at a given point for a definite mission. The tank liaison officer could relay this information to the engineers liaison and he in turn could put his engineers to work. Tank movements in forward area during day-time has been successful only when a unit of smoke is placed around objective. (This was carried out successfully in raid with 135th Inf.)

Tank borne infantry has been tried and proven successful. It got the infantry to their objective with great speed. The doughboy did not have to worry about A/P mines. He protected himself from enemy fire by crouching behind the turret. Tanks should move in fast firing all guns. This leaves the enemy confused as our infantry dismount and go forward with grenades and automatic weapons to clear the objective. Tanks should fire to flanks while infantry is mopping up, then withdraw to defilade and be prepared for counterattack.

SECTION IV - SIGNAL

1. Wire - Since the battalion continued its fight on the defensive, wire has been our chief means of communication with the companies and in most cases to include the platoons. The situation was such that it required a wide separation of the companies. Therefore, because of our limited personnel for laying wire we have depended upon the units to which the companies were attached for the installation and maintenance of the lines. The results have been very satisfactory.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April) Cont'd.

2. Message - Due to excellent enemy observation messenger runs in forward areas were made under cover of darkness except in case of emergency. One messenger run to Division was made daily.

3. Radio - Communication was kept to a minimum as the broad wire net handled most of the traffic. As far as possible we kept one S. C. R. 509 at the Regimental Headquarters and one at the Battalion Headquarters of the unit to which we were attached. This permitted direct radio communication with the infantry when wire was not feasible.

4. Lessons Learned - Wire communication within a tank battalion is indispensable. During an attack it is impractical to have wire communication between the tank companies and the infantry units that the tanks are supporting. To have proper coordination between the infantry and the tank it is necessary for the infantry Commander whom the tanks are directly supporting to have a radio that covers the same frequency band as the tank's radio. The SCR-509 is satisfactory at the Infantry Bn. C. P., but it is not practical for use by the rifle Co.

SECTION V - SUPPLY

1. General

Supply has not been a problem on the beachhead because of lack of movement and the proximity of army supply dumps. Due to excellent enemy observation all of our supplies have been carried forward to our front line units at night. Due to the fact that our tanks are scattered throughout the 34th Division sector it necessitates a great deal of driving by small type vehicles to supply these groups. A definite need exists in the present situation for 1/2 ton trailers.

2. Rations

Throughout the entire period all elements of the command were able to use 5 in 1 or 10 in 1 rations at all times. Only on one occasion was a company compelled to use K ration for several days. The 10 in 1 is definitely inferior to 5 in 1 and is a poor substitute for the latter. Its main defects are the lack of canned vegetables and the K ration noon meal. It is the general opinion of tank crews that K ration is more desirable than C when the tactical situation is such that the crew is confined to the tank.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April) Cont'd.

3. Battle Losses

a. Ordnance

Tank, Medium M4A1	2
Tank, Medium M4	1
Tank, Light M5A1	1

4. Ammunition Expended

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Total No. Weapons</u>	<u>Peak Day</u>	<u>Total Expended for Period</u>
37mm Tank	17	0	0
75mm Tank	54		
S-HE w/fm48		118	1256
S-APC		37	172
Smoke		8	40
105mm How.	6		
HE w/fm48		384	1756
WP		6	23
81mm Mortar	3	0	0
Cal. .30 Carbine	257	0	0
Cal. .30 ball, clip	20	0	0
Cal. .30 AP & Tr, w	157	950	950
Cal. .50 AP & Tr, mlb	85	0	0
Cal. .45 ball	425	0	0

5. Recommendations

Lack of laundry facilities has proven to be quite a problem and one that should be corrected by making equipment available to units for laundry purposes. The service personnel of all units down to include companies are available for this purpose. The laundry situation has been more acute here on the beachhead due to the fact most of the civilians have been evacuated, therefore eliminating our chief method of obtaining laundry service. There should be adequate shower facilities at all times in order that men from the front lines may obtain a hot bath and a change of clothes once a week whenever the tactical situation permits. The exchange of dirty clothes for clean at the shower point is an excellent idea.

Efforts should be made to obtain as much fresh vegetables and fruits as possible to supplement the standard ration.

SECTION VI - COMBINED TANK - INF RAID ON LIMITED
OBJECTIVE MORNING OF 26 APRIL 1944

1. Purpose of Raid

To capture prisoners and equipment at enemy held house 350 yds. beyond our lines.

2. Preparation for raid

Three night patrols were made by the tank platoon leader and platoon sgt. These patrols were to pick lanes through minefields and likely tank routes. All tank commanders made one night reconnaissance and spent all day in forward O.P.s observing the terrain. After these reconnaissances were made the whole platoon moved to a rear area where they practiced the raid with the infantry. Every little detail was ironed out during this practice. Engineers layed tape through the mine field the night before the raid.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (April) Cont'd.

Communication set up as follows:

Tanks to use 528. They were in contact with O. P. by 509. Inf. had 536, in contact with O. P. which had a 300. Inf. Platoon leader fired very pistol when raid was over and his men were to withdraw. Raid was so well planned there was very little use of radio.

3. The Operation

Seven tanks moved into position close behind main line of resistance at 0300 hours. Two of the tanks fired 15 rds and then pulled back making a lot of noise (This was to cause enemy to believe all tanks left). At 0535 art. preparation was put on house and smoke was placed around house to cause enemy observation to be nil. Two tanks moved through our wire about 100 - 150 yds. and fired on house and enemy installations to flanks. Other three tanks with inf. on deck moved as fast as possible to within 25 yds. of house firing as they moved. When tanks were real close to house infantry dismounted*went in house. The enemy was so confused by the speed of our attack that they put up very little resistance. We took 6 prisoners from the house. While the infantry withdrew tanks kept firing to flanks. One tank hit a mine. Crew kept firing till infantry withdrew, then they abandoned tank after destroying it with incendiary grenade.

4. Results of raid

Six prisoners taken, 5 machine guns destroyed, several enemy killed. Our losses were one tank and one infantry man slightly wounded.

Rose L. Hogan
ROSE L. HOGAN
Major, 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding.


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5 Incls.

- Incl. #1-Battle Casualty Report
- Incl. #2-Map (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheet 158 I
- Incl. #3-Map (Italy, 1/25,000) Sheets 158 I, SW, NW, SE, NE.
- Incl. #4-Overlay, (dispositions)
- Incl. #5-Unit Journal, w/supporting papers.

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

1 June 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of May.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C., U. S. Army.
(Thru) Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO #3, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, as changed by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of May is submitted:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of our Operations
1 - 31 May 1944

1. Note:

This period opened with the 751st Tank Battalion still in line in close support of the Infantry after 100 consecutive days in action on the Anzio Beachhead. After being relieved in place on 5 May by the 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regt., the 751st Tank Battalion moved to a training area on the beachhead and was attached to the 13th Armored Regt. for training. Extensive training stressing Tank - Infantry Cooperation was conducted with units of the 3rd Infantry Division. On 9 May, two companies were attached to the 34th Infantry Division and were placed in Division Reserve, but continued training in their respective company areas. At 0630B, 23 May the 3rd Inf. Division attacked in their sector and was closely supported by the 751st Tank Battalion. Combat companies were attached to Infantry Regiments. The attack moved slowly the first day and gained momentum the second day. Loss of tanks was rather heavy the first day. Most of the tank losses being those disabled by enemy AT mines. The tanks were aggressive and accounted for several enemy vehicles and many enemy dead. The light tank company less one platoon was ordered to enter Cisterna and clean up enemy resistance. They were followed closely by the Infantry and enemy resistance ceased at about 1600B, 25 May. On 26 May, "A" and "D" Companies were attached to the 36th Infantry Division. At the close of the period, Companies "B" and "C" were in close support of the 3rd Infantry Division in their advance on Ardena. Companies "A" and "D" were attached to and supporting the 36th Infantry Division in their attack on Velletri.

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1 -	CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL	CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL	
Sutherland, Capt. A. L. R. 13 Feb. 44	
REVIEWING COMMITTEE	

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

2. Daily Summary:

Noon 30 April to noon 1 May - Component units disposed as follows: Mortar Plt. 977219; Assault Plt. 981246 supporting 39th F. A.; Co. "A" (CP 963281), 1st Plt. 979266 and 962286, 2nd Plt. 963276, 3rd Plt. 963268, 2nd Plt., Co "D" 970268 attached and in support of 168th Inf. Regt.; Co. "B" (CP 005255), 1st Plt. 998267, 2nd Plt. 016262, 3rd Plt. 029262 and 031258, 1st Plt. Co. "D", 994262, 3rd Plt., Co. "D" 021246 attached and in support of the 133rd Inf. Regt., Co. "C" (CP 988247), 1st Plt. 952185, 2nd and 3rd Plt. 972219 Division Reserve 34th Inf. Division. Headquarters tanks used as bridge guards at 014240, 951277, 941278. Missions of companies supporting infantry regts. to give close direct support to infantry and to provide counterattacking force in case of enemy break-through. 1st Plt. Co. "C" practicing for Infantry - Tank raid. One light tank at 020245 received direct artillery hit at about 0200B and was damaged.

Noon 1 May to noon 2 May - Assault Plt. fired 3 missions, 1 reg., 2 c/b. Co. "B" tanks fired 220 rds. HE, harassing fire from pos. 033274 and 028279 from 0210B to 0230B. 3rd Plt. Co. "D" relieved from Co. "B" and att. to Co. "C".

Noon 2 May to noon 3 May - Assault Plt. fired 3 missions, 2 c/b, 1 reg. total rds. 37 HE, 1 smoke. 5 tanks Co. "B" fired from pos. grid 0227. Total of 213 rds. HE fired. Smoke observed from Chatteau Woods. 127 rds. fired from same location from 0300B to 0500B. Fire observed from pill box and damage to house. 1st Plt., Co. "D" relieved from att. Co. "B" and att. to 135th Inf. Regt. as of 2100B.

Noon 3 May to noon 4 May - Assault Plt. fired 3 missions, 2 c/b, 1 reg. Total rds. fired 62 HE, 4 smoke. 5 tanks Co. "B" fired 155 rds. HE harassing fire from pos. in grid 0227 from 0300B to 0500B.

Noon 4 May to noon 5 May - Assault Plt. fired 1 mission reg. Total rds. 6 HE and 7 WP.

Noon 5 May to noon 6 May - Battalion relieved in place by 3rd Bn, 13th A.R. Hq. Co. closed in new location at 960200 at 2100B. Bn. C. P. at 960200. Co. "A" closed in new area 966213 at 2330B. Co. "B" closed in new area 968215 at 0130B. 2nd Plt., Co. "D" closed in new area 972217 at 2330B. All other locations unchanged.

Noon 6 May to noon 7 May - Co. "D" relieved from attachment to 34th Inf. Division.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

Noon 7 May to noon 8 May - Co. "A" training with 7th Inf. Regt.

Noon 8 May to noon 9 May - Co. "A" continued training with 7th Inf. Regt. Co. "B" training with 15th Inf. Regt. Co. "C" training with 30th Inf. Regt.

Noon 9 May to noon 10 May - Companies "B" and "C" attached to 34th Inf. Division, remain in present location on the alert.

Noon 10 May to noon 11 May - Continued training with units of 3rd Inf. Division.

Noon 11 May to noon 12 May - Two light tanks att. to 7th Inf. Regt. for training. Co. "A" continues training with 7th Inf. Regt.

Noon 12 May to noon 13 May - Assault Plt. moved into pos. at 982249 att. to 39th F. A.

Noon 13 May to noon 14 May - No change in dispositions.

Noon 14 May to noon 15 May - Continued training and planning for future operations.

Noon 15 May to noon 16 May - Bridge guard cancelled by VCG 34th Inf. Division.

Noon 16 May to noon 17 May - Assault Plt. fired 2 missions, 42 HE, 2 WP for check points.

Noon 17 May to noon 18 May - Bn. C. P. closed in new area 989236 at 1500B. Assault Plt. fired 3 missions, TOT 91 HE, 1 WP. Received 8 rds. c/b.

Noon 18 May to noon 19 May - Assault Plt. fired 4 missions, 1 pers. 1 c/b, 2 training. Fired 108 HE, 6 smoke.

Noon 19 May to noon 20 May - Assault Plt. fired 5 missions, 100 rds. HE.

Noon 20 May to noon 21 May - 1st Plt., Co. "A" moved into pos. in 1st Bn, 133rd Inf. Regt. sector and alerted to support counterattack.

Noon 21 May to noon 22 May - Completed plans for future operations.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

Noon 22 May to noon 23 May - Units moved to assembly areas: Co. "A" vic. 010288, Co. "B" vic. 013260, Co. "C" vic. 988281, Co. "D" vic. 996266. Mortar Plt. 994261. Attack jumped off at 0630B. At 0700B 1 tk. Co. "B" hit mine at 023272 and burned. At 1000B 1 tk. Co. "A" hit mine at 008298 and was disabled.

Noon 23 May to noon 24 May - Assault Plt. fired 9 missions, 1 rolling barrage, 1 c/b, 1 mission on Kraut woods, 1 support of Inf. Total rds. fired 1637 HE, 12 WP. Tank companies continued to support Inf. Regts. in the attack. Co. "A" knocked out Mk IV tank at 017307. Co. "A" lost 6 tanks through enemy mines and 1 tank from enemy AT fire vic. 012299. Co. "B" had 1 tank knocked out by enemy AT near Eastern Junction. Co. "C" bulldozer disabled by mine at 988305.

Noon 24 May to noon 25 May - 2 tanks Co. "A" hit by enemy AT fire at 019323. 5 tanks, Co. "A" in pos. 007315. 2 Plt., Co. "B" in pos. 032297 and 1st Plt., Co. "B" in pos. 030303 supp. Inf. Co. "C" moved through obj. "R" and "T" and held up at "U-2", returned to vic. La Villa during hours of darkness, knocked out mortars and light artillery pieces NE of La Villa. 2 tanks, Co. "C" knocked out N. of Cisterna by en. AT fire. 1 tk. Co. "B" disabled by en. mine. Co. "A" with 7 tanks and inf. attacked toward Cisterna from Isola Bella and took 22 PW. 2 tanks destroyed by en. AT fire. Assault Plt. fired 23 missions, 2 on en. tanks, 2 on en. vehicles, 9 supp. of Inf., 3 on strongpoints, 4 c/b, 3 on gun pos. Total rds. expended 1928 HE. Co. "C" supported 30th Inf. Regt. in cleaning up enemy resistance NW of Cisterna. 2 Plt., Co. "C" supp. Inf. in driving off enemy counter-attack NE of Cisterna. Co. "D" less one Plat. ordered to enter Cisterna to clean up enemy resistance was followed closely by Inf. Enemy resistance in Cisterna ceased about 1600B. Co. "D" assembled at 1725B and had taken about 100 PW. 1st and 2nd Plt., Co. "C" supp. 30th Inf. Regt. in attack toward Cori.

Noon 25 May to noon 26 May - Assault Plt. closed in new pos 038265 at 1310B. Units closed in new areas: Bn. C. P. 060351, Hq. Co. 018312, Mortar Plt. 018312, Co. "A" 018378, Co. "B" 065425, Co. "C" 065425, and Co. "D" 019374. Co. "A" and "D" attached to 36th Inf. Division.

Noon 26 May to noon 27 May - 2nd Plt., Co. "B" moved to 097489 at 0315B under command of Ass't. C. G. 3rd Inf. Division.

Noon 27 May to noon 28 May - Co. "C" and 2 Plt. Co. "B" moved to new areas vic. Giulianella preparatory to further action to the North. 2nd Plt., Co. "B", supported Infantry attack on Artena. Lost two tanks, one by enemy AT fire, one hit AT mine. Co. "B" placed 7 tanks as road blocks covering road entering Artena from the North.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

Noon 28 May to noon 29 May - One plt., Co. "B" from 3rd Inf. Division Res. reported to FSSF and took up pos. NE side of Artena.

Noon 29 May to noon 30 May - Assault Plt. fired 20 missions, 3 c/b, 3 tanks, 4 personnel, 7 Inf. support, 1 strongpoint, and 2 anti-tank guns. A total of 1928 rds. expended. There was no change in disposition of tanks.

Noon 30 May to noon 31 May - Assault Plt. fired 21 missions, 1 reg. 6 on tanks with 3 direct hits, 6 Personnel, 1 defensive fire, 7 intradictory fire. Total rds. expended 884 HE, 6 WP.

3. Summary of Operations of Co. "A" and "D" for period 27 May - 31 May:

Noon 26 May to noon 27 May - Co. "A" and Co. "D" attached to 36th Inf. Division. Co. "A" closed into bivouac at 018380, Co. "D" closed into bivouac at 030345.

Noon 27 May to noon 28 May - Co. "A" attached to 141st Inf. Regt. Co. "D" attached to 143rd Inf. Regt. and given the mission of working with Co. "C", 143rd Inf. Regt. to maintain contact with 34th Inf. Division; also to be used in counterattack role. Co. "D" closed in bivouac at 961399 at 2030B.

Noon 28 May to noon 29 May - 3rd Plat., Co. "D" attacked with Infantry North on road from 955404. Encountered considerable small arms fire, machine gun fire and 80MM mortar fire. Advanced to 955408 and held. 3 tanks from 1st Plt. Co. "D" were being brought up to relieve two tanks on the line when one tank was knocked out by two rounds of AT fire at a range of 250 to 300 yds. While returning to the assembly area the tanks received considerable heavy mortar and artillery fire. The tanks were placed in defensive positions covering armored avenues of approach vic. 961402. The 1st and 2nd Plts. advanced up ridge during night, 2nd Plt. leading, 1st Plt. following with the infantry behind them. All machine guns and 37's were employed while advancing.

Noon 29 May to 30 May - 3rd Plt., Co. "D" took up defensive positions vic. 957406 with Infantry dug in between the tanks, however there was no infantry out in front of the tanks. Received several hits on tanks from enemy Bazooka guns. 4 light tanks were hit, two of which received penetrations and were disabled. Enemy counterattack was beaten off and then Infantry outposted the tanks.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

At the end of the period, Co. "D" had two plts. supporting the remainder of Co. "C", 143rd Inf. Regt. and one Company, 36th Engineers. 1st plt. reached objective with little difficulty. 2nd plt. was held up short of objective by minefield and anti-tank grenade fire. One tank knocked out by enemy mine. Co. "A" held in Division Reserve since the attachment to 36th Inf. Division and was located at 994483 at the end of the period.

4. At the close of the period, units closed in assembly areas at the following locations: 2nd and 3rd Plt., Co. "C" attached to 30th Inf. Regt. at 078500, 2nd and 3rd Plt., Co. "B" attached to 15th Inf. Regt. at 094498 and 103498 respectively. 1st Plt., Co. "B", attached to SSF at 101494. 1st Plt., Co. "C", 3rd Inf. Division reserve at 097495. Co. "A" and "D" remained attached to 36th Inf. Division. Service Company and trains bivouaced in area vic. 074405.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

Summary of Enemy Operations

1 - 31 May 1944

1. General:

Enemy activity directly affecting this organization prior to May 23 was negligible. The first day of the attack on Cisterna many enemy AT mines were encountered. The enemy had the mine fields covered by anti-tank weapons, medium caliber. The anti-tank defense was breached by the end of the first day. From this point on, his anti-tank defense consisted mainly of 88 dual purpose guns and Mark VI tanks. In some instances the Mark VI was fired from dug-in positions. An occasional mine was encountered during the advance, probably due to the speed of our advance causing the enemy to lay his mines in a hasty manner.

The nature of the terrain permitted freedom of movement for the tanks except for the occasional wadis and canals that restricted lateral movement.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire was light and ineffective.

SECTION III - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Operations during the past month consisted of occupying defensive positions, later conducting a period of intensive training on Tank - Infantry cooperation, and then, during the last week, supporting infantry in the attack.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

It becomes more evident as tanks and infantry work together that much planning ahead of time is necessary for the operation to be successful. Each tank commander must know the infantry plan of action, so that, if the platoon leader or platoon sergeant or both are knocked out, the remaining tanks will be able to continue pressing the attack.

Routes through friendly mine fields must be thoroughly swept and plainly marked so that the tanks can pass through them and cross the Line of Departure without being disabled by our mines.

The snake was not used successfully in the operation mainly because it was assembled too far behind the line of departure. The snake must be assembled at such a point that when use is contemplated it can be pulled and pushed straight from assembly point to the point to be used without making any defined changes in direction.

The battle sleds - See Section VII.

SECTION IV - SIGNAL

1. Wire:

At the beginning of the present offensive, wire became a secondary means of communication. Usually the only wire communication we had was from the Battalion Headquarters to higher headquarters. Due to the enemy artillery fire and the movement of heavy equipment the lines were very hard to keep in service. Often movement was too fast to permit the laying of wire to Battalion C. P.

2. Message:

Messenger service from higher headquarters was satisfactory. Our Battalion messenger made at least one trip to higher headquarters daily. Additional runs were made when the situation warranted.

3. Radio:

Radio communication continued to be our primary means of communication to the companies. At the beginning of the present offensive, radio communication was not very satisfactory due to the jamming of the air by the enemy. At times the distances between companies and Battalion C. P. were so great that it was necessary to set up a relay station. We used the Artillery Observer tank as the relay station. The relay set-up worked very satisfactory.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

4. Lessons Learned:

Communications with infantry units ranged from poor to good. At the start of the operation this Battalion drew five SCR-300 radio sets. These were used very little. The most satisfactory set-up used was a liaison officer with a SCR-509 radio set at the infantry regimental or battalion C. P. He was able to maintain contact with his Company Commander or any platoon within the sector in which the infantry regiment or battalion was operating. More consideration was given to this problem than in preceding operations and considerable improvement was noted. In one operation an infantryman with an SCR-300 radio set rode on the platoon leader's tank and maintained contact with the infantry battalion. This worked satisfactorily, but could not be used very often due to enemy artillery and snipers.

SECTION V - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the past operation, the problem of supplying our tank companies with rations, gasoline and ammunition was very difficult due to the fact that the battalion was split between two infantry divisions and the distances involved made it almost impossible for the battalion to supply the detached companies. This problem was solved by attaching three 2½ ton trucks to each of the detached companies and they picked up their supplies from the infantry supply points.

2. Rations:

The principal ration used during operations is the C and K, but whenever the tanks drop back where each crew can cook, 10 in 1 is used. The 5 in 1 ration is preferred over the 10 in 1 by all of the personnel.

3. Clothing:

Our supply of clothing has been excellent and all of the men have been able to maintain a high standard of personal appearance. Have experienced difficulty in obtaining small sizes of combat boots particularly sizes 5 and 5½.

4. Gas, Oil and Ammo:

Gasoline and ammo was drawn from army dumps and the supply was unlimited. As the operation progresses it necessitated making long hauls of these supplies as army dumps did not move forward during the first phase.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

5. Ordnance Supply:

Tank replacements were available during the initial phase of the operation, but as our losses were rather high, due to enemy mines, we were not always able to draw a replacement for a lost tank.

There is an acute shortage in this unit of fire control equipment, such as binoculars and watches. Binoculars are absolutely essential for tank commanders in picking out targets.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance

Tank, Medium M4A1	-	3
Tank, Medium M4	-	6
Tank, Light M5A1	-	1

7. Recommendations:

Arrangements should be made whereby small units can avail themselves of clothing exchange shower facilities. Divisions are given priority on the use of the showers and it is very difficult for a separate battalion to arrange a schedule.

Recommend that a ten percent increase in B rations be issued to each unit when they are pulled out of the line for a rest or reorganization to help build up morale and get the men in better condition after a long period of using only C and K rations.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. At the beginning of the period, the total effective strength of the Battalion was 783, officers and enlisted men. Prior to 23 May, there was only slight variation below and above this figure, resulting from normal causes - hospitalizations, RTU's, shipment on rotation, etc.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

Difficulty was experienced in several cases by the receipt of mal-assigned rotation replacements. Due to duplication of specification numbers, infantry-trained men were sent to fill vacancies requiring specialized and often highly technical knowledge of armored equipment. With the opening of operations on 23 May, casualty evacuations rapidly reduced the unit's effective strength until, at the end of the month, it was only 730. Requisitions had been placed, based on expected casualties, but due to the fact that armor-trained replacements were not available, the combat strength of the unit was considerably weakened. In addition, because of the extended strain of combat without relief, after the first week of new operations, (23 May - 30 May), several cases developed of nervous exhaustion from sheer combat fatigue. The situation became such that at the end of the period, it was necessary to ground efficiently functioning combat equipment simply for lack of personnel to man it.

SECTION VII - THE BATTLE SLED

1. Purpose:

The Battle Sled is to be used as a means to get Infantry on an objective when the advancing infantry is held up. The tanks towing the sleds to make up a hard hitting striking force which can neutralize enemy strongpoints without taking large percentages of casualties.

2. Tactical Use:

The tank platoon with the Battle Sled, and special-trained infantry be held in an attack position to be employed by the Company Commander when the occasion arises. When use is contemplated, the tanks, towing the Battle Sleds carrying the special troops, move straight on to the objective employing all available weapons.

3. The Operation:

For the operation each Infantry Regiment was given 10 Battle Sleds. Two platoons of tanks attached to each Infantry Regiment were equipped to tow Battle Sleds. The Battle Sleds were to be employed as follows: In each Regiment, one platoon of tanks with Battle Sleds attached would remain in an attack position to be employed on call and the other 5 Battle Sleds would be placed in an assembly area where the tanks could return to pick them up when needed. Extensive training was carried on before the operation with the infantry and tanks working together as a team.

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Report of Action Against the Enemy (May) Cont'd.

During the operation the 30th Inf. Regt. used one platoon of tanks towing battle sleds. Their mission was to clear hill Northeast of Ponte Rotto of enemy resistance that was holding up the Infantry advance. The Tank - Battle Sled team proceeded up the road toward Ponte Rotto and turned Northeast on Ponte Rotto - Cisterna Road. They proceeded up the Ponte Rotto - Cisterna road about 300 yds. and encountered a mine field on the road and extending into the field to the right and left of the road. The only path through the mine field was blocked by three M-7's disabled by mines. It was decided that engineers would clear a path for the tanks to pass through the mine field. The enemy laid an artillery ^{on} the tanks but did very little damage. The sleds had to be unhitched and pulled to the side of the road so that the tanks could back out. The tanks were later sent on another mission and did not use the Battle Sleds thereafter.

The 7th Inf. Regt. did not use their Battle Sleds. Both tank platoons were employed without the sleds.

The 15th Inf. Regt. committed one platoon of tanks towing the Battle Sleds. Their mission was to reduce a strongpoint built around two houses. The Tank - Battle Sled team proceeded up the road, turned right off road and moved cross country toward objective. About 300 yds. from the objective the tanks encountered an obstacle that the tanks could not cross. The enemy immediately laid down a terrific mortar barrage that caused many casualties among the infantry and damaged the sleds. The infantry released the sleds from the tanks. The tanks maneuvered around and moved up to the left and closer to the objective. All of the tanks employed all weapons. The two houses were demolished and the entire area was swept with machine gun fire. The enemy resistance immediately ceased, the infantry advanced and took their objective and many prisoners. The enemy casualties were very high with many killed. The other platoon of Battle Sleds was not employed.

Our experience with the use of the Battle Sled was not very satisfactory. A tank moving cross country must of necessity be free to maneuver. Various obstacles are generally encountered requiring the tank to back up or make sharp turns which is impossible if they are towing Battle Sleds. With the fire power possessed by the tank utilized from selected positions any strongpoint can be effectively dealt with. Tanks always draw artillery and mortar fire that is ineffective against tanks, but causes a high rate of casualties among the infantry.

Roue L. Hogan
ROUE L. HOGAN
Major, 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding

4 Incls.

Incl #1-Battle Casualty Report

Incl #2-Map (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheets 158 I, II, III, IV; 150 II.

Incl #3-Map (Italy, 1/25,000) Sheets 158 I NE, SE, SW, NW; 158 II NW, NE, 150 II NE, SE.

Incl #4-Unit Journal and File

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HEADQUARTERS, 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

2 June 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944:

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA(Hosp)</u>	<u>WIA(Not Hosp)</u>	<u>IIA(Hosp)</u>	<u>IIA(Not Hosp)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Company	0	0	3	3	1	0	<u>7</u>
Service Company	0	0	0	2	0	0	<u>2</u>
Company "A"	1	4	5	2	13	1	<u>26</u>
Company "B"	4	0	8	7	1	0	<u>20</u>
Company "C"	3	0	8	0	2	0	<u>13</u>
Company "D"	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	9	6	33	17	20	3	<u>88</u>

Richard R. Neuhoft
RICHARD R. NEUHOFT,
WOJG, 751st Tank Battalion,
Unit Personnel Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS, 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

2 June 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944:

HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Hanson, Donald L.	37474709	Pvt	23 May 1944
DePietro, Mario A.	32764964	Pvt	23 May 1944
McCutcheon, Clarence L.	39117504	Pvt	23 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Gelardi, Jimmie J.	35014776	Pvt	6 May 1944
Gorelick, Jacob L.	31035583	Cpl	17 May 1944
Leon, Henry L.	39230128	S/Sgt	29 May 1944

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Hancock, Lint C.	34680174	Pvt	23 May 1944
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Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

SERVICE COMPANY

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Pulkowski, Edward A.	35154347	T/5	9 May 1944
Muzzey, Worthen D.	0341613	Capt	15 May 1944

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944
continued:

COMPANY "A"

Killed in Action:

None

EM listed below Died of Wounds received 25 May 1944-

Nemec, Stanley L.	39018055	T/4	26 May 1944
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Missing in Action:

Doyle, John D. Sr.	35449984	Cpl	23 May 1944
Caddell, Jesse B.	14016094	Pvt	23 May 1944
Doughty, Edward G.	33590584	Pvt	23 May 1944
Harms, Edward (NMI)	37653416	Pvt	23 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Kinney, Ewing K.	35031563	Sgt	24 May 1944
Hatlak, Joseph J.	32808067	Pfc	24 May 1944
Pawling, Warren (NMI)	13078023	Cpl	24 May 1944
Leibold, Robert V.	35121927	Sgt	25 May 1944
Jones, Glenn M.	37510116	Pfc	24 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Foreman, Erwin L.	01013300	1st Lt	24 May 1944
Price, Thomas A.	19074925	Sgt	24 May 1944

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Lengyle, Joseph W.	01015420	2d Lt	23 May 1944
Warshavsky, Victor (NMI)	32249620	Pfc	24 May 1944
Jimenez, Robert S.	39403086	T/5	24 May 1944
Thorson, Norwin O.	36443480	T/5	24 May 1944
Motts, Robert W.	33464161	T/5	24 May 1944
Cline, George L.	18137006	Pvt	24 May 1944
Levin, Nathaniel I.	01012746	1st Lt	28 May 1944
LeClaire, Garfield (NMI)	37095116	T/4	28 May 1944
Beavers, Orville H.	35155725	Cpl	28 May 1944
Blomster, William L.	37273925	Pvt	28 May 1944
Hutchens, Kenneth W.	35562988	Pfc	28 May 1944
Di Orio, Louis M.	32253138	Cpl	28 May 1944
Busa, Lawrence J. Jr.	31280902	Pfc	28 May 1944

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Bolich, William (NMI)	35029342	s/Sgt	25 May 1944
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Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944 continued:

COMPANY "B"

Killed in Action:

Adoue, Victor E.	01015818	1st Lt	27 May 1944
Kemp, William G.	37509603	Pvt	27 May 1944
Penn, Bradley C.	31319440	Pvt	28 May 1944
Bohman, Ernest J.	35121956	Sgt	27 May 1944

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Rivett, Douglas T.	32099889	Pfc	23 May 1944
Cash, John S.	6899275	S/Sgt	23 May 1944
Ballard Ottis B.	34131369	Cpl	23 May 1944
Smith, Robert E.	33491567	Pvt	23 May 1944
Smith, Donald W.	37561766	Pvt	24 May 1944
Leopold, Edwin (NMI)	35260248	Pfc	27 May 1944
Bell, Columbus M.	34330038	Cpl	27 May 1944
Bridges, Cosper J.	38200762	Cpl	30 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Hilton, Howard C.	32170953	T/4	23 May 1944
Williams, John W.	34169874	Pfc	24 May 1944
Podsadowski, Stanley J.	31130060	Pvt	27 May 1944
Siracusa, Stephen J.	37129976	T/4	27 May 1944
Smith, Marvin S.	34773946	Pvt	27 May 1944
Harmon, Ralph E.	35017638	T/4	28 May 1944
Atchison, Frank W.	37101818	Cpl	28 May 1944

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Van Eck, Henry (NMI)	37550921	Cpl	23 May 1944
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Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

COMPANY "C"

Killed in Action:

Johnson, Elmer L.	37328988	Cpl	24 May 1944
Santos, Valentine F.	39549441	Pvt	24 May 1944
Fraser, Irving T. Jr.	0422324	Capt	26 May 1944

Missing in Action:

None

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944
continued:

COMPANY "C" CONT'D.

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Warren, John L.	35270160	Sgt	23 May 1944
Fischer, John T.	35021069	T/4	23 May 1944
Cook, William C.	34398520	Pfc	23 May 1944
Lear, Vincent R.	33415440	Pfc	23 May 1944
Gonet, Marjan J.	31303131	Pvt	24 May 1944
Evans, William R.	01014440	2d Lt	25 May 1944
Ahearn, Leo F.	32171249	Sgt	24 May 1944
Smith, Dewey E.	16155149	Pfc	26 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Jack, Edward F. Jr.	33462487	Cpl	23 May 1944
Matteson, Gene R.	37509754	Pvt	26 May 1944

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

COMPANY "D"

Killed in Action:

Lee, Fritz J.	7023253	Pvt	23 May 1944
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Missing in Action:

Dougherty, John J.	33577011	T/5	29 May 1944
Earley, Dorel L.	39279514	Pvt	29 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Coriman, Clarence E.	01011608	1st Lt	23 May 1944
Goodroe, Grady C.	01014285	2d Lt	25 May 1944
Carver, Leo W.	37499847	Pfc	28 May 1944
Wilson, Robert D. Jr.	13176724	Sgt	28 May 1944
Armiger, Joseph G. Jr.	01011576	2d Lt	29 May 1944
Booze, Kenneth R.	35031221	S/Sgt	31 May 1944
King, Ellard (NMI)	35260067	Sgt	31 May 1944
Spickler, James E. Jr.	35014780	Sgt	31 May 1944
Rackel, Francis S.	35014783	Pvt	31 May 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Edgar, Clarence E.	35021545	Pvt	23 May 1944
De Felice, Frank M.	32489114	Pvt	24 May 1944
Terry, George (NMI)	36335865	T/5	31 May 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 May 1944 through 31 May 1944
continued:

COMPANY "D" CONT'D.

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Wirt, Charles A.	37511863	Pvt	24 May 1944
Smith, Weldon A.	32286885	Pfc	25 May 1944
Boles, Orin K.	35020951	Pfc	31 May 1944

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Blanton, Robert E.	35121958	S/Sgt	24 May 1944
Wheelock, John E.	35021128	T/5	29 May 1944

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HEADQUARTERS
751st TANK BATTALION
APO #64
U. S. ARMY

20 Mar 46 HSD
Date Initials

1 July 1946

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of June.
TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.
Thru : Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, APO #3, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of June is submitted:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of our Operations
1 - 30 June 1946

1. Note:

The period opened with the 751st Tank Battalion engaged in the offensive toward Rome. Companies A and D were attached to the 36th Infantry Div. until 9 June at which time they returned to Bn. control. The remainder of the Bn, with the 3rd Infantry Div, drove north from Ardea on the morning of 1 June. Enemy resistance was heavy and tank losses were considerable both from mines and anti-tank fire. The drive continued northward to Palestrina and then turned northwest and tanks supported the infantry through Rome, which was entered on 4 June. Co's. B and C continued in mopping up operations north of Rome until 6 June when they reverted to Bn. control and entered assembly areas. On 7 June, Bn, less Co's. A and B, assembled on western edge of Rome.

Co's. A and B opened the period while operating with the 36th Infantry Div. north of Velletri. After heavy fighting in the vicinity of Velletri, they led columns of the 36th Div. north to Rome. Tanks entered Rome early on the morning of 4 June and pushed north to vicinity of Bracciano. Heavy rear guard action, anti-tank guns, and mines were encountered throughout the operation. On 8 June elements of Co's A and D with the 113rd Inf. overran an enemy bicycle battalion in woods northwest of Bracciano, destroying many of the enemy. About 300 prisoners were taken. Co's. then moved into assembly areas and on 9 June reverted to Bn. control and moved to Bn. assembly area on western edge of Rome.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

On 12 June Bn. moved to a bivouac area 4 miles NE of Braociane where it remained, resting and training, through the close of the period.

2. Daily Summary (Bn. less Co. A and Co D which were with 36th Div. until 9 June. See par. 3):

Noon 31 May to noon 1 June - Components units Bn. CP - 061411, Hqs Co. - 061411, Mortar Plt. - 065145, Assault Plt. - 061411, Co. A - 019467, Co B - 069139, Co. C - 069141. Service Co. and trains bivouacced vic. 071405. 2nd Plt. Co. C supported 7th Inf. Regt. in an attack 1700B - four tanks disabled. At 0530B 2nd and 3rd plts. Co. B supported 15th Inf. in attack N. Ardena. 1st Plt. Co. B supported SSF. Assault plt. fired 16 missions - 1 CB, 6 TOT, 7 interdiction. Expended 673 HE, 4 WP. Bn. CP, Hqs. Co., Mortar plt, and 1st plt. Co. C closed in area vic. 097495 at 2200B. 1st plt. Co C in Div. reserve. At 0630B 1st and 3rd plts. Co. C attacked with 30th Inf. Regt. 2nd plt. Co. C reverted to Div. reserve. One Mark VI tk. and other light material knocked out, by 1st plt. Co. "C".

Noon 1 June to noon 2 June - Units continued to support Inf. Regt's to which atchd encountering heavy task and AF fire. Co. B vic. - 081528, 087527, 082513. Co. C vic. 082515, 098493, 087527. One (1) tank Co. B destroyed by AF fire at 1300B. Assault plt. fired 55 missions - 31 interdiction, 17 inf. preparation, 2 nabeLwerfers, 5 TOT. Expended 2122 HE, 3 WP.

Noon 2 June to noon 3 June - Mortar plt. vic. 094514. Assault plt. 098509. 1st Plt. Co. B and 2 tank dozers joined Ellis Task Force. 2nd and 3rd plt. Co. B and 1st plt. Co. C supported 7th Inf. on advance toward Palastrina. 2nd Plt. Co. B - 3 tanks disabled or lost. Two tanks Co. B not manned because of lack of crews.

Noon 3 June to noon 4 June - 1st and 2nd plt. Co. C and 2nd and 3rd plt. Co. B supported 7th Inf. in advance toward Palastrina.

Noon 4 June to noon 5 June - Service Co. closed in area vic. 023590 at 1145B. Bn. CP, Hqs Co, and Mortar plt. arrived area vic. 849682 at 2400B. Service Co. closed in new area vic. 826666. 2nd plt. Co. C supported 30th Inf. in march through Rome. 1st Plt. Co. C joined its Co. and went into support of 15th Inf. Co. B less 1 plt. with RTF supported 15th Inf. in march through Rome.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

Noon 5 June to noon 6 June - Assault plt. relieved from attachment to 39th FA Bn and joined Hq. Co. at 849682. Co. B supported 15th Inf. in clearing area N. of Rome via. 770768 and then assembled in area vic. 828674. Co. C supported 30th Inf. in clearing NE section of Rome and assembled at 739705. Two tics. Co. B lost on RTF.

Noon 6 June to noon 7 June - Co. B and Co. C reverted to Bn. control and remained in assembly areas.

Noon 7 June to noon 8 June - Bn. CP, Hqs. Co, Co. B, and Co. C closed in area vic. 697712.

Noon 8 June to noon 12 June - Maintenance, training and rest. Co. A rejoined Bn. 9 June. Co. D rejoined Bn. 9 June. Atchd to 1st AD for training off 10 June.

Noon 12 June to noon 30 June - Bn. Hqs. closed in area vic. 438706 at 1310308. Relieved attachment 1st AD and atchd Fifth Army off. 1611308. Bn. trained and rested within its area for the remainder of the period.

3. Daily Summary Co. A and Co. D (atchd 36th Div. for period 31 May - 9 June):

Noon 31 May to noon 1 June - Six remaining tanks Co. A supported 141st Inf. N. of Velletri. Five tanks overran 2 Cos. enemy inf. Two tanks working in mountains with 39th Engrs. 1st and 2nd plts. attacked with 2 Co's. of 36th Engrs. N. of Velletri. Encountered heavy AT fire and AT mine fields. Three enemy tanks encountered and destroyed.

Noon 1 June to 2 June - Three tanks Co. A moved thru Velletri at 05008. Six tanks led inf. column N. on Highway and preceded column by about one mile. Heavy AT fire and mines encountered. At 07008, Co. D attacked near crossroad 953423 which was its first objective. Took 16 PW's while clearing out houses on route.

Noon 2 June to 3 June - At 13008 4 tanks Co. A supported 143 Inf. and 3 supported 141st taking 6 PW's. At 12008 Co. D attacked in vicinity of 945939, and was forced to withdraw due to heavy tank and artillery fire. Returned to crossroad 953423 and attacked again at 949469. It was bombed and strafed by 8 enemy planes. Company took up position 950458. Attacked Nemi from W. side of Lake Albano. Attacked crossroad 919495.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

Noon 3 June to noon 4 June - Four tanks Co. A attached to 113 Inf. moved 1 1/2 miles SW of Rocca Priora at 1500B. Rec'd heavy artillery fire. These tanks later led inf. thru Rome. One Mk. III tank, SP, flakwagon, and many MG nests destroyed. Many enemy killed and captured. At 0800B, 1/2 tanks Co. A moved with 112nd Inf. to Rome. One tank remained outside town as road block while remainder mopped up with inf. Co. D tanks supporting 113rd Inf. were used to carry ammo to inf. troops at 919495. Recd. heavy mortar and artillery fire. Co. attached to 111st Inf. 4 June.

Noon 4 June to noon 5 June - Four tanks Co. A entered Rome with 112nd Inf. at 1600B. Three tanks Co. A preceded 113rd Inf. thru and beyond Rome. Encountered enemy strongpoint 3 miles N. of Rome. One tank lost. Two remaining tanks moved through Rome and 1/2 miles N. with 112nd Inf. Encountered and destroyed enemy rocket launcher and a number of enemy infantry. Three light tanks Co. D encountered rear guard action S. of R.J. 800585. Shot up enemy infantry and MG nests and continued to CR 806588 - then to 795620 to Co. assembly area. At about 1600B recd heavy artillery fire - several casualties. On 5 June Co. D moved thru SW section of Rome carrying inf. on tanks.

Noon 5 June to noon 6 June - Co. A advanced about 13 miles W. of Rome. Little or no enemy resistance. Co. D continued thru Rome to point 3 mi. NE. Encountered enemy rear guard action and AT fire. Pulled off road and took up positions for night. Two light tanks attached to 113rd Inf. On 6 June Co. D continued march N. on Route #2.

Noon 6 June to noon 7 June - Co. A took up defensive positions about 13 mi. N. of Rome and remained for the night. Three tanks Co. A with 2 light tanks Co. D advanced with 113rd Inf. and took up position 1 mile S. of Bracciano. Encountered some enemy resistance and AT fire. Remainder of Co. D continued advance to North.

Noon 7 June to noon 8 June - Three tanks Co. A and 2 light tanks Co. D with 113rd Inf. encountered enemy bicycle battalion in woods about 1/2 miles NE of Bracciano. Enemy was taken by surprise. The tanks overran them and killed many. About 300 prisoners were taken. Tanks then moved about 2 miles north and went into positions for the night. Co. D assembled 1 mile S. of Allumiere.

Noon 8 June to noon 9 June - Co. A relieved and moved to Rn. assembly area on west edge of Rome. Two light tanks Co. D rejoined Co. in assembly area S. of Allumiere. Co. then moved to Rn. assembly area.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 9 June 1944

1. General:

Throughout this period the enemy was fighting a delaying action characterized by rear guard strong points usually of from one to two companies in strength and heavily reinforced by tanks and/or anti-tank guns. These strong points were usually placed at road junctions, hill crests, and other strategic terrain features.

Enemy armor was active throughout the period, however, tanks were rarely seen operating in more than platoon strength. Usually there were only two or three tanks operating in close support of the infantry.

The use of "rocket" type weapons, particularly the bazooka, was more evident in this period than heretofore. However, damage was rarely caused to tanks by these weapons.

Men of this organization, who were captured and later escaped and re-joined their unit, reported the enemy retreat to be disorderly. Transportation was insufficient and many horse and mule drawn vehicles were in use. Traffic jams were frequent. Food was scarce and unusually poor both in quality and variety. Interrogations were hasty and no pressure was exerted on individuals who refused to answer questions. Enemy knowledge of the disposition of our forces appeared to be reasonably complete.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

SECTION III - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Tactical:

a. It is believed that tank losses can be reduced by attention being paid to lighting tanks in mass rather than in detail. If less than a platoon of tanks is committed to action, proper leadership and coordination are apt to be lost, and there will be the necessary support lacking, i.e., tanks establishing a base of fire when other tanks advance or withdraw.

b. It is believed that battle sled and "the snobs" (demolition to snipe gaps in mine fields) can be used to an advantage in combat. The tank bulldozer has definitely proved its worth. It is believed that more use should be made of these implements, but it should be borne in mind that tanks detailed for their use cannot be expected to be available at all times for their normal role in action, i.e., the assault. It is difficult to plan two missions and expect both to be filled without encountering some delay in action, or even the failure to accomplish one of the missions.

c. Tanks have a valuable use in transporting infantry, rations, ammunition, wire, etc. in the forward area. When the enemy is about to be contacted, infantry should not be on the tanks because of the amount of fire tanks normally draw.

d. It is believed that greater use can be made of artillery and tank destroyer forward observers being in tanks. More attention should be paid to radio communication between tank, artillery, and tank destroyer units. Coordination between these units is essential in order to reduce tank losses.

e. Coordination between the infantry and tanks is essential for the proper support of the infantry. This requires the following:

- (1) Staying together.
- (2) Tank personnel knowing personally the infantry men that they are to work with and vice versa.
- (3) Tank company commanders and platoon leaders knowing the infantry's plans of departure for the attack, the nature of maneuver and its objectives.
- (4) Infantry commanders should know the tanks routes of approach, their assembly and rallying points.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

(5) The infantry must be made aware of a tank's capability and its limitations. Lacking in this knowledge, there is bound to be misunderstanding that will lead to confusion in battle, unnecessary tank losses, and lost opportunities to destroy the enemy. Frequently the infantry has a better knowledge of the terrain and what they are likely to encounter in the way of enemy resistance than is the case with tank personnel. This information should be given to the commander of tanks in sufficient time prior to the attack so that he can properly make his plans.

(6) Coordination built up between the infantry and tanks during a long period of combat has proved its great value. Therefore, the question is begged when a tank battalion that has been so attached to an infantry division along with its supporting tank destroyer battalion should not remain so attached.

f. The speed of a tank attack should be regulated to that of the infantry. When tanks precede the infantry by more than 150 yards the enemy frequently withholds its small arms fire until the tanks have passed and then fires upon the infantry. The attack made by bounds will prevent this - the infantry advancing until it meets resistance, the tanks then passing through the infantry to wipe out this resistance, and the infantry again advancing when resistance is broken. The close support by tanks should reduce the chance of tanks firing upon their own infantry.

g. Infantry must give protection to tanks at all times when contact has been made or is expected to be made with the enemy. If this protection is missing tanks will be destroyed by bazookas, flame throwers, and antitank grenades both thrown and otherwise propelled. Protection by tank destroyers must be constantly sought after.

h. When tanks are used to clear out a wadi, street, or other narrow defile, the following should be taken into consideration:

(1) Tanks will lose their power to maneuver, thus being more vulnerable to enemy fire.

(2) In soft going usually found in wadis flotation grousers have not in several cases prevented a tank from getting bogged down. In narrow wadis these grousers have caused a tank to turn over.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

1. When tanks are not moving they should be given the opportunity to take hull-down positions and/or concealed positions immediately. Failure in this will cause unnecessary tank losses, and also the element of surprise will be lost when the tanks are committed to action.

j. When tanks are used to support a defense for a period of time, it is believed best to have at least a platoon together in an assembly area from which they can be launched against an attack, rather than in isolated positions where the tanks are subject to being destroyed in detail.

k. Tanks have proved their value as road blocks, but here again they should be so employed that the platoon can work as a team. It should be given tank destroyer support and infantry protection.

l. When it is known that the enemy (Germany) has armored forces to be employed against our tanks, the following should be borne in mind:

(1) The Tiger tank (Mark 6) can "out punch" our Sherman Mk. IV's and will penetrate the heaviest armor plate on our medium tank. Therefore, the element of surprise and the principle of maneuver along with close tank destroyer support must be utilized to offset the above.

m. The assault guns of a tank unit are the close supporting fire for tanks. They should be normally used as such and not attached to the field artillery. This is especially important when a break-through is made in the enemy forces.

2. Comment:

a. If tanks are used over a broad front it is believed that they can be best commanded from the air (out planes) by the senior commander of tanks present.

b. In any event, the commander must be in a position to command in person at critical points of action, and if necessary to lead his tanks in person. This is not to be construed to mean that the commander of tanks should not be available to make recommendations to the commander of forces being supported as to the employment of the tanks. It is mentioned here to bring out the point that once a plan of action has been decided upon, the commander of tanks should then be free to best influence the action of the tanks so that every effort is made to accomplish the mission. Liaison and communications should be utilized to keep the number of forces informed as to the developments of the tank action. It has been found that tank liaison officers to infantry regiments being supported is most desirable. The Table of Organization does not provide for this, so this liaison is sometimes difficult to maintain if there is a shortage of officers.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

3. Battle Efficiency:

a. If full track vehicles are to arrive in the zone of action in their best condition for combat, every effort should be made for the employment of tank transporters. Driving tanks over hard surface roads, especially in hot weather, is extremely costly to bogie wheels and causes other mechanical deterioration.

b. There is a tendency to keep tanks engaged in action for too long a period of time. This causes a rapid decline in battle efficiency as shown below:

(1) Proper tank maintenance is not accomplished.

(2) The physical and mental strain of personnel fighting in tanks is so great that it is not uncommon that a point of exhaustion is reached after three to four days of continuous hard combat.

(3) The tank being primarily an assault weapon of the first order, casualties, both as to personnel and as to the tanks themselves are relatively high. If both types of replacements are not readily at hand, battle efficiency of a high order will not be maintained.

(a) Attention is drawn to the fact that for the most part personnel replacements have not been highly trained tankers.

4. Training and Discipline:

a. A lack of training and discipline brought out the following observations in combat:

(1) Fox holes not promptly and properly dug when tanks were not actually engaging the enemy. Therefore, personnel did not obtain the rest they should have because men do not get proper rest and sleep inside a tank.

(2) Men bailing out of tanks, that were hit, without their bringing their arms and helmets. Some neglected to even provide them with hand grenades that were available.

(3) Failure to take advantage of hull-down positions, to keep tanks properly dispersed and concealed. Keeping the strongest armor plate toward the enemy field of fire was not always resorted to, though possible.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

(4) Too frequently, tanks did not support each other with a base of fire, and neglected the battle tactics of the platoons. These tactics are the essence of all tank tactics.

(5) Failure to keep alert and to provide local security when contact with the enemy was imminent.

(6) Known case of captured soldier who was recovered, who had a letter on his person carrying his military address. This soldier also permitted himself to be unduly engaged in conversation with his captors.

(7) Some personnel not being indoctrinated with the spirit that a gun should be manned in action so long as it can be fired regardless of circumstances, and that tanks must constantly "bore-in". A lack of appreciation that the accomplishment of the mission is paramount to everything else was too often the case.

5. Supply:

a. Ammunition and supplies were kept well forward, thus preventing a delay in action.

b. Minor and serious injuries to and in and about the eyes of personnel in tanks are frequent. It is believed that this can be avoided to a large degree by the use of a suitable mask and goggles.

X. Summary:

a. To establish and maintain battle efficiency the following should be taken into consideration:

(1) Time should be allowed to acquire and improve battle and field technique, discipline, and a will to fight that is comparable to the highest traditions of the service. Too often, the time allotted to tank battalions for training is spent merely in aiding the infantry in their training. This does not mean that the two should not train together so as to provide proper coordination for battle, but it does mean that a certain amount of time should be set aside for the individual training of tank personnel.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

(2) It seems to be a better policy to use tanks for short periods of combat (3 to 4 days) frequently rather than for a protracted length of time. Thus the necessary rest for personnel and the necessary tank maintenance is obtained. It is believed that in the end this will achieve greater results upon the battlefield.

(3) The coordination established between infantry and tank units in their training together and in combat is most valuable. Once it has been obtained every effort should be made to keep the respective units together for future operations.

(4) It is believed that tanks in mass (never less than a platoon) are more effective than tanks fought individually, in which case they are subject to being beaten in detail.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

SECTION IV - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communication with higher headquarters and within the battalion was by radio, wire and messenger.

2. Wire:

During the first few days of the period wire communication with higher headquarters was satisfactory. During the latter part of the period, movement of units was too fast and the distance too great to maintain wire communication. Therefore, radio became the primary means of communication.

3. Radio:

Radio communication with higher headquarters was satisfactory during most of the period. Frequently the distance was so great that contact with the net central stations direct was impossible, and messages had to be relayed through other stations. The companies engaged in combat operations during the period 1 June to 10 June were out of range of the SCR-508 radios which are used for communication within the battalion. An SCR-193 and a tank with an SCR-508 radio were placed with the liaison officer at the C. P. of the division which the respective Cos. were attached to. The SCR-508 was used to communicate with the tank companies. The SCR-193 was used to communicate with the battalion C. P. This was satisfactory but it caused a strain upon personnel and equipment. Enemy interference was slight during the period. Atmospheric interference was had on several occasions.

SECTION V - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the past operations, this battalion was engaged with the enemy until relieved on 1200H 8 June 1944. During the first seven and one half days of the period the problem of supplying tank companies with rations, gasoline and ammunition was difficult due to the fact that the battalion was split between two infantry divisions, which were in two different Corps. The distance involved made it almost impossible to supply the detached companies. The problem was solved by attaching three 2 1/2 ton trucks to each of the detached companies and they picked up their supplies from their respective infantry supply points.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

2. Rations:

The principal ration used during the period was the B ration. The first seven and one half days of the period C, K, and 10 in 1 rations were used. The 10 in 1 rations were used when it was possible for the tank crews to prepare their meals. The 5 in 1 ration is preferred over the 10 in 1 ration by all personnel.

3. Clothing:

Supply of clothing was excellent and all personnel have been able to maintain a high standard of personal appearance. Difficulty has been encountered in procuring combat boots of smaller sizes particularly sizes 5 and 5 $\frac{1}{2}$, and the one piece overall size 36R.

4. Gas, Oil and Ammunition:

The first seven and one half days of the period being spent in combat, gasoline and ammo was drawn from army dumps and the supply was ample. As the drive progressed it was necessary to make long hauls as these supply points were not always able to be moved forward. During the latter part of the period twenty five of the battalion's trucks were detached to the quartermaster for the hauling of supplies. This made it difficult to supply tanks for training with gasoline and ammo due to the long haul and the shortage of transportation within the battalion.

5. Ordnance Supply:

Tank replacements have not been available since the battalion came out of combat. The battalion was short 13 medium tanks and 5 light tanks at close of period.

There is an acute shortage of fire control equipment such as binoculars and watches. Binoculars are essential for tank commanders.

During the period this unit has been unable to obtain the necessary parts for the repairing of wheeled vehicles and tanks due to distance between the Bn. and the ordnance depot.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

Tank, Medium M4- 3
Tank, Light M3A1- 2

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

7. Recommendations:

Arrangements should be made whereby small units can avail themselves of clothing exchange and shower facilities. Divisions are given priority on the use of the showers and it is difficult for a separate battalion to arrange a schedule.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. General:

At the opening of the period covered by this report, battle casualties from current operations had reduced the unit's effective strength to 721 Officers and EM, a figure below authorized T/O strength. Requisitions had been previously submitted, based on expected casualty losses, but advice was received that there were no armor-trained replacements available. The unit was obliged to continue in action, its personnel strength decreasing daily and with no replacements to be obtained. The effect was detrimental to the battalion's combat efficiency because the reduced strength created the necessity of dead-lining serviceable tanks and other material.

It was not until June 17, after being withdrawn from the line, that the unit received its first replacements. A very few of these men had had previous training with tank units. The majority of them were from other arms, mainly infantry, who had been classified as AF gunners. It has been necessary to train them as tank personnel.

On 26 June, twenty-four (24) men were received, supposedly trained tank crew men; however, their training consisted of a two-week period of tank instruction.

Never during the period were replacements received who had the required training and qualifications for the job to which it was necessary to assign them.

SECTION VII - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. During the first week the battalion was moving so fast and frequently that both company maint. sections and battalion maintenance platoon could accomplish little work. Supporting heavy maintenance company was also constantly moving.

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Report of Action for Month of June, Cont'd.

During the remaining three weeks considerable 1st echelon maintenance was accomplished by tank crews. General purpose vehicles were on detached service from the organization for a period of a week and did not get proper 2nd echelon maintenance.

Tank parts were not available in any degree throughout the month, and considerable transmission and final drive work could not be accomplished.

The month of June illustrated that time is not the only element in good maintenance. Without parts and material little can be accomplished and the supply of parts (Ordnance Depot) must be so located as to furnish its supporting units with supplies and materials. Also it was noted that moves by a maintenance unit must be bold and few and preferably at night, so that all daylight working hours may be utilized.

Arthur Snyder

ARTHUR SNYDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding

Incls.

Incl #1-Battle Casualty Report

Incl #2-Map 1/50,000 Sheet 149 I Sheets 150, I,II,III,IV Sheets 142 II Sheets 143

Incl #3-Map 1/25,000 Sheets 150 I SE SW 150 II NE NW SE SW II & III

Incl #4-Unit Journal and File 1/200,000 Italy Road Map Sheet 17

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

RESTRICTED

4 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of July.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, IV Corps, APO #304, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Change #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of July is submitted:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of our Operations
1 - 31 July 1944

1. Note:

The period opened with the 751st Tank Battalion in a rest and training area 4 miles NW of Bracciano, Italy. Co. B had closed in an area in vicinity of Lido de Roma at 2230B on 30 June and was attached to 85th Infantry Division for training. On 12 July the Battalion, less Co. B, Serv. Co., and full tracked vehicles, closed in area vicinity of Roccastrada and were attached to 85th Division upon arrival. On 14 July Service Company and full tracked vehicles arrived at Battalion area. On 15 July, the Battalion moved to area vicinity of Bibbona and were attached to IV Corps. On 16 July Co. B rejoined the Battalion and the Battalion moved to an area 6 miles E. of Bibbona. On 21 July, the Bn. moved to an area vicinity of Fauglia and were placed in support of the 34th Infantry Div. On 22 July Battalion Hqs. closed in area vicinity Q171523. Companies moved up in support of 133rd and 168th Infantry Regiments, and remained in defensive positions, except for small attacks to improve the infantry's lines. The Assault Platoon moved into firing positions vicinity of Q142569 on 23 July. Tanks remained in defensive positions, doing some firing and making several local attacks with infantry units, until 27 July. On this date the 34th Infantry Div. was relieved by the 45th AAA Brigade, acting as infantry. The Battalion remained attached to IV Corps and was sub attached to 2nd Armored Group. Companies remained in their approximate positions in support of the 45th AAA Brigade.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

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On 28 July the Battalion assumed responsibility for support of the entire Brigade front. Two platoons of each medium company were placed in position to be used as artillery, with their remaining platoon functioning as roving tank platoons to be employed in their normal role. Co. D was placed in Brigade reserve. All elements remained thus through the close of the period.

2. Daily Summary for period 22 - 31 July:

Noon 22 July to noon 23 July - Bn. Hqs. and Hqs. Co. closed in area vic Q171523 at 222050B. Other locations are as follows: Co. A, less 3rd Plt. vic Q181477, Co. B - Q121518, Co. C - Q102519, Co. D, Mortar Plt., and 3rd plt. Co. A, in Div. reserve vic Q140547, Assault Plt. vic. Q139562.

Noon 23 July to noon 24 July - Co. B closed vic Q137568 at 1200B. 3rd Plt. Co. A and 3rd Plt. Co. B went into firing positions vic. Q165618. Other two plts. Co. B went into firing positions vic. Q149564. 3rd Plt. Co. B moved to Q161618. 1st Plt. Co. C moved to vic. Q179625 and supported Co. C 168th Inf. Regt. in attack on strongpoint vic Q178634. Assault Plt. moved to firing positions vic Q142569. Sustained three casualties from AP mines. Fired 2 rds. smoke for registration. 1st Plt. Co. C fired 50 rds. HE, knocking out several M/G's and other small pockets of resistance vic Q176628.

Noon 24 July to noon 25 July - 1st Plt. Co. B moved to vic Q137619; 2nd Plt. Co. B vic. Q146618; 3rd Plt. Co. B vic Q163614; Co. B CP vic. Q146618. 1st Plt. Co. B supported 2nd Bn. of 133rd Inf. Regt. in small attack.

Noon 25 July to noon 26 July - 1st Plt. Co. C adjusted fire of Div. Arty. on enemy tks. at Q279675 with good results and at least one large vehicle destroyed. Serv. Co. closed in area vic. Q188480 at 0815B. Co. B lost one (1) tank vic Q137619 as a result of heavy arty fire - 4 casualties. Assault Plt. fired to check registration. Received a few rds. harassing fire - no casualties. 1st Plt. Co. B moved to Q131609.

Noon 26 July to noon 27 July - Mortar Plt. rejoined Hqs. Co. vic Q171532. Assault Plt. fired 2 missions: 1 - personnel, 1 - gun position. Ammo expended - 50 HE, 3 smoke. Co. D less 3rd Plt. moved to area vic Q092546.

Noon 27 July to noon 28 July - Co. D less 3rd Plt. returned vic Q144548. Co. A moved to area vic Q089550. Co. C assembled vic Q093548.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

Noon 28 July to noon 29 July - Service Co. closed in area vic Q185497 at 1300B. Bn. alerted due to enemy naval activity. Companies A and C moved to defensive positions in event of a possible landing. 2nd Plt. Co. D moved to Q199599. Assault Plt. fired 2 missions: 1 - enemy tanks, 1 - suspected fuel dump. Started fires which burned for several hours. Expended 40 HE, 14 WP. 2nd and 3rd Plts. Co. A moved to vic Q030570, 1st Plt. Co A vic Q089550, Co. B vic Q165603, Co. C vic Q093548.

Noon 29 July to noon 30 July - Mortar Plt., vic. Q179611, fired 3 missions: 1 - enemy personnel, 1 - bridge, 1 - enemy mortars. Expended 65 - L, 5 - H, 20 Smoke. Co. A moved vic. Q099540, 1st Plt. Co. A vic Q032576, 2nd Plt. Co. A vic Q022591, 3rd Plt. Co. A vic Q026589. 2nd and 3rd Plts. to be used as arty, 1st Plt. to act as a roving tank plt. Co. B moved to area vic Q145617, 1st Plt. Co. B vic Q161605, 2nd Plt. Co. B vic Q145617, 3rd Plt. Co. B vic Q163604. 1st and 3rd Plts. to be used as arty, 1st Plt. to act as a roving tank plt. 1st and 3rd Plts. Co. C moved vic Q099598 to be used as arty. 2nd Plt. vic Q102552 to act as a roving tank plt. Co. D in reserve at Q144548.

Noon 30 July to noon 31 July - Mortar Plt. fired 144, 5 Smoke. Arty. plts. of Cos. A and C fired for registration. Assault Plt. received harassing fire - 1 casualty. 1st Plt. Co. A moved vic Q027574, Co. C CP vic Q093566, Co. B CP vic Q158601. Other elements remained unchanged through close of period.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

Summary of Enemy Operations
22 - 31 July 1944

1. General:

Throughout this period the enemy held defensive positions generally north of the Arno river. These positions seemed lightly held with main defensive line in mountains to the north.

Artillery fire was light throughout the period although there were numerous heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire in forward areas. Self propelled guns and tanks fired chiefly at night, returning to covered positions prior to daylight.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

Enemy armor was not contacted except for individual tanks firing harassing fire. Several concentrations of armor were observed at a distance and taken under fire.

Enemy patrols were very active at night. These were usually composed of from 2 - 5 men armed with automatic weapons. Their primary mission seemed to be reconnaissance although they would usually fire on or ambush small groups of personnel. Machine guns and ammunition were hidden in buildings in or near our lines for use of patrols or enemy hiding out along the south side of the river.

Partisans proved very helpful in locating minefields and reporting information of the enemy to our forward elements. Their information, particularly concerning minefields, for the most part proved accurate and helpful. It was noted, however, that these partisans were very familiar with our strength, disposition of forces and weapons, and location of our CP's. Such a situation might prove extremely harmful for, although they seem friendly and volunteer information, it must be remembered that they travel through our lines into enemy territory and might just as easily be furnishing information to the enemy.

SECTION III - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Indirect Fire:

In addition to employing tanks for indirect firing to support infantry and/or other tanks, it has been found that they can be employed to great advantage in supplementing field artillery. Therefore, all tank personnel should be trained in indirect fire procedure. The Azimuth indicators have been used very satisfactorily, especially in night firing. The panoramic sight of the type used on the .50 cal. machine gun is more accurate than the Azimuth indicator but it is not an organic part of the tank and therefore is usually unavailable in the combat zone.

2. Recommendations:

a. Experience has indicated the necessity and importance of intelligent liaison with the next higher headquarters. Tank companies are usually attached to or in direct support of infantry regiments for operations, therefore making it necessary that the company furnish a Liaison Officer to the Infantry Regiment. It is recommended that each medium tank company and the light tank company be authorized an officer to be Company Executive Officer and Liaison Officer.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

b. The bulldozer blade as a modification and attachment to the tank has proven highly successful in combat. It is recommended that each medium company be equipped with one bulldozer blade.

c. The present T/O and E authorizes each medium company one M-7. The personnel made available to the M-7 is insufficient to properly employ the piece. It is recommended that M-7's authorized each medium company be included in the Headquarters and Headquarters Company T/O and E as a part of the assault gun platoon making a six gun platoon. It is further recommended that an additional officer in the grade of Lt. be authorized Headquarters and Headquarters Company for the 6 gun Assault Platoon.

SECTION IV - SIGNAL

1. General:

Radio, wire and messenger were used for communications with higher headquarters.

2. Wire:

Wire communications proved quite satisfactory whenever unit remained bivouaced in one area long enough to warrant the laying of wire. Some difficulties were experienced due to the grade of wire used. A large percentage of the wire used was Class B, retrieved wire, and a good many breakages resulted causing some disruption in our communications.

3. Radio:

Radio communications, both voice and C. W., were used with higher headquarters and proved very satisfactory with only a minimum of difficulties experienced. The difficulties had were due mostly to terrain features and the distances involved. Mechanical troubles were slight.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

4. Recommendations:

It is believed that the following changes in T-0 and E 17-25, dated 15 Sept 1943 would prove beneficial: The authorization of a W. O. in communications, the authorization of a 2½ ton truck w/1 ton trailer to the communications section for converting into a repair and spare parts truck, the authorization of one additional T/4 radio repairman and one additional T/5 radio repairman in Hqs. Co. and one additional T/5 radio repairman in each line Co., the authorization of a wire crew in Hqs. Co. consisting of one Sgt. wire chief and two basic linesmen. An additional ¼ ton truck would be needed for the transportation of the wire crew.

SECTION V - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 July this battalion was engaged in drawing tanks and moving back into the line. During the early part of the period the battalion was short four (4) 2½ ton 6 x 6 trucks and three (3) ¼ ton Trucks, 4 x 4 C & R, however, at the close of the period three (3) trucks 2½ ton 6 x 6 and two (2) trucks ¼ ton, 4 x 4 C & R were allocated the battalion and transportation improved.

2. Rations:

The principal ration used during the period was the 10 in 1 ration. This ration is very popular for tank crews in combat, however the 5 in 1 is preferred by all personnel because of the variety it offers.

3. Clothing:

Supply of clothing was excellent and all personnel have been able to maintain a high standard of personal appearance. However, smaller sizes of combat boots, particularly sizes 5 and 5½ and the one piece coverall size 36 R have been difficult to draw.

4. Gas, Oil and Ammunition:

The supply of gasoline, oil and ammunition has been ample for the period.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

5. Ordnance:

a. Tank replacements have been good. At the close of the period the battalion was short two (2) medium tanks.

b. Toward the close of the period parts for general purpose vehicles were less difficult to obtain.

c. The shortage of fire control equipment still exists. Binoculars have not been available.

Equipment, such as rammer staffs, aiming stakes, lighting devices, and Azimuth Indicators also have not been available.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

Tank, Medium M₄ - 1

b. Signal:

SCR - 528, complete.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. General:

The personnel status of the command fluctuated only slightly during the period. Battle casualties were extremely light and the number of hospital returnees remained sufficient to maintain adequate strength at all times. In accordance with T/O revisions, on 31 July, twelve (12) basic privates were transferred on paper to Personnel Center #6 and made available for call by Replacement Command, NATOUSA. These revisions reduced the authorized assigned enlisted strength of the unit from 713 to 680.

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Report of Action for Month of July, Cont'd.

Delay in the receipt of rotation replacements continued. No replacements were received during the period. In some instances, vacancies still exist from rotations as early as February. In the interim, the positions are being filled by capable men to whom the appropriate rating cannot be given. The continued existence of this situation in which men hold positions of responsibility with no hope of compensation has created a personnel problem with which company commanders cannot cope.

SECTION VII - MAINTENANCE

1. The problems of maintenance were reduced to a minimum for the first two weeks of the month due to the turning in of 25 medium tanks to other organizations.
2. Operations in the second two weeks were well coordinated within the battalion and with higher echelons. New equipment (33 medium tanks and 11 light tanks) were technically inspected between the 18th and 21st. There was an abnormal amount of medium tank clutch trouble and general purpose vehicle steering trouble due to extreme dust conditions.
3. A shortage of parts and supplies slowed up operations considerably.

Arthur Snyder
ARTHUR SNYDER,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding.

5 Incls.

- Incl. #1-Battle Casualty Report
- Incl. #2-Maps (Italy 1/50,000) Sheets 112 IV, 111 I, 105 III, 104 II.
- Incl. #3-Maps (Italy 1/100,000) Sheets 112, 111, 105, 104
- Incl. #4-Maps (Italy Road - 1/200,000) Sheets 13, 15, 17
- Incl. #5-Unit Journal and file.

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RESTRICTION

HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

1 August 1944

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 July 1944 through 31 July 1944:

<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA(Hosp)</u>	<u>WIA(Not Hosp)</u>	<u>IIA(Hosp)</u>	<u>IIA(Not Hosp)</u>	<u>total</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Company	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
Service Company	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company "A"	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Company "B"	0	1	3	1	1	0	6
Company "C"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company "D"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>

Richard R. NeuhoFS
RICHARD R. NEUHOF'S,
WOJG, 751st Tank Battalion,
Unit Personnel Officer.

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

1 August 1944

RESTRICTED

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 July 1944 through 31 July 1944:

HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Killed in Action:

Caruso, Joseph J. 32 168 192 Sgt. 23 July 1944

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Niva, Markus B. 16 061 533 Sgt. 23 July 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

SERVICE COMPANY

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

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RESTRICTION

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 July 1944 through 31 July 1944 continued:

COMPANY "A"

Killed in Action:

Dean, Elias W. 34 268 814 Pvt. 30 July 1944

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Nitschke, Arthur A. 37 095 747 T/4 21 July 1944

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

COMPANY "B"

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

Campbell, Thomas R. 11 048 214 Cpl. 25 July 1944

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

Berger, Norman 32 170 189 Pfc. 23 July 1944

Moore, Thomas D. 15 047 949 Pvt. 25 July 1944

Golden, Tarzan N. 37 603 519 Pvt. 25 July 1944

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

Holloway, LeRoy 15 336 323 Pvt. 27 July 1944

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

Bishop, Jesse J. 34 611 096 T/5 25 July 1944

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

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Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 July 1944 through 31 July 1944 continued:

COMPANY "C"

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

COMPANY "D"

Killed in Action:

None

Missing in Action:

None

Wounded on Action (Hospitalized):

None

Wounded in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Hospitalized):

None

Injured in Action (Not Hospitalized):

None

C O N F I D E N T I A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of September.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of September is submitted:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
Summary of our Operations
1 - 30 September 1944

1. Note:

At the opening of the period, the 751st Tank Battalion remained attached to IV Corps and sub-attached to TF 45. Two platoons from each of Companies "A", "B", and "C" occupied artillery positions, while the other platoon from each company was utilized as a roving platoon for the purpose of making demonstrations and deviations along the Arno River in the TF 45 sector. After the crossing of the Arno River was completed on 3 September, the medium tank companies resumed the artillery role and continued to use one platoon as a roving unit. On 9 September, Companies "A" and "D" were attached to 2d Armd Group, and were formed into two separate task forces under the command of the two respective company commanders. Each task force consisted of one platoon of light tanks, one platoon medium tanks, one platoon tank destroyers from 894 TD Battalion, and had supporting elements of infantry. Company "B" was placed in Battalion Reserve and used as artillery from 6 September through 29 September, at which time it was replaced by Company "A". Company "C" was placed in support of the 107th AAA Group on 4 September and remained in that capacity until 15 September, at which time it assumed a supporting role with the 6th Combat Team of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.

2. Daily Summary:

Noon 31 August to noon 1 September - Component units disposed as follows: Battalion CP vicinity 176498, Hq. Co. vicinity 176498, Assault Platoon vicinity 143569, Mortar Platoon vicinity 179610; Company "A" CP vic 020582, 1st Platoon 026589, 1st section, 2d Platoon vicinity 004585, 2d section, 2d Platoon vicinity 068617, 3rd Platoon vicinity 022591; Company "B" CP vicinity 124603, 1st Platoon vicinity 122608, 2d Platoon vicinity 144616, 3rd Platoon vicinity 120608; Company "C" CP vicinity 093566, 1st Platoon vicinity 098637, 2d Platoon vicinity 099595, 3rd Platoon vicinity 099595; Company "D" CP vicinity 144548, 1st Platoon vicinity

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Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

144548, 2d Platoon vicinity 144548, 3rd Platoon vicinity 178608; Service Company CP vicinity 185497. 1st Platoon, Company "A" fired a mission on an enemy gun in the vicinity of 006659 and started a fire in the immediate area. 1st Platoon, Company "B" fired on a house containing enemy personnel in the vicinity of 174675. The area was covered thoroughly and several direct hits were observed. Company "B's" tank dozer reported to 235th Engineer Battalion for the purpose of making a demonstration in the vicinity of 178610. No enemy reaction occurred.

Noon 1 September to noon 2 September - The Battalion forward CP moved to the vicinity of 120610, closing in at 020845B, as the Battalion prepared to cross the Arno River. The 3rd Platoon, Company "D" began its crossing at 020715B and the last vehicle crossed at 0745B. The platoon then closed into the area in the vicinity of 161641. At 1100B, the remainder of the company completed a move to the area 118614. Six tanks from Company "C" crossed the river at 1030B and proceeded to the vicinity of 1161. The 2d Platoon of Company "B", the 3rd Platoon of Company "D", and the Mortar Platoon moved into the vicinity 1466. No contact was made with the enemy.

Noon 2 September to noon 3 September - The Battalion CP and Hq. Co. moved from 176498 to join the Battalion forward CP at 120610, closing in the area at 021515B. Company "A" remained in position south of the Arno River and elements of the company supported the 39th LAA Regt. (Br) in consolidating infantry positions along the river. The 1st section of the 3rd Platoon crossed the Arno River at approximately 021530B and moved to 070641 to support infantry crossing the river. The north bank of the river was cleared with no opposition. The Assault Platoon took position in the vicinity of 110628 at 1230B, and the Mortar Platoon completed its move to the vicinity 125690 at 2230B. Company "D" effected an unopposed crossing of the Arno beginning at 030530B and assembled in the area 108664. The 1st and 2d Platoons were in 45th Brigade Reserve, and the 3rd Platoon supported the 100th Infantry Battalion, having crossed 1 - 2 September.

Noon 3 September to noon 4 September - The Battalion CP moved from its area at 120610, closing in the vicinity 103661 at 031315B. Remaining elements of Company "B" crossed the river and closed into the area 125680 at 1835B, and were joined by the 2d Platoon which had crossed two days before. The 3rd Platoon, Company "A", with the company's tank dozer, constructed by-passes and cleared the road from 054626 to 033623, working in support of the 2d Armd Group. When this mission was completed at about 2030B, the platoon was divided, one section supporting an infantry outpost, and the other providing security while engineers bridged the river at 052622.

Noon 4 September to noon 5 September - The 3rd Platoon, Company "A" accompanied infantry elements to clear mines and debris from the north-south road generally along the 02 Easting. One tank was disabled by a 'Box' mine, causing damage to the engine and track. Company "B" reverted to Battalion Reserve, in an artillery role; Company "C" was placed in direct support of the 107th AAA Group; and Company "D", less the 3rd Platoon, remained in TF 45 Reserve. The 3rd Platoon, Company "D", continued to support the 100th Infantry Battalion.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

Noon 5 September to noon 6 September - Company "A" continued to support the infantry advance in the 2d Armd Group sector and to provide security for engineer units repairing widespread demolitions left behind by the Germans. Company "C" moved from 097659 to 085705, closing at 060030B, and remained in support of the 107th AAA Group. Company "A" was attached to the 2d Armd Group as of 051355B.

Noon 6 September to noon 7 September - Company "D" (less one platoon) was relieved from Brigade Reserve and attached to 2d Armd Group, effective 070825B. One section of the 2d Platoon, Company "A" took position at 058700 and fired a mission on a house believed to be an enemy OP. Ninety-three rounds of HE were expended, covering the area, reinforced by .30 and .50 calibre machine gun fire.

Noon 7 September to noon 8 September - Company "D" was relieved from attachment to 2d Armd Group and reverted to its former status in Brigade Reserve, but was to be attached to 2d Armd Group effective on call. The two platoons, one from Company "C" and the other from Company "D", plus the Mortar Platoon were relieved from attachment to the 100th Infantry Battalion and supported the 434th AAA Battalion, effective 070600B. The 2d Platoon, Company "A" fired on 2 enemy-occupied houses, 1 enemy OP, and a strongpoint, expending 109 rounds of ammunition. They received strong artillery and mortar counterbattery fire.

Noon 8 September to noon 9 September - Company "C", less one platoon, was sub-attached by 107th AAA Group to the 435th AAA Battalion. One platoon of Company "C" was attached to the 434th AAA Battalion. The 1st Platoon, Company "D", formerly attached to the 434th AAA Battalion, was relieved and attached to the 435th AAA Battalion, effective 090005B. One tank from Company "D" preceded a truck carrying bridging material across the approaches to the causeway at 090720. This was done to test for mines before the equipment was placed.

Noon 9 September to noon 10 September - Company "A" moved from 081651 and closed into its new position in the vicinity of 080701 at 1645B. Company "C" opened its new CP at 095723 at 092100B. During the first part of this period, Companies "A" and "D" were broken up into two units, each comprised of one platoon of medium tanks, one platoon of light tanks, one platoon of tank destroyers from the 894 TD Battalion, and elements of supporting infantry. They were commanded by the Commanding Officers, Companies "A" and "D", and were designated TF Heckmann and TF Jamison. Both units were under the control of the 2d Armd Group. TF Heckmann assembled at 091730B in the vicinity of 074700. At 100645B, it attacked to the north and northwest, crossed the Serchio River at 100725B, and proceeded to the area 035723 where it arrived at the end of the period. TF Jamison attacked to the north and northwest at 100630B from its area in the vicinity of 076692, crossed the Serchio and assembled at 010725. The 1st Platoon of Company "D" remained with the 435th AAA Battalion and the 1st Platoon of Company "A" was held in 2d Armd Group Reserve. Company "C" moved its CP to the vicinity 095723, closing in at 092100B.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

Noon 10 September to noon 11 September - The Battalion CP moved from 103661 at 101500B, crossed the Serchio River, and closed into its new area in the vicinity of 087725 at 1530B. The remainder of Battalion Headquarters and Hq. Co. completed the move at 1715B. Company "A" moved to 051707; Company "B" took position at 072730, still in Battalion Reserve. The 3rd Platoon, Company "C" moved to the vicinity of 099723, and the 1st Platoon, Company "D" to 095725. Those moves brought all elements of the Battalion, excepting Service Company, across the Serchio River. TF Heckmann attacked with the 2d Armd Group toward the vicinity of 014767 at 101730B, attained its objective, and remained in defensive positions through the end of the period. TF Jamison moved out at the same time toward 010769, took its objective, and also took up defensive positions.

Noon 11 September to noon 12 September - Two tanks from the 3rd Platoon, Company "A", plus one TD, made an armored reconnaissance at 111500B from Torre del Lago, at 019778, north on Highway #1 to approximately 001820. No enemy was encountered, but at that point, the road was blocked and heavily mined. The patrol returned to position at 994770. At the same time, another patrol consisting of the same number of vehicles made a reconnaissance from the vicinity of 005774 to 990816. At 996797, a road-block was found, but was removed with no enemy reaction. The mission completed, the vehicles returned to their assembly area. Company "C" and the 1st Platoon of Company "D" were relieved from attachment to the 435th AAA Battalion and attached to the 434th AAA Battalion. Company "C" CP moved to 109761; the 1st, 2d and 3rd Platoons moved to positions at 075785, 107757, and 105725 respectively. Company "D" CP moved to 015777; the 1st Platoon moved to the vicinity 075783.

Noon 12 September to noon 13 September - Company "D", less the 1st Platoon, was placed at the disposal of the 39th LAA Regt. (Br) and used to clear enemy from the area bounded by the 99-04 Eastings and 74-77 Northings. It was hoped to rescue 8 British soldiers taken prisoner by the enemy, but neither the soldiers nor the enemy were encountered.

Noon 13 September to noon 14 September - The 2d Platoon of Company "A", as part of TF Heckmann, moved north along Highway #1 from 017782 to about the 80 Northing searching for an enemy patrol of 40 men previously reported in that sector. Accompanying partisans patrolled east as far as the Fosso Quindici line (021800-028787), but no enemy was encountered and the vehicles returned to their area about 131700B. One tank from 2d Platoon, Company "D" and one medium tank from TF Heckmann supported troops of the 39th LAA Regt. (Br) and partisans on a reconnaissance to the vicinity of 988820. A 10 - 15 man enemy patrol was engaged in a short fire fight, following which the enemy withdrew. Subsequently, heavy artillery fire was received from north of the town of Viareggio and SP fire from the vicinity of 983823. No casualties nor damage were sustained. There was no activity among other elements of the Battalion. The 1st Platoon, Company "D" was relieved from attachment to the 435th AAA Battalion and reverted to the control of its parent company.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

Noon 14 September to noon 15 September - The Mortar Platoon was detached from 434th AAA Battalion, and sub-attached to Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, which moved to its new position in the vicinity of 012776 at 142030B. The Assault Platoon moved from 088732 to 031768 at 2000B. Two tanks from 2d Platoon, Company "A" (TF Heckmann) supported British infantry and partisans in the vicinity of 014814 to fire on a suspected enemy CP and on a machine gun nest under the bridge at 017818. At 150600B, two medium and four light tanks from TF Jamison and six medium tanks from TF Heckmann supported a reconnaissance in force into the town of Viareggio. At the end of the period, the patrol had reached the canal Fosso Sedici in the southern part of Viareggio, from the 981 Easting to the 00 Easting, in the area between the 82 and 83 Northings. The tankdozers of Companies "A" and "B" were called to prepare a crossing in the vicinity of 994823. No contact was made with the enemy.

Noon 15 September to noon 16 September - Three tanks from the 2d Platoon, Company "A" (TF Heckmann) crossed the Fosso Sedici at 151045B and advanced to the north edge of Viareggio, remaining there until 1800B, at which time they returned to defensive positions at 011813. The 2d Platoon, Company "D" (TF Heckmann) moved to a position in the vicinity of 016792 at 2000B. The 3rd Platoon, Company "A" (TF Jamison) crossed the Fosso Sedici with the 2d Platoon, Company "A" and remained in defensive position at the northern edge of Viareggio. Three tanks of "D" Company's 3rd Platoon also crossed the canal and assumed positions in the vicinity of 986830 where they were joined by the remaining two tanks at 2000B. These three tanks then supported a reconnaissance patrol to the west of Highway #1 between the 83-85 Northings and captured one PW purported to be an enemy naval correspondent. They returned to their former location at 151700B. Company "A" moved its CP to the vicinity of 009802, the Assault Platoon to 011800, and the Mortar Platoon to 018782. Company "C" was released from control of the 107th AAA Group and was attached to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, effective 152400B.

Noon 16 September to noon 17 September - The Battalion CP closed its old area at 087725 at 1300B and opened in the new area, vicinity 016785, at 1400B. Company "B" moved into the vicinity at 999798 and opened its CP at 2030B. It remained in Battalion Reserve and the platoons took up artillery positions. TF Heckmann began an armored reconnaissance at 0600B toward the vicinity of 062822 - 028840 - 045855 - 039864 - 021872. At the end of the period, they had reached the town of Massarosa (062822). Beginning at 171030B, the 1st section of the 3rd Platoon, Company "D" (TF Jamison) cooperated with partisans in cleaning out enemy in the area along Highway #1 from 987843 to 981853. The 2d section, 3rd Platoon, Company "A" fired on enemy-occupied houses north of the canal at 981853. Four fires were started and later reports from partisans indicated that approximately 20 enemy had been killed. The Mortar Platoon moved to 990814 at 0845B.

Noon 17 September to noon 18 September - TF Heckmann and TF Jamison were disbanded in this period. The 2d Platoon of Company "A" remained in operation with Company "D" and the 2d Platoon, Company "D" with Company "A". The 2d Platoon of Company "A", with the 2d Platoon of Company

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

"D" completed the armored reconnaissance begun in the previous period. The area 028841 - 046855 - 039864 - 021782 was covered with no contact being made with the enemy. The 1st Platoon of Company "C" supported the attack of the 1st Battalion, 6 RCT, BEF moving north until stopped by a roadblock at 058838. The 2d Platoon reconnoitered the vicinity of Camaiore (035900) while the 3rd Platoon attacked with the 2d Battalion, 6 RCT to the vicinity of 114834. An armored patrol begun during the previous period by TF Jamison to the north of Viareggio was halted by impassable demolitions at the 85 Northing. The 3rd Platoons of Companies "A" and "D" participated and neither contacted the enemy. In accordance with Theater policy, the battalion reverted from 'B' time to 'A' time, effective 180200B.

Noon 18 September to noon 19 September - The Assault Platoon moved from 011800 to the vicinity of 977859 at 181900A. The 1st Platoons of Companies "A" and "D" crossed the Fosso Dell'Abate and moved into position at 008890 and 002889 respectively, supporting the 434th AAA Battalion. One tank from the 3rd Platoon, Company "A" was immobilized by a mine at 972848, while attempting to cross the Fosso Dell'Abate at that point. The remainder of the platoon crossed successfully and moved to position in the vicinity of 968878. Movement of the 2d Platoon, Company "C", in support of reconnaissance elements of the BEF, was impeded by extensive demolitions. Their tankdozer completed 15 fills during the period. At 191145A, the platoon assembled in the vicinity 068856.

Noon 19 September to noon 20 September - The Battalion CP was moved from 016785 to the area 978853 at 191315A. Company "A" moved its CP to 013862, Company "B" to 968861, and Company "D" to 950894. The 1st Platoons of Companies "A" and "D" moved in support of the 434th AAA Battalion through Pietrasanta (975928), receiving S/A and M/G fires. The 2d Platoon, Company "C" closed into Camaiore with the BEF and set up roadblocks in the vicinity of 035902. The 2d Platoons of Companies "A" and "D" secured the high ground southeast of Pietrasanta and patrolled into Monteggiori (005912). The 3rd Platoons, Companies "A" and "D" moved to the vicinity of 948907 with the 435th AAA Battalion. Company "D" opened a new CP in the vicinity 946901 at 201100A.

Noon 20 September to noon 21 September - Demolitions and severe enemy S/P and artillery fires prevented any advance during the period. Company "A's" 1st Platoon, with that of Company "D" were halted on an armored reconnaissance by demolitions at 962936. S/P fire came from Querceta (953946) and the platoons took up defensive positions in the vicinity of 970934 and 998924, respectively. The 3rd Platoons of these same companies were also halted in their reconnaissance by demolitions at 954919.

Noon 21 September to noon 22 September - Company "B" opened its new CP location in the vicinity of 946903 at 212045A. The 3rd Platoon of Company "A" and the 3rd Platoon of Company "D" supported the advance of the 435th AAA Battalion to the vicinity of 937934.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

Noon 22 September to noon 23 September - The Battalion CP closed its area north of Viareggio (978853) and moved into Fiumetto (945903) at 221305A. Service Company opened its CP in the vicinity of 958884 at 1440A. The Assault Platoon fired a TOT on enemy guns in the vicinity of 919992 and a harassing mission on the same area, expending 56 rounds HE. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company "A" made an armored reconnaissance to the vicinity of 970947 in search of a crossing of the Fosso Seravezza, but found the terrain unsuitable. They drew heavy enemy S/P and artillery fires. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company "D" advanced with the 435th AAA Battalion to the area 923935.

Noon 23 September to noon 24 September - The Assault Platoon repeated its TOT of the previous period on the vicinity 919992 and harassed the road junction at 924988. There was no activity among other elements.

Noon 24 September to noon 25 September - The Assault Platoon fired harassing missions on road junctions at 881980, 889972, 900990, 905999, and 914997. Company "C" reported its platoons moved to the vicinity 068822.

Noon 25 September to noon 26 September - The Assault Platoon was again the only active element with the battalion. It fired three harassing missions on road junctions at 919994, 923983, 881980, one propaganda mission, and fired on a pillbox at 908953.

Noon 26 September to noon 27 September - Elements of the battalion supported advancing infantry of the 2d Armd Group to the general line 918940-962962. Tanks from the 1st Platoon, Company "A" began an armored reconnaissance to the northwest from their position at 958942, but were halted by demolitions at 947954. Tanks from the 2d Platoon, with 3 light tanks from the 2d Platoon, Company "D" moved to occupy Vallecchia (974952), but were stopped by a road crater at 970950.

Noon 27 September to noon 28 September - Extremely heavy enemy artillery and mortar fires, begun during the preceding period, continued and kept operations to a minimum. Tanks from Company "A's" 1st Platoon moved up Highway #1 from their positions in Pietrasanta (976922), but received such heavy artillery fire that they were forced to return to their former positions. One light tank was damaged by artillery fire in the vicinity of 940950 and was evacuated by Battalion Maintenance.

Noon 28 September to noon 29 September - Company "B" was relieved of its artillery role by Company "A". The relief was effected by platoons after dark. Company "C" remained attached to BEF and moved its CP to the vicinity of 128810.

Noon 29 September to noon 30 September - The relief of Company "B" from its artillery role was completed by Company "A" when its 1st Platoon closed into position, 946912, at 300500A. The 2d and 3rd Platoons had already moved into position at 948913 and 948915 at 292300A and 292145A, respectively. The 1st Platoon, Company "B" was broken into sections and

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

took positions at 953946 and 931924, in support of the 435th AAA Battalion. The 2d Platoon supported the 47th LAA Regt. (Br) in the vicinity of 974928. The 3rd Platoon was also divided, one section in the area 957943, the other at 967943, but both were in support of the 434th AAA Battalion.

Summaries of firing missions are attached as follows:

- Appendix "A" - Tank Platoons
- Appendix "B" - Assault Platoon
- Appendix "C" - Mortar Platoon

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 30 September 1944

1. General:

At the opening of the period, the enemy held light defensive positions on the north bank of the Arno River. His patrolling continued active and he was kept alert by friendly tank demonstrations along the south bank of the Arno, to which he reacted sharply with small arms, machine gun, mortar, and medium artillery fires. There was never any question as to the enemy's intention to hold his defensive positions on the Arno only so long as our forces did not try to cross in strength. Once our crossing began, he was prepared to fight his usual, well-ordered delaying action. This he did, effecting thorough demolition of bridges, and otherwise disrupting communication routes.

Contact was maintained at all times as the enemy withdrew to prepared positions in the mountains to the north. Several times he took advantage of the heavy woods that characterized the terrain and left behind small groups of from ten to fifteen men for harassing purposes. By this means, several prisoners were taken, who doubtlessly had served their purpose.

A minimum of artillery was utilized until our advance elements neared prepared enemy defense lines. Then artillery activity increased markedly, consisting of SP fire on the forward elements and heavy calibre fire on rear areas. The majority of the fire was harassing in nature, but during the lull in the advance at the end of the period, counterbattery fire increased.

Partisan groups continued to cooperate with our troops and were helpful in providing information for our patrols and in accompanying them on their missions. Civilians were found to be friendly and eager to provide information, which in several instances was checked and found to be accurate. However, it was known that the zone in which this battalion was employed throughout the period was predominantly Fascist, therefore, necessary precautions were taken.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

SECTION III - LESSONS LEARNED

1. The tank dozer has continued to be an important factor in the advances made in this sector, where engineer dozers have not been in sufficient number to accomplish the work. In a twenty-four (24) hour period one tank dozer put in fifteen (15) fills in the roads.

a. The tank dozer was not designed for dozer work. The tank dozer is merely an emergency measure. Its blade throws out of balance the tank proper, thus causing an undue strain upon the engine and final drive. This should be ever borne in mind so that the tank dozer is not used for work that can be done by pick and shovel, or when an engineer dozer is available and the tactical situation permits its use. The tank dozer will develop mechanical troubles if used too much and it will not be available when the tactical situation demands its use.

b. Personnel who are experienced in ordinary bulldozing do not know the limitations of the tank dozer unless they have been so instructed. Therefore, the recommendations and suggestions offered by the individual in command of the tank dozer should be respected as to the accomplishment of the respective work.

c. It is recommended that each tank company be assigned a tank dozer, or an engineering platoon be established in the Headquarters Co., which will consist of five (5) tank dozers.

2. Supported personnel should have a definite knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of armor. This will enable them to obtain the greatest benefits from their own armor, and to be aware of what can be expected from hostile armor. Some pertinent points are as follows:

a. The full value of an armor advance or reconnaissance is not obtained unless infantry promptly follows up and secures the ground. When this is not done the element of surprise has been lost, and the enemy takes measures to forestall any future movement in the same area.

b. When infantry do not closely follow-up armor they lose the benefits of the armor fire power. This is especially so when hostile machine guns and small arms are present. These weapons will not open fire on tanks not accompanied by infantry because they can do little damage and their fire exposes their positions. When the infantry does advance these weapons then open fire. It has been found advantageous to have infantrymen ride on the tanks or in battle sleds drawn by tanks, or by following on foot. When deep and rapid advances are to be made trucks loaded with infantrymen can be well employed in an armor column.

3. If the normal amount of enemy activity had been encountered by this battalion in this period several tanks could not have employed because of personnel shortage. See Section VI - Personnel - this report. At the present time several medium tanks have only four (4) men in them.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

SECTION IV - SIGNAL

1. General:

During the month of September, communication within the battalion and to higher headquarters was by radio, wire, and messenger.

2. Radio:

Communications by radio has been very good. Mechanical failures during the entire month were at a minimum. The few failures experienced were due to tube failure and were quickly taken care of. Some difficulties were due to inexperienced personnel. Whenever the personnel was available instructions were given, which has given good results. Enemy jamming has been negligible and very little atmospheric interference was experienced. A relay station was used to contact one unit because of the distance involved. Radio maintenance has been good as we have been able to get repair work done by a signal repair shop throughout the entire period.

3. Wire:

Wire communication has continued to be used to a great extent during this month. Units within the battalion have been employed as artillery and wire communication had to be used in order for them to operate as separate batteries. Wire communication with higher headquarters has been satisfactory. A minimum of breaks in the circuits have been experienced. Due to the lack of proper wire-laying equipment, there is a delay in establishing wire communication whenever we move into a new area.

4. Messenger:

Messenger service was used to handle most of the administrative matter and messages to higher headquarters. Scheduled runs were made to us from higher headquarters twice daily. Messenger service within the battalion and to higher headquarters has been satisfactory.

5. Recommendations:

Due to the increased use of telephones within this unit, it is recommended that we be issued a switchboard BD-72. The need for constant line maintenance and the need of laying and retrieving large quantities of wire it is also recommended that we be issued a reel unit RL-31 in excess of T/E.

SECTION V - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 30 September this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes was generally good. The organization is now up to its authorized strength in vehicles which helped considerably in moving and supplying the battalion.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

2. Rations:

The principal rations used during this period were the B type and 10 in 1 ration. The 5 in 1 ration is considered a better ration by tank crews as the contents are the exact amount for one day for one crew and also offer a larger variety. This ration has, however, been unobtainable.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing, with the exception of Suits, working, 1 pc HBT, is good. None of these suits are available and are urgently needed.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gas, oil, and ammunition has been ample and readily obtainable during the period.

5. Ordnance:

a. Vehicle replacements have been available all during the period. Tires and tubes for the Truck, cargo, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 6x6, and Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4 have not been available during the period and they are urgently needed.

b. The shortage of fire control equipment still exists.

6. Battle losses:

a. Ordnance:

- 1 - Tank, Medium, M4
- 2 - Tank, Light, M5A1
- 1 - Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, C & R

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Casualties for the period have been light. However, difficulty has been encountered in being able to fully man combat vehicles due to the fact that this battalion has never experienced an overstrength sufficient to offset the loss of personnel to combat casualties and sickness. This condition is aggravated by the following:

a. Hospital cases not dropped from organization roles at the end of seven (7) days.

b. When hospital cases are dropped, replacements are not received in sufficient time.

c. Rotation replacements are not made promptly.

d. Personnel who have been ~~diagnosed~~ as being physically and mentally sound under normal conditions, but whose nervous systems break down in tanks when engaged with the enemy. There are several such cases in this battalion, but the medical authorities have not seen fit to transfer the subject individuals.

Report of Action for month of Sept, Cont'd.

e. There have been cases of receiving replacements who have had no armored force training. This necessitated a period of time being spent in training before the individual could be used in combat.

f. This battalion has been in continuous contact with the enemy since the Salerno invasion, with the exception of two (2) periods of a few weeks. Thus, it is clear that the battalion has never had the opportunity to establish an overstrength.

2. It is recommended that this battalion be given at once an overstrength of forty-three (43) armored force replacements, and that this overstrength of approximately six (6) percent of T/O strength be maintained. The figure of forty-three (43) enlisted men is arrived at as follows:

2 tank crews each for 3 medium companies	-	30
2 tank crews for 1 light company	-	8
1 assault gun crew	-	5
Total		<u>43</u>

SECTION VII - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. There were few new or unusual problems that presented themselves during the month.

2. 1st echelon maintenance among vehicle crews was stressed and new crew members were thus instructed while on the front line.

3. Ordnance supplies were still critical, especially tires, tank engines, and light tank parts.

4. Tank dozers were used extensively and the failure of the power train occurred on one vehicle because of excessive use. It was proven that a tank dozer was designed for use to aid an advancing armored column while under fire, and not to replace the engineer dozers.

Arthur Snyder
ARTHUR SNYDER,
Lt. Col., 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding

4 Incls.

Incl #1-Battle Casualty Report.

Incl #2- Maps (Italy, 1/50,000)

Sheets 112-IV, 111-I, 105-III, 104-I, II, IV.

Incl #3- Maps (Italy, 1/25,000)

Sheets 112-IV, NW, SW; 111-I, NE, SE, NW; 104-I, SE, SW, NW;
104-II, NE, SE, NW, SW; 104-IV, NE, 105-III, NW, SW.

Incl #4-Unit Journal and File

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944

TANK PLATOONS

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd			6	319	5	75	1	32	2	64	1	30					12	520
2nd/3rd									3	88							3	88
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th																		
5th/6th			1	200	3	35											4	235
6th/7th			2	80					1	93							3	173
7th/8th			2	60					2	109							4	169
8th/9th			4	200													4	200
9th/10th			3	90													3	90
10th/11th																		
11th/12th																		
12th/13th					3	77											3	77
13th/14th																		
14th/15th											1	48						
15th/16th																		
16th/17th																		
17th/18th			2	80													2	80
18th/19th																		
19th/20th																		
20th/21st																		
21st/22nd			1	36	1	14											2	50
22nd/23rd			4	111	3	29			1	85							8	225
23rd/24th																		
24th/25th																		
25th/26th																		
26th/27th																		
27th/28th			9	292													9	292
28th/29th	5	272	8	270													13	542
29th/30th																	6	69
30th/21th																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH	5	272	43	1744	15	230	1	32	14	502	2	78					80	2858

APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944

ASSAULT PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd											1	24					1	24
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th					1	18											1	18
5th/6th			1	68	1	7					2	69					4	144
6th/7th			2	80													2	
7th/8th			8	230													8	230
8th/9th			1	40													1	40
9th/10th																		
10th/11th																		
11th/12th					1	9											1	9
12th/13th																		
13th/14th																		
14th/15th																		
15th/16th					1	4											1	4
16th/17th			1	346													1	346
17th/18th			1	24													1	24
18th/19th																		
19th/20th																		
20th/21st																		
21st/22nd																		
22nd/23rd			2	56													2	56
23rd/24th			5	179	1	89											6	
24th/25th			5	350													5	350
25th/26th			5	196													6	314
26th/27th	10	225	10	210									1	118			20	435
27th/28th	9	176	5	87	1	8											15	271
28th/29th	1	111	8	113			1	111					2	109			12	444
29th/30th	1	67	3	66									1	50			5	183
30th/31st																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH	21	579	57	2045	6	135	1	111			3	93	4	277			92	3240

APFL DTX "B"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1944

MORTAR PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd																		
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th									1	44	2	70					3	114
5th/6th									1	19	1	40					2	59
6th/7th					1	8			2	42							3	50
7th/8th																		
8th/9th			1	8													1	8
9th/10th																		
10th/11th																		
11th/12th																		
12th/13th					1	2											1	2
13th/14th																		
14th/15th																		
15th/16th																		
16th/17th																		
17th/18th																		
18th/19th																		
19th/20th																		
20th/21st																		
21st/22nd																		
22nd/23rd																		
23rd/24th																		
24th/25th																		
25th/26th																		
26th/27th																		
27th/28th											1	107					1	107
28th/29th																		
29th/30th											1	30					1	30
30th/31st																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH			1	8	2	10			4	105	5	247					12	370

APPENDIX "C"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

5 November 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of October.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of October is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/50,000) Sheet 104 I, IV; 105 IV;
97 III; 96 II;

(1/25,000) Sheet 104 I NW; 104 IV NE;
97 III SW; 96 II SE.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS.

Summary of operations for the period
1 - 31 October

1. General Situation:

Throughout the period, the 751st Tank Battalion remained attached to IV Corps. However, sub-attachment changed from TF 45 to TF 92 at 051300 when the latter assumed command of the sector. The front lines established at the opening of the period were maintained with very slight change. This battalion was not employed as a unit. Various attachments of separate companies or platoons were made to higher headquarters, particularly to the 2nd Armored Group and the 370th Combat Team. The use of tanks in their normal role was limited; consequently, during the entire period, an average was maintained of two (2) medium tank platoons in artillery positions. Co. "C" remained attached to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and was held in reserve until the period 20 - 21 October when two platoons were attached to the Brazilian Artillery Group. During the middle of the month, the crew of Co. "C's" tank dozer did outstanding work in reopening two tunnels on the Lucca-Borgo road.

2. Daily Summary:

Noon 30 September to noon 1 October - Component units disposed as follows: Bn. CP vic 945903; Hq. Co. vic 945903, Mortar Platoon vic 928937, Assault Platoon vic 952902; Co. "A" CP vic 946903, 1st Platoon vic 946912, 2nd Platoon vic 948913, 3rd Platoon vic 948915; Co. "B" CP vic 976925, 1st section, 1st Platoon vic 953946, 2nd section, 1st Platoon vic 931924, 2nd Platoon vic 974928, 1st section, 3rd Platoon vic 957943, 2nd section, 3rd Platoon vic 967943; Co. "C" CP vic 130811, 1st Platoon vic 132806, 2nd Platoon vic 130812, 3rd Platoon 147861; Co. "D" CP vic 931924, 1st section, 1st Platoon vic 951940, 2nd section, 1st Platoon vic 957946, 2nd Platoon vic 976925, 1st section, 3rd Platoon vic 940950, 2nd section, 3rd Platoon vic 924935; Service Co. CP vic 958884. The only

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Report of Action for month of Oct, Cont'd.

activity for the period consisted of missions fired by the Mortar Platoon, Assault Platoon, and tank platoons of Co. "A", which were being used in an artillery role.

Noon 1 October to noon 2 October - The Assault Platoon was active, firing 8 TOT's on as many different gun positions, one harassing mission, and one precision mission on two SP guns at 943963. The effect of this last fire was excellent. Both guns were knocked out and several enemy personnel killed. Co. "A" fired several missions of a TOT and harassing nature. The 3rd Platoon of Co. "B" fired on an enemy strong-point and occupied building, with unobserved results. Co. "C" remained attached to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, but reported no activity. The 1st section of the 1st Platoon, Co. "D" received heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire and was forced to move to the vic of 955943.

Noon 2 October to noon 3 October - Artillery missions were the principal activity during the period. In addition to 12 harassing missions, the Assault Platoon fired one propaganda mission and two precision missions. The first precision fire was on an enemy OP in the vic of 928983. Direct hits were scored and the house set afire. The second was counterbattery on a gun position at 907952. Excellent results were again obtained and the gun destroyed. The 3rd Platoon of Co. "B" fired on dug-in tanks and machine gun positions in the vic of 968956, and an enemy OP at 967967. The platoon moved to a new position in the area 958941. At about 030315A, the 2nd section, 3rd Platoon, Co. "D" engaged an enemy patrol of 15 to 20 men in a fire fight from its position at 940950. The patrol withdrew.

Noon 3 October to noon 4 October - The platoons of Co. "A", all in artillery positions, and the Assault Platoon engaged in normal harassing, TOT, and propaganda firing missions. Co. "A" received heavy counterbattery and the 3rd Platoon moved to the vic of 951901 at 040600A. The 2nd section of the 3rd Platoon, Co. "D" moved to 944951 at 032000A. Effective 040800A, the 2nd Platoons of Cos. "B" and "D" were relieved from attachment to the 107th AAA Gp., and placed in direct support of 2nd Bn., 370th Inf. Regt.

Noon 4 October to noon 5 October - The Assault Platoon fired 16 missions of various types and was credited with knocking out one enemy gun after direct hits had been obtained on the target. The 1st Platoon of Co. "A" moved into position at 952902 at 051145A.

Noon 5 October to noon 6 October - Effective 051800A, this battalion reverted from the control of TF 45 to that of TF 92, as command of the sector changed. All three tank platoons of both "B" and "D" Cos. supported infantry attacks: The 2nd Platoons of both companies supported the 370th Inf. Regt; the 3rd Platoon, Co. "B" and the 1st Platoon, Co. "D" supported the 434th AAA Bn; and the 1st Platoon, Co. "B" with the 3rd Platoon, Co. "D" supported the 435th AAA Bn.

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Noon 6 October to noon 7 October - At 061630A, all elements of the battalion with the exception of Co. "C" and the Assault and Mortar Platoons, were released to the direct control of the Battalion Commander. These elements were designated "TF SNYDER", to which were added "I" Co., 370th Inf. Regt., Co. "B", 894 TD Bn., and one platoon, Co. "B", 317th Engr. Bn. Plans were made for an armored attack north on Highway #1 from Querceta (954947), but reconnaissance disclosed a demolition at 947955 that was impassable without considerable engineer work. For this reason, the plans were postponed. At 070900A, the 2nd Platoon of Co. "E" was attached to Co. "B", 370th Inf. Regt. and at 071145A, following VCCG TF 92, Co. "A" was alerted to move at 071500A. No additional instructions were received.

Noon 7 October to noon 8 October - At 071145A, Co. "A" moved out to support the attack of elements of the 370th Inf. Regt. in the vic of the 9695 grid square. Effective 072200A, "I" Co., 370th Inf. Regt. and Co. "B", 894 TD Battalion were relieved from attachment to this battalion.

Noon 8 October to noon 9 October - The 2nd Platoon of Co. "B" moved to the vic of 967944 to join Co. "A" in the support of the 370th Inf. Regt. One section of TD's from the 894 TD Battalion was attached to Co. "B" and used as security for the 2nd Platoon. The 3rd Platoon of Co. "C" moved from its area at 145861 to the Battalion Service Co. and made an exchange of its five (5) tanks for five (5) new M4A3 tanks, with 76 mm. guns. When the exchange had been completed, the platoon returned to the company area at 130811. Co. "D" closed into an assembly area in the vic of 951941 at 082320A.

Noon 9 October to noon 10 October - At 091335A, Co. "B", less the 2nd Platoon, was alerted to cooperate with "B" Btry. of the 435th AAA Bn. in an attack on an enemy-held cemetery at 944955. At 101700A, the attack was successfully completed. Both the Mortar and Assault Platoons continued firing missions on personnel and gun positions. At 1200A, 3 tanks from Co. "B" were released from support of the 435th AAA Bn and sent to support the 370th Inf. Regt. by moving into firing positions in the vic of 970948.

Noon 10 October to noon 11 October - One tank of Co. "B" was damaged by a mine at 961954, during the early part of the period, and it was necessary to have engineers from TF 92 sweep the road after dark so that the tank could be recovered. During the night, Co. "A" executed a schedule of local movement of its tanks so as to create the impression of increasing armored strength. Two tanks from Co. "B" were dug in in the vic of 945954 so as to reinforce defensive infantry positions held by the 435th AAA Bn. A route reconnaissance was made of the road between Pietrasanta (976927) and Seravezza (975965). The road was found to be impassable to tanks, without extensive engineer work. At about 110600A, Co. "A" captured 16 PW's and turned them over to the 434th AAA Bn. At 1050A, Cos. "D" and "B" (- 1 platoon) were attached to 2nd Armd Gp. Co. "C" remained attached to the BEF and reported no activity.

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Noon 11 October to noon 12 October - During the night, Co. "D" and Co. "B", less one platoon, assembled in the vic of Forte dei Marmi (930924), preparatory to supporting the 435th AAA Bn. in an attack north-west from the lateral road 918940 - 946955 on the morning of 12 October.

Noon 12 October to noon 13 October - The tanks of Co. "D" and the two platoons of Co. "B" continued "mopping-up" operations in the area 918941 - 912948. One tank of the 3rd Platoon, Co. "D" was damaged by a mine.

Noon 13 October to noon 14 October - Two platoons from Co. "A" joined Co. "D" and the two platoons of Co. "B" in order to complete final clearing of enemy from areas occupied in the attack during the previous period. Upon completion of the mission, Co. "A's" tanks were relieved and withdrawn to Forte dei Marmi. At 140845A, the two platoons of Co. "A" were relieved from support of the 2nd Armd Gp. and moved into the vic of 952901.

Noon 14 October to noon 15 October - The 2nd Platoons of Cos. "A" and "B" continued to support the 370th Inf. Regt. At 141810A, the 3rd Platoon of Co. "D" was withdrawn from the line and moved into the vic of the Co. CP at 931924. At 150230A, the 2nd Platoon, Co. "A" joined the 1st and 3rd Platoons at 952901, after being relieved from attachment to the 370th Inf. Regt. The 3rd Platoon, Co. "B" moved into the vic of 932923 at 0630A. This same platoon later moved to 919946.

Noon 15 October to noon 16 October - The Mortar Platoon moved to the vic of 924941 at 152000A. Co. "C" remained attached to the BEF and its tankdozer was used for the reopening of a tunnel at 195883. Tanks of Co. "D" moved up to reinforce the infantry of the 434th and 435th AAA Bns. when the enemy counterattacked across the Fiume la Foce at 160600A.

Noon 16 October to noon 17 October - Two tanks from Co. "B" moved up the coast road in an armored demonstration toward the outlet of the Fiume la Foce at 908951. An enemy counterattack in the 370th Inf. Regt. sector was expected during the night; therefore, the 2nd Platoon, Co. "A" and the 3rd Platoon, Co. "B" moved into assembly areas east of Querceta (955948) in order to support the infantry in repelling any enemy advances. The platoons closed into position at 170330A. The counter-attack did not materialize, but these platoons remained in position to support the 370th Inf. Regt. The 1st and 3rd Platoons of Co. "A" completed moves into artillery positions at 938928 and 938925, respectively, at 170800A.

Noon 17 October to noon 18 October - The Assault Platoon fired 4 missions and was credited with knocking out an enemy vehicle at 916994. Co. "B" moved its CP, closing into its new area, 976925, at 181140A.

Noon 18 October to noon 19 October - The 1st Platoon of Co. "A" was withdrawn from its artillery position and took a defensive position in the vic of 915950, to support the 2nd Armd. Gp. The 1st Platoon of Co. "D" was relieved in position (946949) by the 3rd Platoon, and moved to the vic of the Co. CP at 931924.

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Noon 19 October to noon 20 October - At 200530A, Co. "C" began its move to a new position in the vicinity of 175898. The move was completed at approximately 200650A. Prior to the move, the company's tankdozer continued active in repairing demolitions in the vic of Gallicano (L - 140030). The 3rd Platoon of Co. "A" fired 5 harassing missions from artillery positions to cover TD's laying direct fire on enemy installations.

Noon 20 October to noon 21 October - The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Co. "C" were attached to the Brazilian Artillery Group and preparations were made to move into artillery positions in the vic of 188002. The 3rd Platoon was placed in 6th Inf. Regt. (BEF) reserve. With the exception of harassing missions fired by the Assault and Mortar Platoons, there was no activity among remaining elements.

Noon 21 October to noon 22 October - The 2nd Platoon of Co. "A", and the 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Co. "B" supported the 370th Inf. Regt. by firing on targets of opportunity in the vic of Strettoja (953969). Firing a total of six (6) artillery missions, the Assault Platoon destroyed an enemy CP and placed precision fire on an enemy tank at 940969. Co. "C's" tankdozer continued work on roads in the vic of Gallicano (150080).

Noon 22 October to noon 23 October - At 221450A, upon VCCG TF 92, the 1st Platoons of Cos. "A" and "B" were detached from the 2nd Armd Gp. and placed under control of this battalion, to be used in support of the 370th Inf. Regt. At 221745A, the 1st Platoon of Co. "B" moved to the vic of 964953. Co. "A's" 1st Platoon was not utilized to support the 370th Inf. Regt., but closed into an artillery position in the vic of 936924 at 230545A. The 2nd Platoon moved to a new position at 930924, but remained in 2nd Armd Gp. reserve. The 3rd Platoon of Co. "B", supported by that company's 2nd Platoon, attacked Strettoja (953969) at 221645A. The platoon, less one tank destroyed by a mine, accomplished its mission and returned to its original position. The 3rd Platoon, Co. "C" moved to the area 232967 at 221400A. At 222230A, the 1st Platoon, Co. "D" was relieved in place (931924) by the 3rd Platoon, and moved to the vic of 946949. At 230515A, the 3rd Platoon moved again, with its two sections taking separate positions at 914948 and 913945. Both platoons remained in support of the 434th AAA Bn.

Noon 23 October to noon 24 October - The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Co. "C", having been previously attached to the Brazilian Artillery Group, moved to artillery positions in the vic of 185004 at 231900A. There was no activity among other elements.

Noon 24 October to noon 25 October - Co. "C" moved its CP to 232967. The Assault Platoon fired one harassing and one TOT mission.

Noon 25 October to noon 26 October - The Assault and Mortar Platoons maintained normal harassing fires. In support of the 370th Inf. Regt., Co. "B" fired on targets of opportunity.

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Noon 26 October to noon 27 October - The two platoons of Co. "A" in artillery positions fired 2 harassing missions each. Those of Co. "B" fired 2 each. Co. "B's" tankdozer was used to repair demolitions and clear a road east of Querceta (9594).

Noon 27 October to noon 28 October - The 2nd Platoon of Co. "A" was utilized to support by fire a power patrol conducted by the 2nd Armd Gp. to the vic of Porta (933970). Tanks took up separate positions as follows: #6 - 943954, #7 - 938953, #8 - 944949, #9 - 925948, #10 - 931951.

Noon 28 October to noon 29 October - The 2nd Platoon of Co. "A" returned to its position at 930924 at 290630A, after supporting the 2nd Armd Gp. patrol during the night. With the exception of normal firing missions by the Assault and Mortar Platoons, and the two (2) Platoons of Co. "C" attached to the Brazilian Artillery Gp., there was no activity among other elements.

Noon 29 October to noon 30 October - The 2nd Platoon of Co. "A" moved into firing positions in the area 926945 and at 291530A fired on an enemy gun emplacement at 942967. At 291830A, this platoon moved into the same positions it occupied during the night 28 - 29 Oct., from which it again supported a patrol from the 2nd Armd Gp. No fire was called for, and the platoon returned to the vic 930924 at 300630A. Direct hits were scored by the 1st Platoon of Co. "B" in firing at enemy positions in the vic 940969 - 941966 - 942969. At 292000A, an engineer patrol consisting of one platoon from 317th Engr. Bn., a detail of twelve (12) EM and two (2) officers from this battalion, Co. "A's" tankdozer, and #1 tank from Bn. Hq. Co. departed from the CP (945903), under the supervision of the Battalion Commander, to repair demolitions and build a by-pass on Highway #1, at 937966. The mission was completed at 300400A.

Noon 30 October to noon 31 October - With the exception of harassing missions fired by the Assault and Mortar Platoons, and the tank platoons in artillery positions, there was no activity among the elements of the battalion.

Noon 31 October to 2400A 31 October - The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Co. "B" remained in position, on call, to support a power patrol from the 370th Inf. Regt. The 3rd Platoon supported the patrol by fire between the hours of 1900A and 2400A. The 2nd Platoon, Co. "C" in artillery support of the BEF fired observed missions on enemy strong-points with good results.

Summaries of firing missions are attached as follows:

- Appendix "A" - Tank Platoons
- Appendix "B" - Assault Platoon
- Appendix "C" - Mortar Platoon

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SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 31 October 1944

1. General:

The front that existed at the opening of the period was established and remained static at the close of the period. The enemy's intentions were obvious: that is, to delay our advance to the utmost, availing himself of the excellent opportunities for defense offered by both mountainous terrain, and the coastal plain honeycombed with natural and artificial drainage systems. Combining terrain with thorough demolitions, extensive minefields, and well-placed tank barriers, the immediate coastal area was effectively defended against advance.

The presence of strong forces of enemy ground troops was not indicated by reports from friendly patrols. Particularly in the mountain sector, resistance consisted of pockets of defense manned by small numbers of enemy, but supported by very effective mortar and artillery fires.

Artillery activity, in general, was not excessive; however, during the last 10 days of the period, an increase in enemy gun positions was reported. With the relief of the 42nd Jaeger Division, and its replacement by units of the 148th Div., enemy artillery was notably less active. It is not felt that this is an indication that artillery positions have been abandoned, but rather that the enemy is conserving his reserves until such time as this sector of the front becomes more active.

The stable front has created a rising civilian problem. Refugees have returned more and more to their homes, even in the most forward areas. Their free access to the combat zone, going so far as to permit their traveling to and from enemy-occupied territory, has made it necessary to exercise the utmost security precautions.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communications within the battalion and to higher headquarters during the month of October were by wire, radio, and messenger.

2. Radio:

Due to the fact that the battalion (minus Co. "C") was operating in a fairly narrow sector, radio communication was very satisfactory. During this period the SCR 509 was used, quite extensively, for the purpose of directing tank fire from an OP. The results were satisfactory. Mechanical failures for the month were at a minimum. Excellent radio maintenance was maintained by our own personnel and by the facilities of a radio repair unit. The training of inexperienced personnel was continued and a marked improvement noticed.

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Report of Action for month of Oct, Cont'd.

3. Wire:

Wire communication between higher headquarters and our own companies was very satisfactory. Because of the more stable situation and the lack of excessive movement within the battalion, very efficient maintenance of wire was accomplished.

4. Messenger:

Daily scheduled runs were made to higher headquarters and to all companies with very satisfactory results.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 October, this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes was generally good. The organization at the close of the period had 10 trucks, 2½-ton on DS, and is short 1 Half-track, M3A1, 1 Half-track, 81mm Mortar, M4, and 1 Truck, ¾-ton.

2. Rations:

The principal rations used during this period were the 'B' type and 10-in-1 ration. The 5-in-1 ration is considered a better ration by tank crews as the contents are the exact amount for one day for one crew and it also offers a larger variety. This ration is still unobtainable.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing, with the exception of suits, working, 1 pc. M4, size 36R is good. Shoepacs have only been available for 60% of the organization and the other 40% are urgently needed. Small size socks, wool and large raincoats are also difficult to obtain.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gas, oil, and ammunition has been ample and readily available during the period. However, during the greater part of the period, both the Class III and V dumps were entirely too far in the rear to be suitable under combat conditions.

5. Ordnance:

a. Vehicle replacements have been available during the period. Tires and tubes for the trucks, 2½-ton, have been received. Tires and tubes for trucks, ¾-ton, are still needed.

b. The shortage of fire-control equipment still exists.

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6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

- 1 - Tank, Medium, M4 (AT mine - burned)
- 1 - Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4x4 (Artillery)
- 1 - Watch, wrist, 7 jewel
- 1 - Tank, Light, M5A1 (AT mine)
- 1 - Binoculars, M3
- 5 - Guns, sub. mach., cal. .45, M1

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. Operations during the month were confined mostly to preventive measures. Six-thousand-mile inspections and 100-hour checks were made on the oldest vehicles and the initial servicing and technical inspection were made on 15 new M4A3 medium tanks that were issued to the battalion during the first part of the month.

Five of the M4A3 tanks were issued to each medium tank company. So far, they have proved to be superior to the M4 tank with the 75mm gun. Some of the major reasons are: superior gun, the increased power of the engine, and the increased space in the turret. The lack of M4A3 tank replacements and spare parts will cause a decided disadvantage in keeping the maintenance to the highest standard.

2. There were four tankdozer failures during the month. Two were due to overuse, one to engine failure at 110 hours, and one to sprocket failure. One 'dozer' hit a mine and damaged the suspension system, necessitating 2nd echelon repair. Another 'dozer' bent the blade arms due to hitting a pill-box with the edge of the blade.

3. The failure of $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton frames, by the breaking of the rear spring shackle hanger away from the frame was evidenced on four vehicles. This is believed due to overloading, rough roads, and faulty initial weld.

4. All liquid-cooled vehicles were serviced with prestone.

5. Recommendations:

a. Tankdozers:

(1) The whole power train, including sprocket bolts, hub bolts, final drive shafts, control differential, and propeller shafts should be designed heavier.

(2) The attaching brackets should be made to fit the new type control differential housing on the M4A3 tank, as it is believed the engine in this tank is more suitable for 'dozer' work.

(3) Organizational maintenance should install oversize bolts in the sprocket rings. The bolts should be 'spotted in' with an electric welder in order to insure their remaining tight.

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(4) The blade should be modified so that it could be tilted from either side.

b. Wheeled vehicles - It is necessary to deadline wheeled vehicles regularly for scheduled maintenance inspections and lubrication, even though it may seem that the vehicle "cannot be spared".

c. Procedure - Recovery of disabled vehicles must be started as soon as the tactical situation permits. Tanks of the same platoon should tow a disabled vehicle to cover at the end of the operation, if such is practicable.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Bronze Star

Bramer, Jerome	Capt.	0407308	Med. Det.
Hackmann, James F.	Capt.	0452618	Co. "B"
Ault, Raymond	T/4	35021170	Hq. Co.
Hahn, Robert	T/5	35108416	Hq. Co.
Borba, Joseph G.	T/5	39000370	Co. "D"
Wirt, Charles W.	Pvt.	37511863	Co. "D"

Third Oak Leaf Cluster
To Purple Heart

Bolich, William	S/Sgt.	35029342	Co. "A"
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Second Oak Leaf Cluster
To Purple Heart

Lawrence, James E.	T/4	35021093	Co. "B"
Giddings, Maynard N.	T/5	15320372	Co. "A"
Harville, Kenneth L.	Pfc	6576562	Co. "B"

First Oak Leaf Cluster
To Purple Heart

Hensley, Ralph	Pfc	6989086	Co. "A"
Williams, John W.	Pfc	34169874	Co. "B"
Smith, Robert E.	Pvt.	33497567	Co. "B"

Purple Heart

Voyles, Thomas M.	S/Sgt.	37130058	Co. "A"
Luspeke, John C.	Sgt.	37129714	Co. "D"
Bubnic, Mirko J.	Sgt.	35020850	Co. "B"
Clayton, William A.	Sgt.	34169116	Co. "A"
Richie, Forrest A.	Sgt.	35121895	Co. "A"

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Purple Hearts Cont'd.

Jimenez, Robert S.	Cpl.	39403086	Co. "A"
Ingram, Walter E.	Cpl.	34266326	Co. "B"
Sutherland, Wilfred B.	Pfc	32804109	Co. "B"
Burkhart, Walter J.	Pfc	35760350	Co. "B"
Cline, George L.	Pfc	18137006	Co. "A"
Defelice, Frank N.	Pfc	32489114	Co. "D"
Ratliff, Louis A.	Pfc	37261748	Co. "A"
Albrowczynski, Joseph S.	Pfc	33434230	Co. "A"
Drozdowski, Zygmund	Pfc	32167538	Hq. Co.
Rackel, Francis S.	Pfc	35014783	Co. "D"
Rice, Herbert M.	Pfc	20631018	Co. "A"
Pollari, Salvatore	Pvt.	32794397	Co. "B"
Melazzo, Charles	Pvt.	34707709	Co. "B"

Letters of Commendation

The following letters of commendation were presented by Lt. Col. Arthur Snyder, 751st Tank Battalion on 20 Oct 1944:

1. To the Commanding Officers, Cos. "A", "B", "C"; 751st Tank Battalion for outstanding work of tankdozer crews during the Anzio Break-through, the advance on Rome and beyond, and later operations at the Arno and Serchio Rivers.

2. To the Assault Platoon, Hq. Co., 751st Tank Battalion, for outstanding performance in support of combat operations

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

Moldawsky, Sol Pvt. 36852700 Co. "D" 12 Oct 1944

M.I.A.

None

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Bradley, Clarence J.	1st Lt	01013375	Hq. Co.	6 Oct 1944
Johnson, Alton E.	1st Lt	01014683	Co. "A"	11 Oct 1944
Marquand, John T.	1st Lt	01015814	Hq. Co.	11 Oct 1944
Tappan, Hollis H. Jr.	2d Lt	0516071	Co. "B"	12 Oct 1944
			(DOW)	12 Oct 1944
Pelloth, Herman W.	Sgt	32280640	Co. "A"	16 Oct 1944
Coulter, Fred L.	T/4	37510418	Co. "A"	13 Oct 1944
Bergey, Leroy L.	T/4	33619436	Co. "D"	12 Oct 1944
Burton, Robert L.	Cpl	33455815	Co. "A"	13 Oct 1944
Russo, Patsy A.	Cpl	33667725	Co. "B"	26 Oct 1944
Stokes, Carl L.	T/5	39549612	Co. "A"	21 Oct 1944
			(DOW)	22 Oct 1944
Lisenbee, James T.	Pfc	35127700	Co. "D"	12 Oct 1944
Falk, Sven H.	Pvt	36118273	Co. "B"	8 Oct 1944

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W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Bolich, William	S/Sgt.	35029342	Co. "A"	8 Oct 1944
Voyles, Thomas M. Jr.	S/Sgt.	37130058	Co. "A"	3 Oct 1944
Voyles, Thomas M. Jr.	S/Sgt.	37130058	Co. "A"	19 Oct 1944
Clayton, William A.	Sgt.	34169116	Co. "A"	12 Oct 1944
Pelloth, Herman W.	Sgt.	32280640	Co. "A"	9 Oct 1944
Lawrence, James E.	T/4	35021093	Co. "B"	8 Oct 1944
Jimenez, Robert S.	Cpl.	39403086	Co. "A"	3 Oct 1944
Albrowczynski, Joseph B.	Pfc	33434230	Co. "A"	4 Oct 1944
Ratliff, Louis A.	Pfc	37261748	Co. "A"	3 Oct 1944
Rice, Herbert M.	Pfc	20631018	Co. "A"	7 Oct 1944
Sutherland, Wilfred B.	Pfc	32804109	Co. "B"	21 Oct 1944
Smith, Robert E.	Pvt.	33497567	Co. "B"	8 Oct 1944

I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Evans, Harry D.	Cpl.	16050279	Co. "A"	13 Oct 1944
Hale, Horace K.	T/5	39911456	Co. "A"	13 Oct 1944

I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

None.

3. Rotation Statistics:

Since August 1943 sixty-eight (68) enlisted men have been rotated to the United States. Of the aforesaid number, thirty (30) rotation replacements have been received.

Authorization was obtained to fill twelve (12) rotation vacancies by promotion.

The total of ten (10) officers have been rotated to the United States. Six (6) rotation replacements have been received and authorization obtained to fill one rotation vacancy by promotion.

(See Appendix "D" for rotation statistics of 751st Tank Battalion covering period 1 August 1943 - 31 October 1944.)

4. Comments:

a. Casualties for the period have been light. However, difficulty has been encountered in being able to fully man combat vehicles due to the fact that this battalion has never experienced an overstrength sufficient to offset the loss of personnel due to combat casualties and sickness. This condition is aggravated by the following:

(1) Inadequate provisions for the rapid dispatch of Admission and Disposition Slips from hospitals to units.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Oct, Cont'd.

(2) Rotation replacements are not made promptly.

(3) Personnel who have been diagnosed as being physically and mentally sound under normal conditions, but whose nervous systems break down in tanks when engaged with the enemy. There are several such cases in this battalion, but the medical authorities have not seen fit to transfer the subject individuals.

b. Present policy does not permit a separate tank battalion to requisition an overstrength of personnel while engaged in operations against the enemy. It is recommended that this battalion be given at once an overstrength of forty-three (43) armored force replacements, and that this overstrength of approximately six (6) per cent of T/O strength be maintained. The figure of forty-three (43) enlisted men is arrived at as follows:

2 tank crews each for 3 medium companies	- 30
2 tank crews for 1 light company	- 8
1 assault gun crew	- 5
Total	<u>43</u>

c. It is recommended that this unit be authorized to fill vacancies created by rotation of the first three grades by promotion, and receive basic replacements in lieu thereof.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

1. During this period the battalion operated primarily on a coastal plain with the mountains on the east and the sea on the west. There were numerous canals flowing parallel to the front, emptying into the sea, which formed formidable barriers due to blown bridges and mined areas. It was found that an uninterrupted advance could be maintained by moving the tanks forward at the very edge of the sea and crossing the canals on the deltas formed at their mouths. The corrosive action of the salt-water neutralized the mines by destroying the caps. After crossing the canal, the lead tank would establish a base of fire, while succeeding tanks leap-frogged the position until the offensive formation could be resumed and the attack continued.

2. The mines most frequently encountered in the coastal sector were the Italian box mines. Because of their construction, they were very difficult to detect with a mine detector and had to be located by probing. When time was pressing and no engineers were available, tank crews frequently probed their path through mine fields either by pulling or lifting the mines and neutralizing them. In one isolated case, a mine was buried so deeply that it was not discovered and did no damage until the fifth vehicle had passed over.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Oct, Cont'd.

3. Tanks operating without close infantry support in settled areas are particularly susceptible to ground attack by enemy infantry. Periscopes are shot out and then the hull or turret is pierced by rockets fired from the security of houses or ruins. In all offensive action, very close cooperation with the infantry is urged for the mutual protection of both forces.

4. Because of the large number of demolitions, blown bridges, and obstructions, the tank dozer was found to be one of the most valuable pieces of equipment. Because of the great concentration of weight on the front of the vehicle, the forward bogie wheels and the sprocket bolts gave a great deal of trouble. It was also clumsy to maneuver. It is felt that an armored bulldozer would be much more practical and could be secured at a fraction of the cost. One or the other is essential to successful operation.

5. In many instances, elements of the battalion were called upon for direct fire support to friendly patrols operating at night. By laying their runs by moonlight or on prearranged targets from definite positions at dusk, accurate fire could be brought down at ranges from 600 to 1500 yards. This security enabled patrols to operate or fills to be made, behind the enemy lines with very little danger.

6. Because of the great distances separating various units of this command, supply is a major problem. However, because of the careful synchronization of the supply officer, unusually good results were obtained. If additional censor stamps could be secured, the problem of mail distribution would be greatly facilitated.

C. J. Madden
C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Bn.,
Commanding

3 Incls.

Incl #1-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000)

Sheet 104 I, IV; 105 IV; 97 III; 96 II

Incl #2-Maps (Italy, 1/25,000)

Sheet 104 I NW, 104 IV NE; 97 III SW; 96 II SE.

Incl #3-Unit Journal and File

SUMMARY OF AUXILIARY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944

DATE	C/B		HARRASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		D.STRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL		
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	
1st/2nd	17	479	5	111							1	72							
2nd/3rd	7	137	2	138	1	30												23	662
3rd/4th	5	179	3	178														10	305
4th/5th	3	206	5	206	1	42												8	357
5th/6th	3	111	6	111	1	31	1	111										9	451
6th/7th	3	372	11	372														11	364
7th/8th																		14	744
8th/9th																			
9th/10th																			
10th/11th																			
11th/12th																			
12th/13th																			
13th/14th																			
14th/15th																			
15th/16th																			
16th/17th																			
17th/18th																			
18th/19th																			
19th/20th																			
20th/21st			3	70															
21st/22nd			2	20														3	70
22nd/23rd			2	20														2	20
23rd/24th					1	25												2	20
24th/25th																		1	25
25th/26th			1	48															
26th/27th	3	41	11	178														1	48
27th/28th			2	85	1	40												14	219
28th/29th			2	40					2	48								3	125
29th/30th	1	18																4	88
30th/31st																		1	18
31st/2400 Hrs.			1	30															
TOTAL FOR MONTH	42	1543	56	1607	5	168	1	111	2	48	1	72						107	3549

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944

DATE	C/B		AMMUNITION		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL		
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	
1st/2nd	15	197	7	123															
2nd/3rd	1	88	5	86															
3rd/4th	7	96	3	96					7	86	1	74	1	50	1	52	22	446	
4th/5th	11	200	5	200							1	86	1	50			15	396	
5th/6th	2	225	8	225								1	96				12	338	
6th/7th	6	244	4	244													16	400	
7th/8th	1	114	19	114					1	244			1	50			10	450	
8th/9th	1	73	9	73	1	73	1	114	5	115	4	228					12	782	
9th/10th	3	95	7	95							1	73					30	685	
10th/11th	1	26			3	20	2	24	1	95	3	100					13	365	
11th/12th	15	297									1	26	1	75			14	385	
12th/13th	3	110	4	110	1	14			1	148	2	148					8	171	
13th/14th	6	66	4	66	1	15	1	66	5	110	1	112					18	593	
14th/15th	6	52	3	53							1	68	1	65			12	456	
15th/16th	4	39	1	39									1	50			14	347	
16th/17th	2	166	9	156													10	155	
17th/18th	2	42	1	42					1	156	1	161					5	78	
18th/19th	3	62					2	62	1	43							13	639	
19th/20th			6	130					1	62	2	63	1	50			4	127	
20th/21st	1	44	3	44					1	130			1	25			9	299	
21st/22nd	1	49	3	49			1	49	3	44	1	45					8	285	
22nd/23rd	2	88							1	51							8	177	
23rd/24th	1	20															6	198	
24th/25th	1	5	1	5							1	50					2	88	
25th/26th	2	39	1	38													2	70	
26th/27th	2	49	2	48					1	38							2	10	
27th/28th	1	23			1	75											4	115	
28th/29th	1	6							1	22							4	97	
29th/30th					1	8					1	7	1	50			3	120	
30th/31st			2	55			4	80								1	41	5	63
31st/2400 Hrs.			3	31													2	49	
TOTAL FOR MONTH	99	2515	110	2122	8	205	12	468	28	1344	23	1308	9	466	2	93	291	8581	

Appendix "C"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944

MORTAR PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd			2	73													2	73
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th			2	30													2	30
5th/6th			3	30													3	30
6th/7th																		
7th/8th			2	100													2	100
8th/9th																		
9th/10th			2	64													2	64
10th/11th																		
11th/12th																		
12th/13th			1	91													1	91
13th/14th																		
14th/15th																		
15th/16th							1	29									1	29
16th/17th					1	2			1	79							1	79
17th/18th									1	60							1	60
18th/19th																	2	62
19th/20th																		
20th/21st											4	88					4	88
21st/22nd			4	65					2	56	3	55					5	111
22nd/23rd									3	63	2	63					9	191
23rd/24th							1	17	1	18							2	35
24th/25th																		
25th/26th									2	11							2	11
26th/27th																		
27th/28th									1	14	2	14					3	28
28th/29th											1	5					1	5
29th/30th											4	52					4	52
30th/31st											2	12					2	12
31st/2400 Hrs.			1	24													1	24
TOTAL FOR MONTH			17	477	1	2	2	16	10	222	19	368					49	1115

Rotation Statistics for period 1 August 1943 to
31 October 1944

	Total number of men rotated		Co. % of Total by Grade										Actual %	En Auth.			
	Hq.	%	Sv %	A %	B %	C %	D %	Med %									
M/Sgt	1	8%										1	1.4%	5%			
T/Sgt			2	17%								1	33 1/3%	3	4.2%	10%	
S/Sgt			2	17%	1	5.5%	2	18%	2	18%			7	9.8%	15%		
T-3														0%	5%		
Sgt	4	42%	1	8%	3	22%	3	27%	2	18%	3	50%	16	21.4%	15%		
T-4			1	8%	3	22%	1	9%	1	9%	1	16%	1	33 1/3%	8	16.2%	9%
Cpl	2	17%			2	15%			2	18%	2	34%	8	10.2%	8%		
T-5	1	8%	2	17%	2	15%			1	9%			6	8.4%	11%		
Pfc	2	17%	3	25%	2	15%	4	37%	3	28%		1	33 1/3%	15			
Pvt	1	8%	1	8%	1	5.5%	1	9%					4	24.4%	22%		
Total	11	100%	12	100%	14	100%	11	100%	11	100%	6	100%	3	100%	68	100%	100%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

8 December 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of November.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of November is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/200,000) Sheet 11, 13.

104 I, IV.

(1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II, III; 98 III,

W, IV SW; 104 I NW, IV NE.

(1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE; 98 III

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period

1 - 30 November

1. General Situation:

Throughout the period, 1 November to 30 November, the 751st Tank Battalion (less Company "C" and 3rd platoon, Company "D") was attached to IV Corps, but there was no time in which all elements of the battalion worked together. During the first three (3) days of the month, Company "C" was attached to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, but the remainder of the unit supported the 92nd Infantry Division. On 3 November, Company "A" and two (2) platoons of Company "D" were relieved from the 92nd Division and attached to CCB, 1st Armored Division. The following day, the battalion headquarters and Headquarters Company were placed under the control of CCB, and a few days later, Company "B" and Service Company were attached to the same command. This left Company "C" and the 3rd platoon of Company "D" as separate units under the 92nd Division, now operating as an independent command under Fifth Army, which attachment remained effective through the end of the period. Following the move to the CCB sector, the battalion was placed under control of IV Corps Artillery, but all elements with the exception of Company "A" and the Assault Guns were shortly relieved. These two units took artillery positions and were placed under the operational control of the 424th FA Group. From that time, the battalion headquarters and subordinate units experienced a succession of attachments and sub-attachments to headquarters including TF 45, 2nd Armored Group, 435th AAA Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment, and 1st Infantry Division, BEF. At the end of the period, the following attachments were effective:

- 1 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

a. IV Corps:
Headquarters Tank Section.

(1) 2nd Armored Group:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (less Tank Section and Assault Platoon)
3rd platoon, Company "B".

(a) 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment - 2nd platoon, Company "B" and 2nd platoon, Company "D".

(b) 435th AAA Battalion - 1st platoon, Company "A".

(2) 424th FA Group:

Company "A" (-2 platoons)
Assault Platoon.

(3) 1st Infantry Division, BEF:

3rd platoon, Company "A"
1st platoon, Company "B"
1st platoon, Company "D"

b. TF 92:

Company "C"
3rd platoon, Company "D"

The tanks performed both in the artillery role and as support to the infantry. Operations were difficult throughout the period. They were hindered on the coastal plain by both natural and artificial tank obstacles, and in the mountains by the unsuitability of tanks to mountainous terrain.

2. Daily Summary:

From 010001A to noon 1 November - Effective 010445A, the 1st platoon, Company "A" was relieved from operational control of the 424th FA Group and was attached to the 2nd Armored Group, per VCOG TF 92. This platoon relieved the 2nd platoon, Company "D" at 010500A in position - 930924, following which, Company "D's" platoon closed into a new position in the vicinities 918952 and 926949.

Noon 1 November to noon 2 November - Increased enemy activity was noted throughout the sector front and all elements were alerted, but no movement developed and there was nothing to report from any unit.

Noon 2 November to noon 3 November - At 022200A and 022230A, respectively, messages were received from Commanding General, TF 92 to alert two (2) platoons of light tanks, and one (1) company of medium tanks to report to Commanding Officer, CCB, 1st Armored Division as soon as possible. At 022400A, a reconnaissance party departed from the Battalion CP - 945903 - to make contact and act as guides. Company "D", less one platoon cleared the area 931924 at 030020A; Company "A" cleared its area 931922 at 030125A. At 031000A, VCOG IV Corps attached Company "A" and Company "D" (-1 platoon) to

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

CCB, 1st Armored Division. Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company were ordered at 0945A to move to the vicinity 599059 where they would meet a guide and be directed to their final destination.

Noon 3 November to noon 4 November - At 1310A, Battalion Headquarters, plus the Assault and Mortar Platoons left the vicinity 945903 and closed into a new area at 597088 at 2130A. Upon arrival, Battalion Headquarters remained directly under the control of IV Corps, but the Assault and Mortar Platoons were attached to CCB, 1st Armored Division. The three (3) battalion staff tanks were ordered to report to the Headquarters Commandant, IV Corps, to be used as security for Corps CP. Per VOCC, CCB, at 1500A, Company "A" was sub-attached to 68th FA Battalion for use in an artillery role. At the same time, Company "D" (-1 platoon) was sub-attached to 13th Tank Battalion, 1st Armored Division. At 1700A, both companies closed into their new positions: Co. "A" - 599153; Co. "D" - 588147. At 040930A, both Company "A" and the Assault Guns were placed under operational control of 89th Tank Destroyer Battalion by VOCC, IV Corps. At 1030A, the 3rd platoon, Company "D" was attached to Company "B", this battalion, and both units remained under the control of TF 92.

Noon 4 November to noon 5 November - At 1700A, the Assault Platoon moved into artillery position in the vicinity of 603157. Two tanks from 2nd platoon, Company "A" were placed in position to act as security for IV Corps Advance CP, until relieved by staff tanks of this battalion. At 1800A, #1 tank, Headquarters Company joined these two Company "A" tanks in their defense role. On the morning of 5 November, the tanks of Company "A" were relieved by tanks #2 and #3, Headquarters Company and returned to control of their parent unit.

Noon 5 November to noon 6 November - Company "C" was relieved from attachment to BEF and at 060300A closed into position at 931924. There was nothing to report from other elements.

Noon 6 November to noon 7 November - Upon arrival in its new area, Company "C" was attached to TF 92. The 2nd and 3rd platoons were sent into defensive positions at 928928 and 917947, respectively, at 061900A, while the 1st platoon was held in reserve. In this move, the 3rd platoon, Company "D" was relieved by the 3rd platoon, Company "C", and upon relief reverted from control of Company "B" to that of Company "C". The 1st platoon, Company "D" moved into position at Palazzo - 635220 - at 070400A, in support of the 13th Tank Battalion. The 751st Tank Battalion, less units with TF 92, was attached to IV Corps Artillery.

Noon 7 November to noon 8 November - Company "D" (-1 platoon) was placed under the operational control of 1st Infantry Division, BEF, effective 071200A. At 071800A, the 1st section, 1st platoon moved from 635220 to 635225. An hour later, the 2nd section, 2nd platoon moved from 588147 to 635220. There was nothing to report from other elements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

Noon 8 November to noon 9 November - Battalion Maintenance Platoon moved into the vicinity of 595119 at 081730A. The 1st and 2nd platoons of Company "A" moved to new artillery positions at 600144 and 594144 at 1830A. Both Company "B" and Service Company were alerted to move from their positions on the coast to 603157 on 9 November.

Noon 9 November to noon 10 November - Company "B" was released from attachment to TF 92 and departed from its area - 978922 - at 090825A. Upon arrival at its new position, 601153 at 091900A, Company "B" was placed under the operational control of 1st Infantry Division, BEF. Service Company closed its area - 958885 - at 090900A and arrived at 595091 at 091700A.

Noon 10 November to noon 11 November - With the exception of normal firing missions by elements in artillery positions, there was no activity among other units.

Noon 11 November to noon 12 November - Effective 120600A, Company "B" was relieved from operational control of 1st Infantry Division, BEF, and reverted to the control of this battalion. The battalion itself returned from control of IV Corps Artillery to that of IV Corps. The 1st section of the 2nd platoon, Company "D" was subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire. One tank was hit by shell fragments, destroying the .50 cal. AA gun, four (4) periscopes, and the 37-mm gun.

Noon 12 November to noon 13 November - There was no activity among elements of the unit, other than normal firing missions by artillery sections.

Noon 13 November to noon 14 November - No action except normal artillery firing missions.

Noon 14 November to noon 15 November - The Assault Platoon fired one (1) harassing mission; Co. "A" fired eight (8) harassing missions. There was no activity among other units.

Noon 15 November to noon 16 November - At 2230A, one platoon of Company "B" was relieved from the control of this battalion and placed under the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment. The 2nd platoon, Company "A" moved into a new artillery position in the vicinity 597141 at 160700A. The 1st section, 2nd platoon, Company "D" departed from its area at 635220 and moved to 588147 at 151800A.

Noon 16 November to noon 17 November - A message from G-3, IV Corps placed one platoon of Company "B" under the control of the BEF, effective 161400A. At 1630A, the 2nd platoon of Company "D" was relieved from attachment to the 2nd Battalion, 1st CT, BEF and attached to 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment.

Noon 17 November to noon 18 November - The 1st platoon, Company "B" moved to the vicinity of 587146 at 171530A. The 1st section, 1st platoon, Company "D" relieved the 1st section, 2nd platoon in position at 635225, at 171300A.

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

Noon 18 November to noon 19 November - At 190855A, a message was received from IV Corps attaching this battalion headquarters and Headquarters Company (less the Assault Platoon), Company "B" and Company "D" (less two platoons) to TF 45, effective 18 November. The Assault Guns and Company "A" remained under the operational control of 424th FA Group. Company "C" and the 3rd platoon, Company "D" remained attached to TF 92, and the 1st platoon, Company "D" to the BEF. The Assault Platoon fired seven (7) precision adjustment missions on enemy guns. All three platoons of Company "A" fired in defense of enemy counterattacks.

Noon 19 November to noon 20 November - There was no activity, with the exception of firing missions by assault guns and tanks in artillery role.

Noon 20 November to noon 21 November - At 202130A, Operations Instructions #2, Headquarters TF 45 was received whereby the battalion headquarters, Headquarters Company (less the Assault Platoon), Company "B", and Company "D" (less 2 platoons) were sub-attached to 2nd Armored Group.

Noon 21 November to noon 22 November - There was no activity among elements of the battalion.

Noon 22 November to noon 23 November - At 222200A, orders were received from 2nd Armored Group making sub-attachments of elements of this battalion to infantry units in the Group sector, for support of pending operations. The 1st platoon of Company "B" was ordered to move under cover of darkness during the period 22 - 23 to an assembly area in the vicinity of 568176, being attached upon arrival to the 3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, BEF. During the same period, the 2nd platoon, Company "B" and the 2nd platoon, Company "D" were ordered to move to the vicinity of Crociale - 565158 -, coming under control of the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment, upon arrival. The Mortar Platoon was also attached to the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment, and instructed to move to positions in the area 570175. Company "B's" 3rd platoon took position in Lizzano - 5112 -, under the operational control of the 435th AAA Battalion. For the purpose of the coming operation, the Tank Section, 2nd Armored Group was attached to Company "B", this battalion.

Noon 23 November to noon 24 November - At 231800A, Company "B" opened its advance CP in Gaggio Montano - 554168 - and was joined by this battalion's advance CP at 2130A. During the hours of darkness, the Mortar Platoon moved to 570175, and prepared to support the infantry in its advance on the morning of the 24th. At 240600A, all three platoons of Company "B" and one platoon of Company "D" moved from their assembly areas to support the infantry attack. The 1st platoon, Company "B" moved from 588175 northwest to Bombiana - 584182. Just north of the town, #1 tank was immobilized by a mine and blocked the road so that the other four (4) tanks could proceed no farther. The remainder of the platoon took firing positions in the vicinity of 589189. Three tanks of the 2nd platoon moved out of Gaggio Montano toward Morandella - 548178 - at 0600A, with the 2nd platoon, Company "B". Company "D's" platoon reached its objective at 241000A, but the tanks of Company "B" were delayed. The 3rd platoon moved north on the Vidiciatico - 5138 - Querciola 513163 road. At 1100A, it arrived at 518173 where it

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

was delayed by a minefield. When the minefield had been cleared, three tanks of the platoon moved on to Corona 517176, but the other two (2) tanks were immobilized because of mechanical difficulty. The tank section, 2nd Armored Group, was held in reserve at Crociale - 567158.

Noon 24 November to noon 25 November - At about 1600A, three tanks of the 3rd platoon of Company "B" reached their objective at Corona - 517176 - and took defensive positions under heavy enemy artillery fire. The other two tanks were delayed because of mechanical trouble, but joined the platoon after dark. The three tanks of the 2nd platoon that had moved toward Morandella during the previous period arrived there at 1700A. The 2nd section (2 tanks) remained in Gaggio Montano. The 1st platoon, Company "A" was relieved from attachment to 424th FA Group, by VCCG, IV Corps and attached to 435th AAA Battalion. The platoon moved from its artillery position in Querciola - 513164 - arriving there at about 250530A. The 1st platoon, Company "B" retained firing positions in the vicinity of 589189 supporting the BEF.

Noon 25 November to noon 26 November - There was no movement of elements during the period. All platoons of Company "B" and the two from Company "A" and Company "D" remained in defensive positions, firing on targets of opportunity in support of the infantry. The Assault Platoon and two tank platoons of Company "A" still in artillery positions were active in firing missions on enemy personnel and installations.

Noon 26 November to noon 27 November - While attempting to clear a road for the 1st platoon, Company "A", that company's tankdozer struck a mine at 522173 and was put completely out of action. The platoon received intense artillery fire at that point. One tank was damaged, one man killed, and the platoon leader injured. There was nothing to report from other elements. At 261800A, the 1st platoon, Company "B" went under the control of the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, BEF.

Noon 27 November to noon 28 November - The 3rd platoon, Company "A" moved from its artillery position at 280800A, to support the BEF in the vicinity of Bombiana - 585182. The platoon reached 571163, but could go no farther. Three tanks were stuck there and the platoon was receiving intense artillery fire at the end of the period.

Noon 28 November to noon 29 November - At 281700A, the 3rd platoon, Company "A" was able to conclude its move begun during the previous period and took position in an assembly area near 573174. During a severe counterattack in the vicinity of Corona - 518177 - Company "A's" tankdozer, previously immobilized by mines, was captured near 522173 by the enemy at approximately 2400A. At about the same time, three tanks of the 3rd platoon, Company "B" were taken by the enemy in the town of Corona. A total of five men were casualties, three wounded and two missing-in action. The remaining two tanks of the 3rd platoon withdrew to Vidiciatico - 501138.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

Noon 29 November to 2400A 30 November - The 3rd platoon, Company "B" (2 tanks) moved to Silla - 547148 - to reorganize and rest. One section of the 2nd platoon, Company "D" moved from 549178 to Gaggio Montano - 551168 - to be held in reserve by the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry Regiment. There was no activity among other elements.

Summaries of firing missions are attached as follows:

- Appendix "A" - Tank Platoons
- Appendix "B" - Assault Platoon
- Appendix "C" - Mortar Platoon

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 30 November 1944

1. General:

The first four days of the period were spent on the coastal plain where the enemy situation had changed little for approximately six weeks. The front lines remained stable and the tanks' principal activity consisted of artillery missions and firing on targets of opportunity in support of the infantry.

Following the move to the battalion's present sector, it became clear that the enemy's intentions were the same as encountered on the coast. He held his lines with every intention of denying us any advance. The tanks supported the infantry in a general attack against the Belvedere - Castello ridge, and the enemy fell back, offering only slight resistance. However, the expected counterattacks soon followed and reached such an intensity that the ground was re-taken, indicating that the enemy intended to hold the high ground at all cost. His methods were devised to use to the utmost advantage the mountainous terrain in which he was engaged and the numerous mountain villages that were easily converted into strongpoints.

Units of all three regiments of the 232nd Infantry Division were identified in the battalion's immediate sector - the 1043, 1044, and 1045. Throughout the period, it was obvious that the sector was being constantly strengthened by building up weak companies with replacements brought from Germany and even from other units on the Italian front. Although a number of prisoners were taken, including some deserters, there was no indication that there was any serious defect in the morale of the enemy's troops.

Enemy special-agent operations continued and the use of close-in espionage was especially noticed. It was necessary to take particular precautions against the presence of civilians near CP areas and the transporting of civilians in military vehicles.

- 7 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communications with higher headquarters were by radio, wire, and messenger.

2. Radio:

Radio communication during the month of November was not as satisfactory as in the previous period. This was due partially to mountainous terrain, bad atmospheric conditions, and the fact that a major number of the radio sets in this unit are badly worn from such long periods of continuous use. The sets operate normally in every way for short distances, but they no longer have the strong output or receiving qualities needed for operating at normal distances. The majority of these sets have operated continuously since this battalion entered the line on 23 July 1944. Numerous mechanical failures have been experienced. Several replacement vehicles have been received from Ordnance with faulty radio equipment. Due to the close cooperation between the radio repairmen of this unit and the help of a signal repair unit, no vehicles were without communication for any length of time. During the latter part of the month several SCR AM/VRC - 3 sets were mounted in tanks. This set is an SCR 300, with a special mounting kit for mounting in tanks, and is used for communication between tanks and infantry. It has been used in actual combat and proved very satisfactory.

3. Wire:

Wire communication to higher headquarters was very satisfactory. Because of the widely scattered positions of the companies it was not always possible to maintain wire communication with them. Because of the artillery role in which the tanks of this unit have been employed, a letter has been written to Fifth Army requesting a switchboard, BD-72, four (4) reel units, RL-31, and twenty (20) telephones, EE-8, in excess of current TO & E. This equipment is deemed necessary in order to operate efficiently under present conditions.

4. Messenger:

Messenger runs to higher headquarters and the companies were made daily. Results were very satisfactory.

5. Miscellaneous:

Pigeons were sent to this headquarters for training and exercising purposes. Results of flights are unknown.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 30 November, this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes was generally good. At the close of the period the organization has five (5) trucks, 2½-ton, on DS, and is short one (1) truck, ¼-ton, two (2) half-tracks, M3A1, and one (1) half-track, 81mm mortar, M1. Having these trucks on continued DS has considerably hampered the transporting and maintenance of supplies within the battalion.

2. Rations:

The principal rations used during this period were the 'B' type and 10 in 1 ration. On several occasions "bad" cases of 10 in 1 rations were drawn from the ration dump. This was caused by dampness soaking through the ration boxes which were next to the ground on the bottom of a pile in the ration dump.

It was necessary to draw an extra ration a day for each light tank crew using 10 in 1 rations. The reason for this is that it is impossible to break-down to a four-man tank crew four-tenths of a 10 in 1 ration while it can easily be broken down in half.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing with a few exceptions has been good. While small size shoepacs have not been available, overshoes were drawn as substitutes until the small size shoepacs become available. Small size socks, wool, ski have not as yet been issued this organization and are urgently needed. Large size raincoats have been difficult to obtain during the period.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gas, oil, and ammunition has been ample and readily available during the period.

5. Ordnance:

Vehicle replacements have been available during the period. Also, a limited amount of tires and tubes, which have been needed for some time, have been received. While the repair of vehicles that go to ordnance has been satisfactory, it is the opinion of this headquarters that the length of time for completion of repairs is too long. This, of course, also hampers the transportation of supplies within the battalion.

6. Battle Losses:

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

a. Tank Losses:

(1) Medium:

<u>No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Damage</u>
1 - M4A3	Mines	Broken both tracks. Recovered within 24 hrs.
1 - M4A1	Mine	Broken track and damaged suspension system. Recovered within 48 hrs.
3 - M4 & M4A1	Captured	Tanks disabled by crew. Believed totally destroyed later.
1 - Tank Dozer	Mines and later hit by A.P.	
5 - Total		Total Loss

(2) Lights:

1 - M5	Enemy artillery.	HE fire damaged the 37mm gun - turned into ordnance.
1 - M5	Enemy artillery.	37mm gun damaged. Turret jammed. Turned into ordnance
2 - Total		

b. Other Losses:

2 - H.T. M3A1	Direct hit by enemy artillery.	One partially burned; one repairable by 4th echelon maintenance.
3 - Watches, Wrist		
4 - Biscoculars, M9		
19 - Guns, submachine, cal. .45		
1 - Carbine, cal. .30		

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. Second echelon maintenance during the month was greater than usual, due to the extremely difficult terrain the tanks and trucks were forced to negotiate. Repairs consisted largely of major unit failures such as transmissions, transfer cases, and engines. In most cases these units were not replaceable due to critical shortage of new or rebuilt units, and considerable improvisation was necessary.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

2. Considerable difficulty was encountered in the servicing of light tank replacements. The battalion maintenance platoon was forced to do an abnormal amount of fourth echelon work before the tanks could be sent on to the line. Medium tank replacements were in somewhat better condition.

3. The mountainous terrain over which the tanks and general purpose vehicles were consistently operating, caused considerable recovery work for company and battalion maintenance. Because of this the recovery vehicles and 10-ton wreckers were operating consistently every night and as the crews were thus absent from the battalion shop, repair work was slower.

4. One (1) tankdozer, five (5) medium tanks and two (2) light tanks, were battle casualties and one (1) tankdozer, two (2) medium tanks, and three (3) light tanks, were tallied due to mechanical failure necessitating fourth echelon repair.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Silver Star

Adoue, Victor E. (posthumously)	1st Lt.	01015818	Co. "B"
Pellegrinon, Homer	Sgt.	35260134	Co. "B"
Ingram, Walter E.	Cpl.	34266326	Co. "C"
Hupp, Elva	Pfc	37404603	Co. "C"

Bronze Star

Norton, Frank	Cpl.	34268941	Co. "B"
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2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

Rustausky, Stanley A.	Techn 4th gr	31258663	Co. "A"	26 Nov 1944
Ferris, Alfred	Pfc	13082982	Co. "D"	8 Nov 1944

M.I.A.

Edwards, Irving C.	Sgt.	33003145	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944
Harmon, Ralph E.	Sgt.	35017638	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944
Dowell, Raymond P.	Techn 5th gr	35017002	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944

W.I.A.-(Hospitalized)

Casey, Gerald E.	Cpl.	37511013	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944
Harper, Howard	Techn 5th gr	34330101	Co. "C"	14 Nov 1944
Canaan, Francis A.	Pfc	32285129	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944
Gilroy, Paul A.	Pvt.	35017647	Sv Co.	14 Nov 1944
Pollari, Salvatore	Pvt.	32794397	Co. "B"	28 Nov 1944

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Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

W.L.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Spurlock, Mark M.	Techn 4th gr	35019968	Co. "A"	26 Nov 1944
Jones, Donald H.	Pvt.	32100716	Co. "A"	26 Nov 1944

I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Coffee, Joshua M.	Techn 4th gr	34762130	Co. "B"	29 Nov 1944
Gomez, Humberto R.	Pfc	38455984	Co. "B"	29 Nov 1944

I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

None.

3. Comments:

a. The provision in the Table of Organization for six (6) basics per medium company, and five (5) per light company, is inadequate as a matter of practicable application. In theory the allotted basics would be absorbed into the creative operational personnel when warranted. It has become apparent, however, that the basics are in fact a pool of personnel that cannot be injected into the effective strength of the battalion. This condition is based upon the fact that each unit of this battalion has on the average of five (5) EM that are ineffective in an organization of this nature. This group consists of the following elements:

- (1) Over Age.
- (2) Physical Delinquents.
- (3) Malassigned and maladjusted.

To alleviate the above condition, it is desired that the ineffectual personnel be exchanged for personnel capable of meeting the physical requirements of a tank unit.

b. Casualties for the period have been light. However, difficulty has been encountered in being able to fully man combat vehicles due to the fact that this battalion has never experienced an overstrength sufficient to offset the loss of personnel due to combat casualties and sickness. This condition is aggravated by the following:

- (1) Reason set forth in paragraph a, above.
- (2) Inadequate provisions for the rapid dispatch of Admission and Disposition Slips from hospitals to units.
- (3) Rotation replacements are not made promptly.

c. It is recommended that this unit be authorized to fill vacancies created by rotation of the first three grades by promotion, and receive basic replacements in lieu thereof.

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Report of Action for month of Nov, Cont'd.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

1. Because of the mountainous terrain, the problem of supply became a challenge of major proportions. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that all platoons were widely separated in particularly inaccessible locations. In some instances, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks were used where the mule trails permitted; in other cases, light tanks were used; and in extreme cases, mules were employed, with tank crews transporting the supplies the last five hundred yards on their backs. Engineers did a very commendable job in repairing roads, but it was a never ending task due to the heavy rains. If inclement weather persists, tanks will be reduced to a supporting role from stationary positions.
2. In all operations for the past month, the tanks were more or less roadbound or canalized. This made them particularly susceptible to fire from AT guns. It was only by diligent "overwatching" and splendid cooperation and coordination with TD's that the various units escaped heavy losses.
3. It is questionable whether or not tanks are satisfactory as stationary outposts or armored pill boxes because of their high silhouette and the difficulty in outposting them with infantry. Most counterattacks are made at night, when tanks are particularly blind. It does not seem practical to jeopardize such valuable equipment by subjecting it to "bazooka" raids, when the same mission can be performed equally as well by ground mounts and improvised pill boxes. At times, the tactical situation may require their use in the outpost role. In those instances, great care should be taken to place tanks strategically so as to be mutually supporting with final protective lines that can be laid down regardless of the visibility.
4. Under actual combat conditions the new SCR AN/VRC - 3 radio has proved to be very satisfactory when operating with infantry in a supporting role. It results in splendid cooperation and coordination between the units. After a week of continuous operation, there were no mechanical failures.

C. J. Madden

C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding

7 Incls.

Incl. #1-Daily Summary of Operations, Co. "C" - 7 - 30 Nov

Incl. #2-Maps (Italy, 1/200,000) Sheet 11, 13

Incl. #3-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000)

Sheet 97 I, II, III; 98 III, IV; 104 I, IV.

Incl. #4-Maps (Italy, 1/25,000)

Sheet 97 I SE, II NE; 98 III NW, IV SW; 104 I NW, IV NE

Incl. #5-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Nov 1944

Incl. #6-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 30 Nov 1944

Incl. #7-Unit Journal and File.

APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944

TANK PLATOONS

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd			3	70													3	70
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th			1	40	1	5											2	45
5th/5th			4	122	1	2											5	124
6th/7th			5	100	1	10											6	110
7th/8th			4	60													4	60
8th/9th	1	40															1	40
9th/10th			3	20	1	5											4	25
10th/11th			1	88	2	13											3	101
11th/12th			2	110													2	110
12th/13th	1	30	1	20													2	50
13th/14th																		
14th/15th			8	163													8	163
15th/16th	2	58	3	48	1	5											6	111
16th/17th	2	16			1	50											3	66
17th/18th			4	100													4	100
18th/19th	1	23	3	64							3	63					7	150
19th/20th			6	145													6	145
20th/21st			7	140							1	20					8	160
21st/22nd	4	73	4	75													8	148
22nd/23rd			4	100													4	100
23rd/24th			2	60	1	13											3	73
24th/25th	1	73	1	72													2	145
25th/26th	3	127	13	155					3	100							19	382
26th/27th	1	9	6	160													7	169
27th/28th																		
28th/29th	9	104	3	104							5	104					17	312
29th/30th	9	158	8	257			1	156	1	56							19	627
30th/2400HRS																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH	34	711	96	2273	9	103	1	156	4	156	9	189					153	3586

APPENDIX "C"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944

MORTAR PLATOONS

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd																		
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th																		
5th/6th																		
6th/7th																		
7th/8th																		
8th/9th																		
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20th/21st																		
21st/22nd																		
22nd/23rd																		
23rd/24th																		
24th/25th																		
25th/26th											1	145					1	145
26th/27th									1	5							1	5
27th/28th																		
28th/29th																		
29th/30th																		
30th/24 COHRS																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH									1	5	1	145					2	150

APPENDIX "B"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1944

ASSAULT PLATOONS

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		D STRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd													1	25			1	25
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th																		
5th/6th					1	9					1	44					2	53
6th/7th	3	154			1	7											4	161
7th/8th			2	209													2	209
8th/9th			1	30													1	30
9th/10th	7	130			1	10											8	140
10th/11th			1	88	2	13											3	101
11th/12th			3	80	2	22											5	102
12th/13th	2	72	1	15	2	18											5	105
13th/14th	2	36	2	48	1	12					1	51					6	147
14th/15th			1	30													1	30
15th/16th	1	12	1	12													2	24
16th/17th			3	166													3	166
17th/18th	1	69			4	69											5	138
18th/19th	7	175															7	175
19th/20th	1	21															1	21
20th/21st																		
21st/22nd	4	88			2	4											6	92
22nd/23rd			1	40	2	3					1	41					4	84
23rd/24th			1	10													1	10
24th/25th	8	93	1	93	1	2	1	93	4	93							15	374
25th/26th	3	33	2	34													5	67
26th/27th	1	16	1	16									1	75			3	107
27th/28th			2	35													2	35
28th/29th													1	131			1	131
29th/30th			6	210													6	210
30th/2400HRS																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH	40	800	29	1116	19	169	1	93	4	93	3	136	3	231			99	2737

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DAILY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS COMPANY "C",
WITH 3RD PLATOON COMPANY "D",
ATTACHED FOR PERIOD 7 - 30 NOVEMBER 1944

Noon 7 November to noon 9 November - Nothing to report.

Noon 9 November to noon 10 November - Company was sub-attached to 365th Infantry Regiment. VCG TF 92.

Noon 10 November to noon 11 November - 2nd platoon fired direct fire on enemy installations in Porta - 933970.

Noon 11 November to noon 12 November - The 1st platoon (-2 tanks) moved to Querceta - 953947 - at 1830A. Two tanks on a separate mission in Scravezza - 974966 - fired on enemy machinegun positions. The 2nd and 3rd platoons fired on enemy positions, destroying an OP and a pillbox.

Noon 12 November to noon 13 November - The 1st platoon knocked out an enemy machinegun in Scravezza and the 2nd platoon an OP in Montignoso - 936994.

Noon 13 November to noon 14 November - All platoons fired direct fire on enemy positions.

Noon 14 November to noon 15 November - The company CP was heavily shelled, wounding two men. The CP moved to 032023 at 1700A.

Noon 15 November to noon 24 November - All platoons fired direct fire missions in support of the infantry. There was no further action to report.

Noon 24 November to noon 25 November - While on a direct firing mission, the 2nd platoon received heavy enemy artillery fire and was forced to withdraw. One tank was immobilized by a land mine at Forte dei Marmi - 928920.

Noon 26 November to noon 27 November - Nothing to report.

Noon 27 November to noon 28 November - The 2nd platoon moved to the vicinity of Viareggio to practice amphibious operations with the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry Regiment. All tanks from the platoon were committed to salt water. The 3rd platoon fired on an enemy OP and received heavy artillery fire in return.

Noon 28 November to noon 29 November - The 2nd platoon continued practicing amphibious operations. One tank was completely immobilized due to immersion in salt water. The 3rd platoon moved to Querceta - 953947.

Noon 29 November to 2400A 30 November - Nothing to report. At the close of the period, the 1st and 2nd platoons were at 933930 and the 3rd platoon at 915945.

Incl. #1

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HEADQUARTERS
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

DUPS

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of December. ⁴⁴

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of December is submitted:

DOWNGRADED TO:
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED

AUTHORITY OF TAG TCM

Map Reference: Italy - (1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II, III; 93 III, IV; 104 I, IV.
(1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE; 98 III NW, IV SW, 104 I NW, IV NE.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period
1 - 31 December

13 Mar 46

HSD

Date

Initials

1. General Situation:

Throughout the period 1 - 31 December, the 751st Tank Battalion continued to operate without Company "C" and the 3rd platoon of Company "D". These two elements were attached to the 92nd Infantry Division and functioned directly under the control of that unit. The remainder of the battalion was attached to IV Corps with sub-attachments made to American and Brazilian infantry units within the sector. On 20 December, all elements of the battalion, less Company "C" and the 3rd platoon of Company "D", were returned to the control of this headquarters, and the headquarters placed directly under IV Corps. It was given the mission of supporting the infantry of TF 45 in the sector held by the 900th AAA Battalion and of constituting Corps Reserve with all elements not actually employed as infantry support. The Assault Guns and two (2) platoons of Company "A" continued in their artillery role under the control of IV Corps Artillery, and the Headquarters Tank Section remained as local security for the Advance CP IV Corps until released to the battalion on 25 December. As in the previous period, operations for the majority of the battalion were in mountainous terrain, presenting the usual difficulties of maneuver and supply.

2. Daily Summary:

From 010001A to noon 1 December - The 2nd platoon of Company "B" remained attached to the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry, but moved from its position in the vicinity of 546178 to a new area in Gaggio Montano (552168). The 2nd Platoon of Company "D" moved from the same area, the 1st section going into Gaggio Montano, and the 2nd section to Gabba (536152), closing in at approximately 010500A.

XXVIII

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

105-69.2

1860
2/2

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

Noon 1 December to noon 2 December - The 1st platoon of Company "A", in support of the 435th AAA Battalion, closed into its new position in the vicinity of 517129 at 011300A. The 2nd platoon of that company continued in the artillery role; the 3rd platoon remained attached to BEF. The 2nd section of the 2nd platoon, Company "D" joined the 1st section in Gabba (536152) at 011245A.

Noon 2 December to noon 3 December - The 3rd platoon of Company "A" was called upon to support the infantry of the BEF in an effort to repulse an enemy counterattack launched from the vicinity of Abetaia (578189) at 022300A. At 030430A the tanks were forced to withdraw to 589157, following the infantry's withdrawal. At 030930A, the tanks moved out with the infantry in an attack to restore the line to its former position. The 1st platoon of Company "B" also fired during this action, but did not move from its position in Bombiana (584183).

Noon 3 December to noon 4 December - At 1800A, the 3rd platoon of Company "A" was relieved from attachment to BEF and reverted to the control of its parent company, moving to the vicinity of 582119. At 031600A, the battalion opened a forward CP at 587147, in conjunction with Company "B", which had moved from Gaggio Montano (553167) at 1545A. The 2nd platoon of Company "B" moved into firing positions in the vicinity of 555165 to support the BEF counterattack against C. Vitelline (574185). Their mission was accomplished and the platoon returned to its original position 549168 at 1700A.

Noon 4 December to noon 6 December - With the exception of normal firing missions by the Mortar Platoon and the tanks in the artillery role, there was nothing to report from elements of the battalion.

Noon 6 December to noon 7 December - The Mortar Platoon received enemy shell fire, but reported no damage other than to one mortar bipod. There was nothing to report from other elements.

Noon 7 December to noon 8 December - The Mortar Platoon was released from the support of the 2nd Battalion, 370th Infantry, and moved from its position at 533167 to 600085, closing in at 071500A.

Noon 8 December to noon 9 December - The 1st section, 2nd platoon, Company "D" moved from its position in Gabba (536152) and took firing positions in the vicinity of 529156. The 2nd section remained in Gabba. There was no activity among other elements.

Noon 9 December to noon 10 December - Effective 091800A, the 3rd platoon, Company "B" was relieved from attachment to TF 45 and attached to the 1st Infantry Division, BEF for the support of contemplated operations.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd

Noon 10 December to noon 11 December - At 1715A, the 1st platoon, Company "D" received approximately 100 rounds of estimated medium enemy artillery on its position at 635220. Four casualties resulted, one killed and 3 wounded. At dawn, 11 December, the 1st platoon, Company "A" moved into position in the vicinity of 505155 in preparation for diversionary action later in the day. The 3rd platoon, Company "A" moved into artillery positions in the 5912 grid square at 110800A. The 3rd platoon, Company "B" moved into the area 555164 at 110630A, preparing to support action of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF.

Noon 11 December to noon 12 December - At 1630A the 1st platoon, Company "A" moved into firing positions in the vicinity of 513163 and supported the diversionary action of elements of the 435th AAA Battalion by firing on enemy targets in Rocca Cornetta (491173). When their mission was completed, the tanks returned to their original position at 517129. Before dawn 12 December, the 1st platoon, Company "B" moved into firing positions in the vicinity of 583183 and 581185. Beginning at dawn the platoon supported the attack of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF on Mt. Castello by firing on OP's, m/g's, and pill-boxes. The 3rd platoon, Company "B" supported the attack from vicinity of 555164.

Noon 12 December to noon 13 December - The 1st and 3rd platoons, Company "B" continued to support the attack of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF throughout the day of 12 December. At 121700A the 1st platoon returned to its original position where it remained through the remainder of the period. Effective 130600A, the 3rd platoon was relieved from attachment to 1st Infantry Division, BEF and reverted to the control of its parent company. The platoon moved to its new position in the vicinity of 587147 at 130730A.

Noon 13 December to noon 15 December - With the exception of normal firing missions by the Assault Platoon and the tank platoons of Company "A" in artillery position, there was no activity to report.

Noon 15 December to noon 16 December - Two tanks of the 2nd platoon, Company "A" moved to a new artillery position in the vicinity of 632149, and the 3rd platoon took new positions at 629151.

Noon 16 December to noon 17 December - The 2nd platoon, Company "A" completed its move begun during the previous period. Effective 170600A, the 2nd and 3rd platoons of Company "B" and the 2nd platoon, Company "D" were released from the control of TF 45 and placed under the control of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF.

Noon 17 December to noon 18 December - Following the move of its two artillery platoons, Company "A" moved its CP to 636140 and closed into its new area at 1715A. The Assault Platoon also occupied new artillery positions in the vicinity of 607162 at 1330A. Per VOSO, 2d Armored Group, the Mortar Platoon was attached to the 900th AAA Battalion.

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Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

Noon 18 December to noon 19 December - The Mortar Platoon moved to the vicinity of Lizzano (517129) at 181400A, and took firing positions at 497142 the following morning to support the 900th AAA Battalion.

Noon 19 December to noon 20 December - The Battalion Forward CP moved from Valdibura (597088) to Castelluccio (543116), closing in at 201200A.

Noon 20 December to noon 21 December - All elements of the battalion under the control of the BEF and IV Corps Artillery were relieved from such attachment and reverted to this unit. At the same time, the unit was relieved from attachment to TF 45 and placed directly under IV Corps. As a result of these changes, the CP's of Company "B" and Company "D" were moved, the former to Lizzano (517128) and the latter to the vicinity of Maenzano (506136). Headquarters, Company "B" and the company's 3rd platoon closed into their new area at approximately 1830A. The relief of the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company "B" by elements of 13th Tank Battalion took place during the night of 20 - 21 December. When the relief was completed, the platoons joined the remainder of the company in Lizzano, the 2nd platoon closing at 202000A, the 1st closing at 211200A. The 1st platoon, Company "D" moved from vicinity of Palanzo (635219) to Querciola (513164). Upon arrival to Querciola the platoon relieved one platoon, Company "D", 13th Tank Battalion. The relief was completed at 2300A.

Noon 21 December to noon 22 December - The 1st platoon of Company "D" was attacked by an enemy patrol in the vicinity of 513163 at 1830A. The enemy fired at the tanks with bazookas, but was repulsed before damage could be done. The 2nd platoon, Company "D" was relieved in place by elements of 13th Tank Battalion at 212100A. The platoon joined the Company Headquarters near 506136 at 220100A.

Noon 22 December to noon 23 December - The 1st platoon, Company "A", still in position in Lizzano (517128), was placed under the operational control of the Commanding Officer, Company "D", this battalion, as was the 2nd platoon, Company "A", 89th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The 2nd platoon, Company "D" relieved the 1st platoon in place - 511163 and 511159 at 221830A, and the 1st platoon moved to the area of the Company CP - 506136.

Noon 23 December to noon 25 December - With the exception of normal artillery firing missions, there was no activity among elements of the command.

Noon 25 December to noon 26 December - At 251200A, the Headquarters Company tanks serving as local security for IV Corps Advance CP were relieved and returned to the control of this battalion. The tanks closed into the Battalion CP area at Castelluccio (543116) at 1900A.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

Noon 26 December to noon 27 December - The 1st platoon of Company "A" left its position in Lizzano (517128) at 270435 and moved to Vidiciatico (501139), closing into new positions at 0700A.

Noon 27 December to noon 28 December - NTR.

Noon 28 December to noon 29 December - After receiving severe counterbattery in its artillery position at 632149, the 2nd platoon, Company "A" departed from that area at 1940A, closing into the vicinity 612152 at 2245A.

Noon 29 December to noon 30 December - The 1st platoon, Company "D" relieved the 2nd platoon in place 504163 - 504148. The relief was completed at 300545A. The 2nd platoon closed into the company area vicinity 506136 at 300630A.

Noon 30 December to 312400A December - NTR.

- Appendix "A" - Summary of firing missions, Tank Platoons.
- Appendix "B" - Summary of firing missions, Assault Platoon.
- Appendix "C" - Summary of firing missions, Mortar Platoon.
- Appendix "D" - Summary of Action, Company "C", and 3rd platoon, Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, 1 - 31 December 1944.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 31 December 1944

1. General:

The enemy situation changed little during the period, either physically or in the attitude displayed by the troops. Patrol activity was constant throughout the sector as the enemy made every effort to keep aware of all our movements. The one attempt made by our forces to advance against the Belvedere - Castello ridge was met with concentrated fire and the same tenacious defense demonstrated in former action concerning the same terrain features. There is no doubt of the fact that the enemy fully appreciates the importance of this high ground and intends to hold it at all cost.

Movement and shifting of troops throughout the general sector during the middle of the period indicated a possibility that the enemy would revert from his defensive attitude and go on the offensive. However, it did not appear that concerted action would materialize in this battalion's immediate sector. It was very likely, though, that diversionary action might be directed against forward infantry elements. If successful, such action could have been developed with the objective of severing Highway #64 and preventing its further use to us as a supply route.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

Road conditions and general terrain seriously restricted the movement of armor; therefore, any enemy advance would have to rely principally on infantry troops. Defensive plans for the battalion's tanks to support the infantry were made accordingly.

The activity of enemy agents remained normal. It was easy for them to cross the front lines simply by utilizing back trails through the mountains. The inability to eliminate this traffic made it imperative that all troops, particularly those in forward villages, remain alert for the presence of suspicious individuals.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communications with higher headquarters were by wire, radio and messenger.

2. Radio:

Radio communication during the month of December was the same as in the last period. Mountainous terrain and bad atmospheric conditions continued to act as a disturbing factor. Within the companies and for short distances, communications were satisfactory. A new T/E has been inaugurated, authorizing four SCR 508's and fifteen SCR 528's per medium company and four SCR-508's and fourteen SCR 528's in the light company. This arrangement does away with all SCR 538's and permits two way communication between all radio-equipped vehicles. The extra SCR 508's make it possible for all platoon leaders to operate two separate nets. Mechanical failures were at a minimum for the period.

3. Wire:

Wire communication to higher headquarters was very satisfactory. Because of numerous moves and the widely scattered positions of the companies, it was not always possible to maintain wire communication with them. In answer to a letter written to Fifth Army requesting equipment in excess of T/E, a switchboard BD-72, 4 reel units RL-31 and 20 telephones EE-8 have been received. These items are to be turned in by 29 January 1945 unless a time extension is granted.

4. Messenger:

Messenger runs to higher headquarters and to the companies were made daily with satisfactory results.

5. Miscellaneous:

The platoon of M4A3 tanks belonging to Company "A", this battalion has been employed in an artillery role since the first week of November 1944. This platoon is equipped with a 76mm gun and each tank in

Report of Action for month of Dec, Tont'd.

the platoon had fired between 1500 and 2000 rounds at the end of December. During the last week of the period, the speakers on all five radios (SCR 508 and SCR 528) were blown out. It is apparent that the speaker is not constructed to withstand the concussion resulting from extensive firing of the 76mm gun. Though speakers have occasionally blown on M4 and M4A1 tanks equipped with the 75mm guns, such occurrences have been few. It is recommended that a modification be made to the speaker in these tanks whereby concussion waves may be absorbed to some extent before striking the speaker cone.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 December, this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes was generally good. At the close of the period the organization still has 5 trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, on DS, and is short 5 trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, and 1 carrier, personnel, half-track, M3A2, w/winch. Having these 5 trucks on continued DS still considerably hampers the transportation and maintenance of supplies within the battalion.

2. Rations:

The principal rations used during this period were the "B" type and 10 in 1 ration. The 5 in 1 ration is considered a better ration by tank crews as the contents are the exact amount for one day for one tank crew and because this ration offers a larger variety of food. This ration, however, has been unobtainable for some time.

It was necessary to draw an extra ration a day for such light tank crew using 10 in 1 rations. The reason for this is that it is impossible to break-down to a 4-man tank crew four-tenths of a 10 in 1 ration while it can easily be broken down in half.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing with a few exceptions has been good. These exceptions were small size socks, wool, ski, and large size rain-coats.

During the month, winter clothing was issued, combat suits, jackets, field, pile, trousers, kersey lined, etc. Due to previous experience, it is felt that the best type of winter clothing for a tank battalion is the combat suit. This suit not only offers warmth, and is waterproofed, but it is durable enough to stand the long winter months of hard wear that a tanker gives it.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gas, oil, and ammunition has been ample and readily available during the period.

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

5. Ordnance:

Vehicle replacements with the exception of trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, and carrier personnel half-tracks, M3, have been available. A limited amount of tires and tubes have also been received. Certain vehicular spare parts and equipment which have been needed were ~~unavailable~~. Binoculars, enough to bring the battalion up to its authorized TO & E strength, have been received, as have 34 watches, wrist, 15 jewel.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

8 - Guns, sub. mach., cal..45, M1
1 - Watch, wrist, 7 jewel

b. Signal:

23 Flashlights, TL-122-A

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. The difficult terrain over which the vehicles of the battalion operated caused the majority of 2nd, 3rd and 4th echelon repair during the month.

2. Repair of general purpose vehicles was greater than usual because of accidents, due to icy roads and other unfavorable weather conditions.

3. During the assault on M. Castello and Mt. Belvedere, there was an enormous amount of recovery work, making it necessary that the Battalion Motor Officer directly control the work of all company and battalion recovery crews so that a maximum of coordination might be obtained.

4. As in previous periods, replacement tanks drawn during the month were in poor condition, due apparently to carelessness on the part of 4th echelon Ordnance personnel.

5. The fact that personnel have insufficient training in 1st echelon maintenance and the lack of interest in the care and functioning of their equipment was evidenced by the amount of 2nd and 3rd echelon work which had to be done.

6. Recommendations:

a. Instruction as to the care and functioning of all equipment must be continuous and stressed more fully even in combat.

b. Company commanders should be instructed as to the correct use of the company maintenance personnel and equipment. Company commanders apparently do not realize that the maintenance and upkeep of their vehicles and training of the drivers and crews are a direct command responsibility.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Legion of Merit

Goldberg, Sam Sgt. 32110448 Sv Co.

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

Wirt, Charles A. Pvt. 37511863 Co. "D" 10 Dec 1944

M.I.A.

None

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Harper, William R.	St. Sgt.	32669165	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
Canady, Leland G.	Sgt.	37510426	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
Emigh, James T.	Sgt.	16100686	Co. "A"	3 Dec 1944
Coffel, John W.	T/4	37510937	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
Sanders, Ralph Jr.	T/5	37408844	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
McMahan, Walter T. Jr.	Pfc	33217450	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
Carver, Leo W.	Pvt.	37499847	Co. "D"	21 Dec 1944
Castorena, Daniel L.	Pvt.	38539530	Co. "C"	14 Dec 1944
Cope, Johnie B.	Pvt.	34509932	Co. "A"	3 Dec 1944

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Shamblin, Howard C.	1st Lt.	01013256	Co. "A"	29 Nov 1944
Hart, Wilbert W.	Sgt.	38341816	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944
Haggerty, Thomas J.	Pvt.	42036886	Co. "D"	10 Dec 1944

I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Lindsey, Clayton R.	Cpl.	35417459	Co. "A"	3 Dec 1944
Gambka, Edwin W.	Pfc	36570371	Co. "A"	22 Dec 1944

I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

None.

3. Comments:

a. General replacements received have been of a high caliber. The new personnel appear to be well trained and disciplined. Rotation replacements, however, have been of an inferior standard. The latter replacements in almost every case have been overseas for a minimum period of 19 months, and in several instances, rotation replacements have accrued overseas service equivalent to the accrued overseas service of the individual rotated. As a result, the combat efficiency of these replacements has proved to be of a low standard.

Report of Action for month of Dec, Cont'd.

b. Rotation replacements have been received promptly for personnel currently rotated to the United States. Twenty-four (24) vacancies remain frozen. These vacancies created an undue hardship upon the enlisted men filling the T/O vacancy created in that the commensurate rating cannot be awarded.

c. It has been estimated that over a period of four months, the return of personnel to the United States on temporary duty will create an absence of eighteen (18) EM, decreasing the effective strength of this organization.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

1. In winter operations, it has been found that in mountainous terrain, tanks equipped with steel tracks are impracticable. Because of the icy, precipitous roads, grousers are needed, and on steel tracks, no provision has been made for the mounting of grousers. Rubber chevron tracks equipped with grousers is the type of track recommended for operations of this kind. If rubber tracks are not available, pairs of rubber blocks may be inserted in the steel track at regular intervals which will permit the mounting of grousers.

2. In snow covered mountainous terrain, white camouflage mantles thrown over tanks in direct fire positions would be very valuable for the purposes of secrecy and security. The practice of permitting snow to remain on combat vehicles for camouflage purposes cannot be recommended.

3. The Assault Gun Platoon of this organization has found the M7 Assault Gun superior to the new M4A3 tank equipped with the 105mm howitzer, as an artillery weapon. The accuracy of the new piece is below standard as there is no compensation for cant. In order to achieve maximum range, it is necessary to elevate the front of the tank. In fire missions deviating from the immediate front, the gun is inclined to cant and there is no compensating, levelling mechanism as there is on the M7. The accuracy of this new weapon is also impaired by the use of the azimuth indicator, which has proved to be inaccurate at medium and maximum ranges in comparison to the sighting equipment in the M7.

The closed turret also presents a problem making it difficult for crews to engage in rapid firing. The smoke and fumes are also a nuisance and when heavy charges are used, the concussion is very severe. In addition there is less storage space.

C. J. Madden
G. J. MADDEN,

Major, 751st Tank Battalion,
Commanding

6 Incls.

Incl #1-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheet

97 I, II, III; 93 III, IV; 104 I, IV.

Incl #2-Maps (Italy 1/25,000) Sheet

97 I SE, II NE; 98 III NE, IV SW; 104 I NW, IV NE.

Incl #3-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Dec 1944.

Incl #4-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 31 Dec 1944.

Incl #5-Unit Journal and File.

Incl #6-Journal and File of Co. "C", 751st Tk Bn

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944

TANK PLATOONS

DATE	C/D		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd	3	58	7	114					2	56					1	58	13	286
2nd/3rd	4	153	4	153	1	9					1	154					12	469
3rd/4th	5	63	2	62					1	63	5	62					13	250
4th/5th			1	90							5	100					6	190
5th/6th	3	52	2	53													5	185
6th/7th			1	30													1	30
7th/8th			2	40													2	40
8th/9th	1	23	1	21							1	21					3	65
9th/10th	1	14	1	17					1	14	1	14					4	59
10th/11th			1	40	1	2											2	42
11th/12th			1	30	1	3											2	33
12th/13th	4	100	9	400													13	500
13th/14th			1	25							1	25					2	50
14th/15th	1	58			1	3											2	61
15th/16th					1	11											1	11
16th/17th																		
17th/18th			2	39					2	39							4	78
18th/19th			1	30					1	30							2	60
19th/20th			3	53							1	53					4	106
20th/21st	2	40	2	40					1	40	1	40					6	160
21st/22nd	2	38									2	38					4	76
22nd/23rd	4	86	5	88							5	86					14	260
23rd/24th	10	60	5	95	1	9			1	25	1	35					18	227
24th/25th	2	41	4	41							1	42					7	127
25th/26th											1	10					1	10
26th/27th					1	5					4	96					5	101
27th/28th	4	110	1	36					2	36							7	182
28th/29th	5	103	6	18													11	121
29th/30th	4	105	3	105	2	2											8	212
30th/31st	1	30	4	50	1	6					5	50					11	136
TOTAL FOR MONTH	56	134	69	1670	9	50			11	303	37	826			1	58	183	4041

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944

ASSAULT PLATOON

TOTAL	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL		
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	
1st/2nd					1	2											1	2	
2nd/3rd	1	19	1	19													2	38	
3rd/4th			1	18									1	150			2	168	
4th/5th																			
5th/6th					1	17											1	17	
6th/7th					3	27											3	27	
7th/8th					1	8							1	100			2	108	
8th/9th											1	18					1	18	
9th/10th																			
10th/11th	1	62			1	2					1	32	1	150			4	246	
11th/12th					1	8											1	8	
12th/13th	2	121	10	400													12	521	
13th/14th																			
14th/15th	4	160															4	160	
15th/16th	1	42	1	42	2	5											4	89	
16th/17th	2	112															2	112	
17th/18th									2	28						2	27	4	55
18th/19th																			
19th/20th	1	72									1	13					2	26	
20th/21st	1	65	1	65													2	130	
21st/22nd													1	60			1	60	
22nd/23rd			3	35	3	11											6	46	
23rd/24th			2	10					1	10							3	20	
24th/25th													1	40			1	40	
25th/26th											1	30	1	30			2	60	
26th/27th	1	15									1	15					2	30	
27th/28th	2	10			1	10											3	20	
28th/29th													1	51			1	51	
29th/30th	2	36											1	48			3	84	
30th/31st					1	9							1	70			2	79	
TOTAL FOR MONTH	18	661	19	589	15	93			3	38	5	108	9	699	2	27	71	2215	

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 1944

MORTAR PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd											1	10					1	10
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th																		
4th/5th							1	30									1	30
5th/6th																		
6th/7th																		
7th/8th																		
8th/9th																		
9th/10th																		
10th/11th																		
11th/12th																		
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22nd/23rd																		
23rd/24th																		
24th/25th																		
25th/26th																		
26th/27th																		
27th/28th																		
28th/29th																		
29th/30th																		
30th/31st																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH							1	30			1	10					2	40

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SUMMARY OF ACTION, COMPANY "C"
(3RD PLATOON, COMPANY "D" ATTACHED)
751ST TANK BATTALION
1 - 31 DECEMBER 1944

Company "C", with one (1) platoon, Company "D" attached, was under the direct control of TF 92 throughout the period. On 2 December, the company was subattached to TF Walker, to support the troops of the 3rd Battalion, 371st Infantry Regiment. The following day, the 1st platoon moved from the company CP to a new position in the vicinity of 905938, closing in at 032000A. The tanks' role consisted solely in firing direct and harassing fire from selected positions on enemy positions and targets of opportunity. On 6 December, the 2nd platoon moved from the company CP to firing positions in the area 940954. The 3rd platoon left its firing position at Querceta (955948) and moved to the company CP 932923. Effective 112400A, the 2nd platoon was detached from TF Walker and attached to the 371st Infantry Regiment, and subsequently sub-attached to that regiment's 2nd battalion. No change was made in the platoon's position. During the period, 13 - 14 December, the company (less 2nd platoon) was attached to the 1st Battalion, 366th Infantry Regiment. At 141750A, an excessive amount of enemy movement was reported in the vicinity of 930959. A relief was believed to be in progress and the area was taken under fire. The sector in which the company operated under the 1st Battalion, 366th Infantry Regiment was placed under control of the 366th Infantry Regiment on 16 December, at which time Company "C" reverted from attachment to the 1st Battalion to attachment to the regiment. At 181700A, the 3rd platoon, Company "C" and the 3rd platoon, Company "D" were divided into sections and sent into forward positions. Three medium tanks from Company "C" and two light tanks from Company "D" moved to 944947; three light tanks and two mediums took positions at 921938. There was no activity until 23 December when the company CP moved from 932923 to Pietrasanta (978921). At the same time, the company's 3rd platoon moved to 922978, and Company "D's" platoon to 968009. One platoon of light tanks from the 758th Tank Battalion was attached to Company "C" for operational control at 251000A. With the exception of a move made by the 1st and 3rd platoons to Pozzi (966948) on 27 December, there was no further action during the remainder of the period.

Appendix "D"

C O N F I D E N T I A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464
U. S. ARMY

6 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of January.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #5, D. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of January is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II; 98 III, IV
104 I, IV.
(1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE; 98 III
NW, IV SW; 104 I NW, IV NE.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period

1 - 31 January

1. Throughout the period the battalion operated in a defense role, therefore, most of the activity engaged in by the battalion consisted merely of reliefs of elements within companies. Company "A" continued its artillery mission, but moved its CP and FDC from 636140 to 591141 at 011030A. On 3 January, the 1st platoon of Company "A" was relieved from its mission of infantry support in Vidiciatico (499139) and reverted to an artillery role under company control in positions at 598147. On 13 January, two (2) tanks from the 3rd platoon moved into new artillery positions at 626154 and, after completing registration, were joined by the platoon's three (3) remaining tanks on 14 January.

2. At the opening of the period, Company "B" was called on to relieve the 1st platoon of Company "A" in its position at Vidiciatico (499139), but due to the frozen roads, was unable to do so immediately. It was necessary to make adjustments by replacing steel chevron tracks with rubber chevron tracks and grousers. When this was completed, the 3rd platoon effected its relief of Company "A's" platoon at 031930A. Adjustment of tracks continued in the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company "B" in order that reliefs could be effected in the future. At 102000A, the company's 2nd platoon relieved the 3rd platoon in position, and the 3rd platoon returned to the Company CP in Lizzano (517128). The 2nd platoon was relieved in turn by the 1st platoon at 171800A, and the 1st platoon by the 3rd platoon on 25 January. On 22 January, while the 1st platoon was in position in Vidiciatico, and again on 26 January, when the 3rd platoon was there, two (2) tanks from the platoon moved to the vicinity

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

of 492141 to relieve two (2) TD's of the 894 TD Battalion in direct firing positions. On 31 January, while the tanks of the 3rd platoon were in direct firing positions. On 31 January, while the tanks of the 3rd platoon were in direct firing positions, they rendered very effective fire against enemy machine gun nests that had pinned down a friendly patrol. Both enemy positions were silenced.

3. Company "C", with the 3rd platoon, Company "D", remained attached to the 92nd Infantry Division through the entire period, and sub-attached to the 371st Infantry Regiment. All three (3) tank platoons of Company "C" were in positions in the vicinity of Pozzi (967944) and the light tank platoon of Company "D" at Ruosina (009969). Activity consisted mainly of direct fire on enemy installations, which had a very good effect. On 12 January, the 1st platoon was moved to the Company CP for maintenance purposes, and on 14 January, the 2nd platoon took artillery positions at U963922, leaving only the 3rd platoon in a forward position. The 2nd platoon was relieved of its artillery mission on 22 January by the 1st platoon, and was then placed in regimental reserve. On 29 January, the 3rd platoon moved its forward position over to the 2nd platoon at 1900A and assumed the mission of regimental reserve. This situation continued until 31 January, when the company and the platoon of Company "D" were relieved from attachment to 92nd Infantry Division and returned to battalion control. As the period closed, the company was in process of moving to join the battalion in the vicinity of Forretta (5812).

4. Company "D", less the 3rd platoon attached to TF 92, was in support of infantry troops throughout the period, initially of the 900th AAA Battalion and then of the 86th Mountain Regiment when the sector changed command. At all times, either the 1st or 2nd platoon was in a forward position, establishing outposts with one tank section at 514164 and the other at 504148. The 1st platoon was in the forward positions at the opening of the period, but was relieved by the 2nd platoon on 6 January. Reliefs were again effected on 12 January, 20 January and 27 January, resulting in the 1st platoon's being on outpost duty from 27 January till the end of the period, and the 2nd platoon's remaining in the vicinity of the Company CP (506136). At 311935A, the 2nd platoon moved to Gaggio Montano (552168) to relieve tanks of the 13th Tank Battalion. On 31 January, the 3rd platoon was released from attachment to TF 92 and returned to battalion control. At the end of the period, the platoon was moving to join its parent organization.

5. The Mortar Platoon was prepared to support forward infantry elements from its positions near Vidiciatico (499139) but was not called upon to do so. The Assault Platoon continued in the artillery role, firing both harassing and observed missions.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

6. In the vicinity of Vidiciatico (5013) the 751st Tank Battalion has an ideal direct-firing position (493140), which is capable of accommodating two tanks. In this position the tanks can cover, with direct fire, the ridge from 465140 to 490172, and the draw from 490172 to Mt. Belvedere (523177). The platoon leader has an observation post near the position, and any movement observed is immediately taken under fire. Individuals are sniped upon, sometimes getting direct hits with air bursts. In this manner, many casualties are inflicted on the enemy. A daily relief of the tanks gives all the personnel in this sector an opportunity to keep their gunners-eye in trim.

Appendix "A" - Summary of firing missions, Tank Platoons
Appendix "B" - Summary of firing missions, Assault Platoon

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 31 January

1. The enemy situation remained stable throughout the period. The patrolling activity that so sharply increased during the previous month continued on the same determined scale. In spite of civilian reports to the contrary, there was no indication that the enemy had any intention of withdrawing from his present positions except under extreme pressure.

2. With the exception of normal reliefs, there was no movement or shifting of enemy troops noticed in this unit's immediate sector. The frozen condition of the roads made it almost impossible for the enemy to effect any sudden thrust with armored support. He maintained his defensive positions, content to actively harass our supply routes and rear installations with artillery, and to repel our patrols probing into his forward positions.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communication during the month was by radio, wire, and messenger.

2. Radio:

Because of the static condition of the unit throughout the period, radio communication was at a minimum. A radio net was maintained only as an emergency means of communication. All stations reported in periodically. During heavy snowstorms, atmospheric conditions created excessive static noises, causing very poor reception for all stations.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

3. Wire:

The primary means of communication for the period was by wire. Extensive wire nets have been installed. Because of heavy snowfall and the lack of wire maintenance personnel and equipment, much time was required to trace and repair broken or shorted lines. In spite of difficulties encountered, good communication was maintained.

4. Messenger:

Runs to higher headquarters and to all companies were made twice daily. Inclement weather and hazardous road conditions caused some difficulty in maintaining a constant schedule, but all runs were completed as expeditiously as possible. Results have been very satisfactory.

5. Miscellaneous:

An experiment with the speakers of two receivers, BC-603, is being conducted in an M4A3 tank w/76mm gun. The experiment is to determine the feasibility of installing a piece of oiled silk in front of each speaker to absorb concussion waves created by firing the 76mm gun. This, in turn, should reduce the number of speakers being blown loose from the base of the cone. Results of experiment are yet unknown.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 January 1945, this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes continued to be generally good. The organization still has five (5) trucks, 2½-ton, 6x6, lwb, on DS. Having these trucks on continued DS, together with several trucks in the Ordnance for repair, make the transporting and maintenance of supplies within the battalion difficult.

2. Rations:

The rations used during this period were the "B" type and the 10 in 1 ration. It was necessary to draw an extra ration a day for each light tank crew using 10 in 1 rations. The reason for this is that it is impossible to break down to a four-man tank crew four-tenths of a 10 in 1 ration while it can easily be broken down in half.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing during this period has been exceptionally good. The winter clothing issued last month has proven very useful, and so far has met with approval of all the men. The bag, mountain sleeping is especially praised. It is still felt, however, that the best type of winter clothing for a tank battalion is the combat suit because of its durability and warmth.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gas, oil, and ammunition has been ample and readily available during the period.

5. Ordnance:

Vehicle replacements, with the single exception of trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, have been available. More tires and tubes have been received, but certain vehicular spare parts and equipment have not been available. Certain tools have also been unobtainable.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

3 - Guns, sub. mach., cal..45, M1
1 - Gun, mach., cal..50, HB, M2, flex.

b. Signal:

3 - Flashlights, TL-122-A

c. CWS:

2 - Masks, gas, service, lightweight

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

1. During the month of January there was a decrease in second and third echelon maintenance on tracked vehicles. This can be credited largely to the stable situation in which the battalion operated. Three cases of improper acceleration were experienced on the M4A3 tanks. These tanks were immediately evacuated to fourth echelon maintenance for repairs.

2. The presence of snow and ice made the use of grousers necessary. Since grousers could not be used with the steel chevron track, it became necessary to exchange all steel tracks for rubber chevron tracks. The exchange has been completed with the exception of five tanks.

3. An increase of second and third echelon maintenance on half-tracks and wheeled vehicles has been noticed. This increase is largely due to the unfavorable conditions under which the vehicles are being operated and the length of service that these vehicles have seen.

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Legion of Merit

DILL, RICHARD H. CWO W2 109 159 Service Co.

Bronze Star

MADDEN, C. J.	Major	0 250 761	CO, 751st Tank Bn.
Gracely, Robert W.	M/Sgt.	35 018 018	Service Co.
Erickson, Robert T.	St Sgt	36 048 338	Company "B"
Fogle, Howard J.	St Sgt	35 018 023	Company "B"
Williams, John W.	Cpl.	34 169 874	Company "B"
Yohn, Manro	Cpl.	33 554 233	Company "A"

Purple Heart

Daniel, Benjamin E. Pvt. 35 201 656 Hq. Co.

Commendation

Commendation to Assault Gun Platoon, 751st Tank Battalion, from Commanding General, IV Corps.

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

None

M.I.A.

None

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Dalpiaz, Albert A.	Techn 5th gr	33 505 283	Co "C"	11 Jan 1945
Daniel, Benjamin E.	Pvt.	35 201 656	Hq Co	9 Jan 1945
Morris, James V. Jr.	Pvt.	19 139 237	Co "C"	23 Dec 1944

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Chebiniak, Frank	Sgt	32 100 711	Co "C"	1 Jan 1945
Morris, James V. Jr.	Pvt.	19 139 237	Co "C"	2 Jan 1945

Note: Sgt. James T. Enigh reported as WIA (Hospitalized) on December 1944 report died of wounds on 13 January 1945.

I.I.A. (Hospitalized and Not Hospitalized)

None.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

3. Comments:

a. Receipt of rotation replacements has been prompt, but the general caliber of the replacements has been poor. In most cases, however, the replacements have been successfully absorbed.

(1) This unit has rotated four tank platoon sergeants. To date, three rotation replacements in this category have been received. In every instance, the replacement has been incompetent. Two of the replacements were infantry platoon sergeants with no comprehension of the capabilities of a tank and equally ignorant of tank tactics. The remaining replacement is a trained artilleryman with three week's ineffective armored force training.

(2) It is needless to dwell upon the ability and integrity incumbent upon a tank platoon sergeant. Incompetency in this position jeopardizes lives and valuable equipment. The inevitable reduction of these replacements effects an undue hardship upon the non-commissioned officer concerned.

(3) It is recommended that thorough and profound consideration be exercised in respect to the selection of replacements of tank platoon sergeants.

b. It is interesting to note that in computing the adjectival rating on WD AGO Form #67, an officer may obtain the rating of excellent or better, though two or more pertinent characteristics are unknown. This fact appears to indicate a fallacy in the basis for computing the adjectival rating as specified in the subject form.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

1. This battalion has devised a system whereby tanks can engage direct fire targets at night, computing adjustments from data derived from observed fire during the day. Night firing positions are selected, marked by stakes, and prepared to be occupied at any time. In this manner, the gun may be sighted regardless of visibility. Accurate results may be obtained by this system.

2. If no firing data has been computed for direct fire at night, splendid results can be achieved by briefly illuminating the target with artificial moonlight.

3. By occupying strategic firing positions, tank crews have had the opportunity of perfecting their gunnery by sniping at enemy personnel. Positions are occupied before daylight and withdrawal made after dark. After a few registration rounds, the crews wait patiently to greet an unsuspecting enemy with air bursts.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Jan, Cont'd.

4. All tank crews are being taught to probe for mines. They are instructed to check for booby traps and, using the protection of a tank, to pull the mine by means of a 950-foot wire. In the absence of engineers, the tank crews will be capable of clearing mine fields if required to do so.

5. In anticipation of offensive operations, all officers and personnel are studying enemy strength, positions, and terrain so as to be prepared to exploit fully any enemy withdrawal. Sand tables, maps, aerial photos, and ground reconnaissance are widely used.

C. J. Madden.
C. J. MADDEEN,
Major, 751st Tk Bn,
Commanding

5 Incls.

Incl. #1-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheet

97 I, II; 98 III, IV; 104 I, IV.

Incl. #2-Maps (Italy, 1/25,000) Sheet

97 I SE, II NE; 98 III NW, IV SW; 104 I NW, IV NE.

Incl. #3-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Jan 1945.

Incl. #4-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 31 Jan 1945.

Incl. #5-Unit Journal and File.

APPENDIX "B"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1945

ASSAULT PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARRASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd	9	263	1	49													10	312
2nd/3rd	4	46															4	46
3rd/4th	5	83					1	26									6	109
4th/5th			1	39													1	59
5th/6th													1	114			1	114
6th/7th													1	100			1	100
7th/8th													1	50			1	50
8th/9th			3	45									1	6			4	51
9th/10th					1	11											1	11
10th/11th	2	12														2	2	24
11th/12th	1	19			1	16											2	35
12th/13th	2	20											1	40			3	60
13th/14th	1	12															1	12
14th/15th	2	16															2	16
15th/16th	1	62															2	62
16th/17th	4	36															4	36
17th/18th																		
18th/19th	2	50															2	50
19th/20th																		
20th/21st	5	105															5	105
21st/22nd	2	85											1	70			3	155
22nd/23rd	5	111															5	111
23rd/24th	3	58															3	58
24th/25th																		
25th/26th	1	18															1	18
26th/27th													1	50			1	50
27th/28th	2	39			2	5											4	44
28th/29th													1	30			1	30
29th/30th	3	31			1	6							1	50			5	87
30th/31st	2	58	1	58													3	116
TOTAL FOR MONTH	56	1124	6	211	5	38	1	26					9	510	2	12	79	1921

APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1945

TANK PLATOONS

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd	4	77	4	79	1	6			2	77	4	77					15	316
2nd/3rd	5	94	2	43	1	7			1	43							9	187
3rd/4th	3	50	3	48	2	4					1	48					9	150
4th/5th			1	40	2	21	1	40			3	40					7	141
5th/6th	1	46	2	48	2	2					3	46					8	142
6th/7th	3	69	4	80													7	149
7th/8th	1	15	1	20							3	40					5	75
8th/9th	4	104	4	52	3	14											11	170
9th/10th	1	14	2	13	1	8					1	13					3	44
10th/11th	2	10	1	9					1	9							4	28
11th/12th	2	120			1	7					2	20					5	117
12th/13th	2	15	2	25	1	7					3	25					6	72
13th/14th	1	13															1	13
14th/15th											3	45					3	45
15th/16th	1	21	1	21	1	8	1	21			2	23					6	91
16th/17th	1	10	3	46							1	20					5	76
17th/18th					1	3											1	3
18th/19th	2	20	1	10	3	11			1	10	1	10					5	51
19th/20th			1	14					1	13	3	40					4	67
20th/21st	1	34			2	8											3	42
21st/22nd	2	32							1	16	6	32					9	80
22nd/23rd	1	10	2	20							1	10					3	40
23rd/24th					2	12			1	10	2	20					5	72
24th/25th			3	58	1	33			1	10							5	101
25th/26th	1	26	1	26							1	27					3	79
26th/27th			1	15					1	15							3	45
27th/28th					1	13			1	15	1	15					3	43
28th/29th			1	15	2	7					2	15					5	37
29th/30th	2	108	5	53					1	15							8	176
30th/31st	3	99			2	6					1	12					6	117
TOTAL FOR MONTH	43	989	45	735	29	177	2	61	12	233	44	578					176	377

C O N F I D E N T I A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #164
U. S. ARMY

9 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of February.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, C. C., U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #164, U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of February is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II; 98 III, IV.
(1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE; 98 III
NW, IV SW.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period

1 - 28 February

February marked the resumption of offensive activity in this battalion's immediate sector; however, the early part of the period was spent largely in effecting normal reliefs within companies and in consolidating the battalion's strength for attacks to come. During the first two days of the period, Company "C", with one platoon of Company "D", moved from the positions it occupied in support of the 92nd Infantry Division on the coastal plain and joined the battalion in the vicinity of Porretta - 5812. For the first time in several months, all elements of the battalion were together and the unit was complete.

At the beginning of the period, the positions of elements were as follows: Headquarters Company, CP - 543116, Mortar Platoon - 502138, Assault Platoon - 607162; Company "A", CP - 648199, 1st Platoon - 598147, 2nd Platoon - 613154, 3rd Platoon - 627156; Company "B", CP - 517129, 1st Platoon - 517129, 2nd Platoon - 499139, 3rd Platoon - 517129; Company "C" was in the process of moving from the coast to Porretta; Company "D", CP - 506136, 1st Platoon - 514163 and 504148, 2nd Platoon - 552167, 3rd Platoon - 506136; Service Company - 587114. From these positions, tanks of the unit were in defensive posts to support the infantry of the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Infantry Division, BEF in the event of counterattack. One platoon of Company "A" was in an artillery role under the direction of L24 FA Group, and so was the Assault Platoon of Headquarters Company.

The first movement of the period occurred on 1 February when Company "A" relieved a company of the 13th Tank Battalion in its positions at Biola - 648199. The 1st Platoon went into position at 622192, the 2nd at 645190, and the 3rd at 658202. These positions were all in the vicinity

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

Highway #64 and were selected because they offered advantageous fields of fire. In this manner, any threat of armor approaching the BEF sector could be easily repulsed. All reliefs were completed by 011500A. During the afternoon, Company "C" relieved other elements of the 13th Tank Battalion, with the 3rd Platoon at 559161 and one section of the 2nd Platoon at 584184. The company CP, with 1st Platoon and one section of the 2nd Platoon, remained in Silla - 585141. One section of the 3rd Platoon, Company "D" closed into the vicinity of the company CP at 506136 at 012100A, but the remaining section did not join it until after dark, 2 February. This is the platoon that had been in the coastal sector, separated from its parent unit, and this movement placed it under the control of the Commanding Officer, Company "C" once again.

From this time until 18 February, when the attack against Mt. Belvedere was initiated, only reliefs of platoons within companies took place. Company "B" relieved its 2nd Platoon at 499193 with the 1st Platoon at 071845A, and the 2nd Platoon returned to the company area, in the vicinity of 517129. While the 1st Platoon was in this position, it fired in support of an infantry raid on an enemy strongpoint at 500168, effected by the 10th Mountain Division. This platoon was, in turn, relieved by the 3rd Platoon at 141815A. At 10015A, the 1st Platoon, Company "D" was relieved by the 3rd Platoon in its positions at 514163 and 504148. The 1st Platoon returned to the company area - 506163 - at 100600A. Relief of the 3rd Platoon by the 1st Platoon, in the same positions, was effected at 170515A. The Assault Platoon was placed under the operational control of the 248 FA Battalion, effective 161300A, per VOCO 424 FA Group, but did not change position. At 161700A, the Mortar Platoon moved into a new area in the vicinity of 543116.

'D' Day for the attack against the Mt. Belvedere - Mt. della Torracchia Ridge was set for 19 February, but the big plan in which this battalion participated was put into effect on 18 February, or 'D'-1. The preliminary portion of the main attack was made against the Pizzo di Campiano-Mt. Serrasiocia Ridge in order both to unbalance the enemy's defenses and to gain the high ground for observation during the attack against Belvedere itself.

Troops of the 10th Mountain Division, in conjunction with Brazilian forces of the 1st Infantry Division, BEF, carried through the principal offensive, but the action on 'D'-1 was exclusively the work of the 86th Mountain Regiment, 10th Mountain Division. Throughout both periods, all armor supporting the infantry was under the direct command of Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion.

On 'D'-1, one platoon of medium tanks with 76-mm guns, plus one platoon of Tank Destroyers from Company "A", 701st TD Battalion, formed fire support for infantry troops assaulting the Mt. Mancinello-Pizzo di Campiano area. Tanks were in positions at 1482142, 1473138, and 1471133; the Tank Destroyers at 1493141 and 1488152. At the completion of this mission, the platoon of Tank Destroyers remained in that area, but the platoon of tanks returned to the control of its parent company (Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion), preparatory to supporting the infantry attack scheduled the next morning against Mt. Belvedere.

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

In addition to the entire battalion strength of tanks, Company "A", 701st TD Battalion was attached to this headquarters to be used as a supplement to the supporting role the tanks were to assume. For the action to be opened on 'D' Day, all the armor was broken down into five (5) different forces, each of which was to be employed in a different sector of the front and in support of different infantry elements. The 'Froman Force', under the command of 1st Lt. Floyd N. Froman, Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion, consisted of two (2) platoons of medium tanks from Company "B", and one platoon of light tanks from Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion. This force was to support the attack of the 87th Mountain Regiment in such a manner as to permit one platoon of mediums and the platoon of lights to be used in firing on the C. Florio (L505174), C. Valle (L502178), Polla (L508176) line, while the other platoon of mediums was held in reserve, to be used when the infantry moved into Valpiana (L518183). This reserve platoon of medium tanks was the same platoon that had supported the assault on Pizzo di Campiano and it had moved to positions in the vicinity 1471141 - 1472137 to prepare for its new mission. At the same time, the 3rd Platoon, Company "B" had moved into firing positions at L508166, from where sufficient fields of fire could be obtained to provide adequate support to the advancing infantry. The 1st Platoon, Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, the platoon of light tanks attached to the Froman Force, was stationed in the vicinity of Querciola (L512162) to act as outpost until such time as the attack moved through it.

The second force, under 1st Lt. Thomas J. Murphy of Company "D", was composed of the 2d Platoon of medium tanks from Company "B" and the 3rd Platoon of light tanks of Company "D", supporting the attack of the 85th Mountain Regiment in its advance across the high ground from Mt. Belvedere (L523177) to L. della Terraccia (L558203). These platoons assembled in the vicinity of Querciola, but moved with the advance of the infantry to L520170 as progress was made toward the peak of Mt. Belvedere on the first day of the attack.

A third force, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Platoons, Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion, and the 2d Platoon, Company "D", commanded by Capt. Alan R. Guttridge, was placed in support of the 86th Mountain Regiment, to fire upon order of this battalion headquarters on positions along the Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Castello ridge. The 1st Platoon had firing positions at L565158, the 3rd Platoon at L548167, and the 2d Platoon, Company "D" at L546182.

The fourth and fifth forces were both under the operational control of Capt. Lee E. Neville, Company "A", but the fourth was commanded directly by Capt. Ira P. Harrington of this battalion and was comprised of the 2d Platoon of Company "C" and one platoon of TD's from the 701st TD Battalion. The mission of this group was to support the attack of the 1st Infantry Division, BDF against Mt. Castello (L567192) from firing positions at Bombiana (L585183). The fifth force was made up of the three platoons of tanks of Company "A", with the same mission as the fourth group, but firing from Riola (L650198).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd

All assault guns of the battalion, formed into a single platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Joseph W. Longvel, were utilized in an artillery role at L611166 under the direction of 424 FA Group. The Mortar Platoon was not employed as a unit.

Such were the positions of all units assigned and attached to this battalion at 'H'-hour 'D'-day, 19 February 1945.

As the attack advanced in the left sector, the 3rd Platoon, Company "B" and the 1st Platoon, Company "D" were not called upon to move from their previously selected supporting positions. However, on 20 February, the 1st Platoon, Company "B" was required to move through Corona toward Valpiana (L519183) in order to reinforce the infantry troops occupying the latter town. In process of making this move, the platoon encountered extensive mine fields in the vicinity of Corona. Though such a situation had been contemplated and sweeping by engineers had been effected previous to the tanks' advance, it proved impossible to detect and remove all the mines. The result was that two tanks from the 1st Platoon were damaged. When the road had been sufficiently swept for the tanks to continue their advance, the platoon proceeded to Valpiana, occupied good defensive positions, and assisted the infantry in consolidating the newly-won ground.

To the immediate right of this sector, the Murphy Force had been reduced to one platoon of medium tanks, the 2nd Platoon of Company "B". The 3rd Platoon of Company "D", originally a part of this group, was transferred to the control of the Guttridge Force on 20 February and moved to the vicinity of Gagic Montano (L551167). The same change was made in the status of the 1st Platoon, Company "D" when it was removed from the control of the Froman Force, after the attack had been mounted.

As the 2d Platoon of Company "B" moved up the slopes of Mt. Belvedere, its progress was seriously hampered by mines, even more thickly planted than those found in the vicinity of Corona. The platoon leader's tank was totally destroyed, but the platoon succeeded in gaining the top of the mountain and went into position east of the peak at 212200A, at points immediately behind infantry front-line posts.

As the 36th Mountain Regiment progressed in its attack across the ridge from Mt. Belvedere toward Mt. Castello, the Guttridge Force was ordered to move from its original firing positions to Cappella di Ronchidos (L544186). It was necessary that extensive work be done by engineers of the 10th Mountain Division, but with their aid, the vehicles succeeded in fulfilling a seemingly hopeless mission. Contact was made with the infantry in its advance and the tanks were able to reinforce the forward positions against inevitable counterattacks.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd

Forces Harrington and Neville played no part in the initial stages of the attack. The 1st Infantry Division, BEF did not inaugurate its advance until the American units had reached Hill 1053 (L548189). Then both these groups of armor were prepared to lay defensive fires in case of counter-attack and to engage targets of opportunity upon call or observation. When the Brazilian troops had occupied Mt. Castello, the 2d Platoon, Company "C" moved from its firing position in Bombiana to Abetaia (L577190) to act as a roadblock against possible counterattack. In so doing, one tank struck a mine and was partially damaged. In subsequent action against their positions, the tankers of this platoon were credited with taking six (6) prisoners.

At the conclusion of this action, the unit's tanks were displaced as follows: Company "A", 1st Platoon - 622192, 2nd Platoon - 654190, 3rd Platoon - 650202; Company "B", 1st Platoon - 519174, 2nd Platoon - 526177, 3rd Platoon - 500166; Company "C", 1st Platoon - 543184, 2nd Platoon - 517190, 3rd Platoon - 543184; the tanks of Company "D" were dispersed in the area between 537179 and 543184, held as a reserve. From the positions held by the tanks of Company "C" atop Mt. Belvedere, they fired on, and were credited with destroying two enemy tanks, one at 518194, and the other at 519197. After all newly-gained positions had been consolidated, the vehicles in good firing positions began a program of harassing fire at targets consisting of personnel, suspicious houses, crossroads, and suspected CP's.

The taking of the Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Castello Ridge opened the way for further advance in the right part of the sector. With Headquarters, 751st Tank Battalion in command, a separate task force, consisting of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C", 701 TD Battalion, and Company "D", 126 Engineer Battalion was formed to support an attack to be made by the 86th and 87th Mountain Regiments of the 10th Mountain Division on 1 March 1945. When this force was created, Companies "B", "C" less one platoon, and "D" reverted to the control of the Commanding Officer, 701st TD Battalion until such time as the operation was completed. There was no change made in the original disposition of the tanks. Defensive positions were maintained at the close of the month.

Appendix "A" - Summary of firing missions, Assault Platoon.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 28 February

The enemy's positions at the beginning of the month, his activity in rear areas, and his alert reaction to constant patrolling by our forces had not changed appreciably from their former state. With the high ground still firmly in his hands and defensive positions occupied to the very best advantage, it was obvious that any attempt to advance on our part would be met by immediate and determined opposition.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

This is exactly what happened when Mt. Belvedere was attacked on 19 February. Though the troops of the 232 Infantry Division had been in the line for several months, they nevertheless put up a good defense. Fortunately, our attack was made at a time that coincided with a relief being effected by the German forces. The 741st Regiment of the 114th Jaeger Division had been shifted to this sector from Lake Comacchio, near the Adriatic, in order to relieve a regiment of the 232nd Division. The regiment had been marching for approximately a week and, instead of being able to effect a normal relief upon its arrival, was committed immediately as reserve. The morale of the troops was low. Their sudden entry into the line without sufficient orientation, coupled with the fact that they were weary and ill-fed, made them rather willing prisoners. They were second-rate troops at best - on about the same level as those of the division they were relieving. From them it was learned that the other regiment of their division, the 721st, was to leave the line at Comacchio very shortly and follow them to this sector, and that the entire division would soon appear on the Fifth Army front.

Throughout the action, the chief obstacles to advance proved to be mines. In view of the fact that the enemy had had at least three months to prepare his defensive positions, he had organized his terrain thoroughly. In the vicinity of Corona and Mt. Belvedere, box, teller, and Toff mines were utilized with a diabolical cleverness seldom before encountered by this unit. In addition, across the high ground of the ridge, anti-personnel stake mines were prepared in such an intricate pattern that advances by the infantry was practically impossible without constant resort to Bangalore torpedoes and other demolitions requisite to clearing a path of advance. In many instances, these stake mines were found planted at intervals as small as five feet. In the right sector - that is, around Abetain - a variation of the Toff mine, composed wholly of pressed papier-mache and glass, with only a small piece of metal used as a detonating fuse, was met for the first time by this battalion.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communication during the period 1 February to 1 March 1945 was by radio, wire and messenger.

2. Radio:

Radio communication during the month was satisfactory. A continuous FM net was maintained between unit headquarters and the companies, and between the companies and their platoons. In one instance, radio communication between headquarters and one of the companies was impossible because of distance and terrain features.

Mechanical failures during the period were at a minimum. The few failures encountered were of a minor nature and quickly corrected.

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Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

3. Wire:

Wire communication was maintained to higher headquarters and to all companies of this unit throughout the entire period. Numerous line breaks were encountered and the lack of wire personnel made it impossible to make speedy repair. Radio operators and repairmen were used to maintain the wires.

4. Messenger:

Messenger service was maintained to higher headquarters and to all companies of this unit. Runs were made twice daily, at scheduled times, or as close to scheduled times as circumstances permitted. Results were very satisfactory.

5. Miscellaneous:

During the operation against Mt. Belvedere, communications followed the routine procedure within the battalion net, but it was imperative that the various groups of armor maintain constant contact with the infantry troops they were supporting. This necessitated the employment of SCR's 300 in order that a common frequency might be found between the infantry and the tanks. It has been only recently that tank units were authorized these SCR's 300. Previously, having only the standard SCR 508, 528, or 538, tank units were seriously handicapped by a lack of tank-infantry communications. Even though it has been impossible to obtain the full quota of SCR's 300 now authorized the battalion, the few with which the tank companies have been equipped have proved of inestimable value. At such times as full issue is received, there will be a sufficient number of sets to provide seven for each of the four line companies. At present, only half that number is available.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 28 February 1945, this battalion was on the line and the supply of all classes continued to be generally good. The organization still had five (5) Trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ on DS, and having these trucks on continued DS makes transportation within the organization difficult.

It was necessary to have **fifteen (15)** mules attached to the battalion for the purpose of transporting ammunition and gasoline to tanks which were impossible to service with any type of vehicle this battalion possesses. However, this is far from a satisfactory arrangement due to the limited amount of mules available and the amount of supplies needed in the positions.

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Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

2. Rations:

The rations used during this period were the "B" type and the 10 in 1 rations. It was still necessary to draw an extra ration per day per each light tank crew using the 10 in 1 ration. The reason for this is that it is impossible to break down to a four (4) man tank crew four-tenths of a 10 in 1 ration while it can easily be broken down in half.

3. Clothing:

The supply of all clothing during this period has been exceptionally good. The winter clothing issued in December has proved to be very satisfactory and has met with the approval of all men of the organization. The bag, sleeping, mountain is exceptionally good. It is still felt, however, that the combat suit is the best type of winter clothing for a tank battalion, because of its durability, warmth, etc.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gasoline, oil, and ammunition has been plentiful and readily available during the period.

5. Ordnance:

Vehicle replacements, including Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4, C&R have been available. All tires and tubes with the one exception of tubes, 7.50-20 have been available, but certain vehicular spare parts and equipment have not been available. Certain tools have been unobtainable.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

- 19 - Gun, sub-mach., cal..45, M1
- 1 - Watch, Wrist, 15-jewel.
- 1 - Binoculars, M3

b. Signal:

- 1 - Radio set, AN/VRC-3
- 1 - Radio set, SCR-508
- 3 - Radio set, SCR-528
- 2 - Telephone, field, EE-8
- 13 - Flashlights, TL-122

c. CWS:

- 8 - Mask, Gas, Service, lightweight

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

During February, there was a noted improvement in the standard of 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance throughout the battalion. Simultaneously, there was a decrease in 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance required. Changing weather and the subsequent relaxing of frozen conditions made movement much more facile and lessened considerably damage due to unfavorable road conditions.

Replacement of unserviceable and near-unserviceable vehicles was good. Four (4) new 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks were received in exchange for four (4) old ones and a change of vehicles was made in the Medical Detachment. Two half-tracks were turned in for three (3) $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks and one (1) $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck.

Tank losses due to enemy action consisted of two (2) M4's and two (2) M4A3's, all destroyed by mines, but replacements were received in good time and the combat efficiency of the battalion was not affected. One (1) $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck was completely destroyed by fire on the night of 17 February 1945.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Silver Star

Kinney, Ewing K.	St Sgt	35 031 563	Company "A"
Warren, John L.	Sgt.	35 270 160	Company "C"
Jimenez, Robert S.	Cpl.	39 403 086	Company "A"
Cook, William C.	Pfc	34 398 520	Company "C"

Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star

Connolly, Eugene F.	Tec 5	32 007 311	Med. Det.
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Bronze Star

Lynch, Frank J.	Sgt.	32 180 971	Company "C"
Mitchem, Everett L.	Cpl.	37 513 988	Company "C"
Dwyer, Kenneth E.	Tec 5	35 021 026	Service Co.

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

FINE, JOHN A., JR.	MAJOR	0 364 327	Hq Co	21 Feb 1945
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M.I.A.

Dushensky, John	Tec 4	32 314 480	Co "B"	20 Feb 1945
Burdge, Samuel R.	Pfc	31 329 456	Co "B"	20 Feb 1945
Ivanik, Matthew	Pvt	6 777 330	Co "B"	20 Feb 1945

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

MOYER, WENDELL M.	CAPT.	01 013 020	Hq Co	22 Feb 1945
KECKE, GORDON	1ST LT	01 012 316	Co "B"	20 Feb 1945
MAHL, HERBERT E.	1ST LT	01 013 266	Co "D"	21 Feb 1945
Newman, Garrett T.	Sgt.	34 194 600	Co "C"	20 Feb 1945
Jameson, Montworth E.	Tec 4	39 380 800	Co "C"	24 Feb 1945
Bocion, Thaddeus G.	Tec 5	35 040 008	Co "C"	24 Feb 1945
Carver, Leo W.	Pfc	37 499 847	Co "D"	24 Feb 1945
Paine, Archie E.	Pfc	31 083 526	Hq Co	28 Feb 1945
Rossi, Felix A.	Pfc	39 767 346	Hq Co	22 Feb 1945
Holloway, LeRoy	Pvt	15 336 323	Co "B"	20 Feb 1945

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

*NEVILLE, LEE E.	CAPT	0 450 166	Co "A"	8 Jan 1945
*Bulla, William R.	1st Sgt	35 155 612	Co "A"	8 Jan 1945
*Spurlock, Mark M.	Tec 4	35 019 968	Co "A"	30 July 1944
Carpino, John	Sgt	37 510 018	Co "D"	18 Feb 1945
Conley, Everett A.	Cpl	37 335 962	Co "C"	22 Feb 1945
Jack, Edward F. Jr.	Cpl	33 462 487	Co "C"	22 Feb 1945

I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

LaPlant, Thomas W.	Sgt	35 327 064	Co "B"	24 Feb 1945
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I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

None

* Not included on prior reports.

3. Comments:

- a. The personnel status indicates a marked improvement.
- b. The 8th Replacement Depot has manifested a true comprehension and perspective in respect to replacements. Replacements were made available promptly and courteously.
- c. The general replacements appear to be well trained and disciplined and they are unique in that they are spirited and possess a true will to fight.
- d. Rotation replacements have reached this organization with the least possible delay, and they have been of a splendid caliber. Rotation replacements have depicted the ability to orientate themselves in a commendable and effective manner.

Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

e. Active operations appear to indicate a weakness in the T/O of this organization in respect to:

- (1) Provision for Liaison Officer.
- (2) Lack of provision for officer overage to compensate for casualties.

f. Experience has proved that every operation demands the services of the minimum of four (4) liaison officers. The T/O provides for one (1). A tank battalion, when committed, is normally in support of four to five elements in order to coordinate the armor with the infantry. It is imperative for this organization to furnish a liaison officer with each unit.

g. Since the minimum of strength is available, casualties, which appear to be inevitable in every action, seriously cripple the combat efficiency of the organization. When one is incapacitated, there is no present available source to immediately replace him. It requires the minimum of two days to requisition, obtain, and assign a replacement.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

Effective armored support of infantry is dependent on adequate communication facilities and sufficient liaison officers with the supported unit to keep abreast of the situation at all times. This requires a minimum of four liaison officers and the T/O provides for only one. There is also an insufficient number of $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks for this service. A tank battalion needs a minimum of twenty-two additional $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks to operate efficiently in combat.

The T/O for a tank company should provide for one additional officer per company and four additional $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks. The T/O of a tank company provides for five officers and two $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks. A tank destroyer company provides for six officers per company, six $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks, with the remainder of the vehicles similar. This latter arrangement has been found to be much more satisfactory. A $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck per company is also needed for supply.

The operation of armor is conditioned by terrain and obstacles. For that reason, the progress of an armored attack is very dependent on engineer assistance. During the last operation, the greater number of vehicular and personnel casualties were received as a result of mines. Closer liaison and better understanding should be maintained between the tanks and the engineers. Tank personnel should also be given basic engineer training.

Our supply system was rather awkward during the latter part of this period because the tanks of Companies "B", "C", and "D" were in a position that could not be reached by our supply vehicles. Supply dumps were established as near the tanks as our supply vehicles could carry them. Fifteen mules were requisitioned and were used to transport the supplies from the forward dumps to the tanks. This system worked out very satisfactorily.

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Report of Action for month of Feb, Cont'd.

C. J. Madden
C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Bn.,
Commanding

5 Incls.

Incl. #1-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheet
97 I, II, 98 III, IV

Incl. #2-Maps (Italy, 1/25,000) Sheet
97 I SE, II NE; 98 III NW, IV SW.

Incl. #3-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Feb 1945.

Incl. #4-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 28 Feb 1945.

Incl. #5-Unit Journal and File.

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SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1945

ASSAULT PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTAR		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		MISCELLANEOUS	TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds		Mission	Rds
1st/2nd	6	132											1	20		7	152
2nd/3rd	1	18											1	50		2	68
3rd/4th	1	12											1	20		2	32
4th/5th	1	60														1	60
5th/6th	6	138														6	138
6th/7th	5	174			1	22										6	196
7th/8th	2	91														2	91
8th/9th	2	51											1	57		3	108
9th/10th	1	12														1	12
10th/11th	2	85														2	85
11th/12th																	
12th/13th													1	40		1	40
13th/14th																	
14th/15th			2	41	1	11										3	52
15th/16th	5	146														5	146
16th/17th			3	30									1	49		4	79
17th/18th			6	70	1	8										7	78
18th/19th													1	50		1	50
19th/20th	1	18														1	18
20th/21st	7	85	5	85	2	85	8	85	1	85						23	425
21st/22nd			5	140		40	21	153			1	240				28	573
22nd/23rd	1	34	2	66	1	4										4	104
23rd/24th	8	216	6	119	1	16			3	116						18	467
24th/25th			8	235	1	3										9	238
25th/26th			7	270									1	50		8	320
26th/27th			6	140			7	200								13	340
27th/28th	2	10	3	45							3	45	1	30		9	130
TOTAL FOR MONTH	51	1282	53	1241	9	189	36	438	4	201	4	285	9	366		166	4002

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HEADQUARTERS 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464 U. S. ARMY

8 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the Month of March.

THRU: Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with par. 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of March is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II; 98 III, IV.
(1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE;
98 III NW, IV NW, SW, NE.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period
1 - 31 March

At the opening of the period, a separate task force had been formed under the command of Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion to support an attack to be made on 1 March 1945 by the 10th Mountain Division. This force consisted of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C", 701st TD Battalion, and Company "D", 126th Engineer Battalion. When this force was formed, Companies "B", "C", less one platoon, and "D" reverted to the control of the Commanding Officer, 701st TD Battalion. Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion, remained in support of BEF in the Riola (648199) sector.

'D'-Day was scheduled for 1 March 1945; 'H'-Hour was to be at 0700A. The 10th Mountain Division, with supporting armor and artillery, was to attack two regiments abreast astride the road. The artillery was to open a twenty-minute preparation preceding 'H'-Hour. The armor - Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C", 701st TD Battalion, and Company "D", 126th Engineer Battalion, all commanded by Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion - was to jump off with the infantry at 'H'-Hour. Air support was to be directed against specified targets consisting of road junctions, bridges, known enemy emplacements, and motor transport. But things did not go that way, for the attack was twice postponed, and finally materialized on 3 March.

The plan of operations required that the tank and TD companies be broken up into two different forces. The Commanding Officer, Company "B", 701st TD Battalion was given control of one platoon of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, in addition to his own company, and placed in support of the 86th Mountain Regiment, attacking on the left of the road. The force

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

on the right consisted of two platoons, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion and Company "C", 701st TD Battalion, supporting the 87th Mountain Regiment. The Commanding Officer, Company "C", 701st TD Battalion led this group. For the sake of clarity, we will call the one on the left the "Ault Force", and the one on the right, the "Patch Force". In addition, there was a base of fire formed at Casa di Bombiana - L587190 - by the 2nd Platoon, Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Platoon, Company "A", 701st TD Battalion. An excellent field of fire lay before them and they could cover the movement of the first units across the Line of Departure. It was not until the infantry had secured the objectives at LOVE that these positions lost their advantage and the platoons were moved.

It was not contemplated that the "Patch Force" be committed to action until the infantry had occupied and secured objectives EASY and ITEM, at which time a platoon of tanks was to join an infantry company in forming a roadblock at Pietra Colora - L596221. Company "C", 701st TD Battalion was employed as artillery prior to the opening of this action, and stayed there on an alert status, prepared to move out on two-hours' notice. When the time arose, its mission would be to drive into Castel d'Aiano itself with the 85th Mountain Regiment. The "Ault Force", however, was prepared to move in conjunction with the infantry from the very beginning of the attack, leap-frogging from position to position, constantly overwatching, prepared always to engage any targets delaying the advance of the foot troops.

Captain Ault moved his force and the two platoons of tanks that were to go with Captain Patch into an assembly area at L573175 at 0130A on the morning of 3 March. From this area, the TD's, preceded by two platoons of tanks, moved out the next morning in plenty of time to be at the Line of Departure by 0700A. As the infantry moved forward, so did the armor, but the nature of the terrain forced the vehicles into canalized positions on the road. Because of continued close-in reconnaissance made right behind the infantry's front line, the armored vehicle commanders were able to find excellent positions from which comprehensive fields of fire could be obtained. It was in this manner that the infantry had constant and immediate support while still on the move, and that the tanks and TD's were able to move quickly into supporting defensive positions, once the objectives were occupied and consolidation of positions was begun.

The attack had an ominous beginning, for during the march to the Line of Departure, before even starting through the artillery bull's-eye that Malandrone had turned out to be, a tank of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion ran off the road, threw a track, and was out of action at once. The remaining four tanks continued the march, and fortunately this proved to be a case when a bad beginning means a good ending.

The infantry's first objective was Mt. Terminale and the strongpoint at Iola - L566218 - both of which had to be cleared before ABLE and CHARLIE objectives could be taken. Soon after the advance began, the remaining four vehicles of the leading tank platoon left the road and started across

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

the ridge toward Mt. della Vedetta - L585223. It was an unfortunate move, for the terrain was definitely not suitable. One tank got as far as L572209, another went on to L574208, and two even climbed to L579217, but the result was that three vehicles threw tracks and were immobilized for a good portion of the day. Due to remarkable work by the tank company's maintenance section, the vehicles were back in action in record time, but valuable fire power had been lost for several hours. The one tank still mobile was taken by Captain Visher, Commanding Officer, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, to accompany him as he led the advancing armored column.

Meanwhile, the infantry at Mt. Terminale had been held up by determined resistance from Iola - L566218. The Germans had barricaded themselves in the cellars and were firing from houses that had been converted into forts-in-miniature. The presence of armor was needed urgently; so, the platoon of TD's that led the advance moved up to RJ 908 - L569216 - where they could actually gain entry to the town and clear it of enemy. Once the immediate job was completed, the platoon remained in town until it was called the next afternoon to take defensive positions along the infantry line atop objective ABLE.

During the fight for Iola, progress was going well on the right. The infantry of the 87th Mountain Regiment had occupied CHARLIE and was far along the way to EASY. Since the armor had been unable to follow them across the ridge, the foot troops moved alone onto M. della Vedetta and into the town of Pietra Colora - L570221. A roadblock was established there and was intended to be reinforced by a platoon of tanks that had been moving north from the Line of Departure since 0930A. It takes only a short time to tell, and opposition from the enemy was not intense, but the terrain was grueling for the doughboys and it was late afternoon before they could enter Pietra Colora and were in need of the extra protection tanks would give their forward positions. The tanks were not moving too rapidly, either, for to get to Pietra Colora, they were forced to go north all the way to the road junction at Canevaccia - L587236 - and then turn back southeast toward Pietra Colora.

Securing the high ground around the crossroad and making that junction tenable was a job that lasted the rest of the day. When night came, there was a platoon of TD's in Iola, and two other platoons with a platoon of tanks, south of the crossroad, unable to do anything but wait. That night, the infantry was in Pietra Colora and wanted tank support for their roadblock, but the tanks could not get there. Even after they were able to go on to Pietra Colora, they were again stopped short of their goal, this time by demolition and mines. Engineers went to work immediately, but it was a big job and took time. Before the platoon could move forward, its mission was changed, and it was ordered to L600237. The 1st Infantry Division, BEF, had attacked in conjunction with the 10th Mountain Division, occupying S. Maria Villiana - L610215, and they were such a short distance from Pietra Colora that the need for an armored roadblock had been eliminated.

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Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

The attack continued at 0800A, the morning of 4 March, with Mt. Acidola - L597231 - and Bacucco - L605244 - as the immediate objectives. In preparation for the breakthrough that was hoped for that day, Company "C", 701st TD Battalion was moved before dawn from its artillery positions to the assembly area at L571176, and readied to drive all the way to Castel d'Aiano if possible.

Mt. Acidola was occupied by 0900A, clearing Canevaccia sufficiently for the crossroad to be used, and the company of TD's could continue toward Castel d'Aiano. One of the road radiating from Canevaccia went to Montese, a known center of enemy activity, and it was imperative that the approaches to it be controlled by fire. Two platoons of TD's from Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, left the LSR in the vicinity of Sassomolare - L585242 - with the intention that one of them should continue to Hill 788 - L588600 - while the other occupied vantage points in Sassomolare proper. They marked time there until Hill 788 was in our hands, then the vehicles started the climb. But once again, terrain proved the deciding factor, and it was not long before maintenance crews were busy replacing thrown tracks and getting vehicles back into action. It was a time-consuming delay that proved an all-night job, and the next morning the platoon was back at L588242, the point from which it started.

The terrain was proving rough going for the infantry and on the morning of 4 March, it was obvious that the attack would not be far enough advanced by night to permit the armor's entry into Castel d'Aiano. The "Patch Force" continued north, firing at houses, flushing enemy infantry from cover, and providing countless prisoners for our own doughboys, and made its plans to take position at Madonna di Brasa - L600247 - in sufficient strength to cover thoroughly the town and all approaches to it.

The movement north, even on the road, was slow. Engineers had to sweep constantly to clear a path free from mines, and at L596246, they found a blown bridge that delayed the column all night. The job was too big for the engineers working with the tanks to handle on the spot, and assistance was requested. It was slow in coming, and the tank dozer of Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion, was sent to the scene. The road was hard-surfaced, though, and the tank dozer could do little by way of breaking it and filling in the blow. Regular engineer equipment was needed; so another urgent request was made, and work finally began. The next morning, at 0800A, a message was received from the Commanding Officer, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, that four tanks had finally been able to enter Madonna di Brasa and occupy good firing positions.

At the end of the second day, the platoon of tanks originally bound for Pietra Colora was at Sprilla - L600237, and the platoon of TD's that occupied Iola had moved to L558225, the northernmost point of objective ABLE. From there it could move into firing positions on the crest of the ridge and fire both into Maserno - L551229 - and Montese - L558245. One platoon of tanks and the company of TD's trying to get into Madonna di Brasa were deployed in the vicinity of the LSR between the demolition at

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Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

L596245 and the crossroad at L586236. One platoon of tanks and two platoons of TD's were in positions in the vicinity of L588242, from where they had been covering the advance of the "Patch Force" as it moved north.

That night, the 85th Mountain Regiment got set to by-pass Castel d'Aiano the morning of 5 March and to attack objectives QUEEN, NAN, and OBOE. They would be supported by fire from vehicles of Captain Patch's group, and once all the high ground had been secured, one battalion of the 87th Mountain Regiment and the armor would enter Castel d'Aiano and consolidate it within roadblocks on all entries into town.

At 0800A, following the usual twenty-minute artillery concentration, the infantry jumped off and occupied objectives QUEEN against opposition that was considerably more intense than that encountered during the previous two days. They did not know it at the time, but that morning they were hitting elements of the 29th PG Division, quite different from the 232nd Infantry or 114th Jaeger Division. Difficulty was met on the approach to NAN, at the village of Famaticcia - L611262; so, tank and TD fire was placed on the target, successfully reducing it. The platoon of tanks on the extreme right at Sprilla began moving at dawn through Pianestrina - L610238 - and then north to join Company "C", 701st TD Battalion at Castel d'Aiano. When it had passed Pianestrina, a call came from the infantry requesting fire on strongpoints barring their advance on M. della Castellana, objective OBOE. The mission was completed and the platoon continued, but for the second time, this platoon's mission was changed, and it was ordered to remain at Pianestrina to act as security over the road leading into Castel d'Aiano from the southeast.

The situation at Castel d'Aiano had opened so that Captain Patch found he could take some of the vehicles in with little opposition. His command destroyer and the command tank of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, with a platoon of TD's, entered at 1100A and proceeded to clear it as much as possible. Of course, infantry was requested immediately, but the battalion that was to occupy did not move out until 1400A, and then was delayed by resistance at L607254. By 1630A, it was clear that troops would not be available to outpost the armor that night. Enemy infantry was seen on the hill to the rear of town, and the vehicles had to withdraw to their former positions at Madonna di Brasa. Somehow, somewhere along the line, an excellent chance to destroy or capture enemy personnel and materiel had been lost, because the infantry was unable to follow up an opportunity presented by an armored penetration.

As the infantry improved its positions on GEORGE, the morning of 5 March, a platoon of TD's from Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, formerly at HOW, moved to Le Borre - L573230 - and waited there at the infantry battalion commander's request, before moving onto the top of the ridge after dark. However, the division commander ordered the platoon into position during the afternoon; so, at 1600A it proceeded to the vicinity of L570235. Another change was made when the platoon still at HOW moved to the vicinity of Chirichella - L584237 - to form a roadblock toward Montese. The platoon of tanks originally near Sassomolare remained in place.

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

As the third day closed, the position of the armor was little different from that existent at the end of the second day. "Patch Force" was still south of Castel d'Aiano. One platoon of tanks was at L609244, near Pianestrina, and the other in over-watching positions at L587242. Two platoons of Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, were in defensive positions at L570235 and at L584237. The other platoon planned to move the morning of 6 March from ABLE back into Iola - L567219, because its firing positions atop the ridge had become inaccessible and the vehicles were desired in a more mobile location.

During the night 5 - 6 March, infantrymen had entered and cleared out Castel d'Aiano. The town was under intense artillery and mortar fire, but was securely held, and it was imperative that roadblocks be formed on the west, north, and east sides of town. "Patch Force" moved in on the morning of 6 March and set to work, with the help of engineers, to make the place impenetrable by road. Their mission had been completed.

Company "C", 894th TD Battalion, was attached to Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion and closed in vicinity 568215 at 2315A on 7 March. On 12 March the company was employed in an artillery role. The original units of the Task Force, which were Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C", 701st TD Battalion, plus Company "C", 894th TD Battalion, and Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion, remained under control of Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion. Companies "B", "C" and "D", 751st Tanks remained under control of Headquarters 701st TD Battalion.

After the Castel d'Aiano actions, the rest of the period was spent in relieving platoons and firing missions from direct fire positions which the tanks and TD's occupied. Company "D" relieved one platoon at a time and drew new M24 light tanks. The company is now complete with new M24 light tanks.

All six assault guns of the battalion were used in an artillery role, first, under directions of 248th FA Group, and later, under 1125th FA Battalion. The platoon was relieved for rest on 28 March after two hundred forty-eight consecutive days on the "line", firing both night and day missions.

The mortar platoon was not employed as a unit during the past period.

At the close of the period, our units are displaced as follows: In support of 81st Cal. Rec. Squadron Company "A", 1st Platoon - 662207, 2nd Platoon - 672232, 3rd Platoon - 689227. In support of BEF, under command Headquarters 701st TD Battalion, Company "B", 1st Platoon - 491151, 2nd Platoon - 519170, 3rd Platoon - 506166 - 499168; Company "C", 1st Platoon - 565226, 2nd Platoon - 572207, 3rd Platoon - 553195; and Company "D", 1st Platoon - 535183, 2nd Platoon - 531178 - 527176. The Assault Platoon and Mortar Platoon in rest area at Porretta - 580123; Forward CP - 582231; Rear CP and Headquarters Company - 580123; Service Company - 587144.

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Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

The attached armor, in support of 10th Mountain Division, are displaced as follows: Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, 1st Platoon - 623253 - 617242, 2nd Platoon - 603252, 3rd Platoon - 577188; Company "B", 701st TD Battalion, 1st Platoon - 604253 - 601244, 2nd Platoon - 573222, 3rd Platoon - 609253; Company "C", 701st TD Battalion, in artillery positions - 603236; Company "C", 894th TD Battalion, 1st Platoon - 603238, 2nd Platoon - 592243 - 603238, 3rd Platoon - 581239 - 588244.

Appendix "A" - Summary of firing missions, Assault Platoon.

Annex "A" - Overlay, Castel d'Aiano Action.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 31 March

The enemy situation underwent a marked change during the early part of the period, when the attack against Castel d'Aiano was mounted. Not only were the front lines drastically revised, but the troops used by the enemy to hold this sector at the end of the attack were widely divergent from those met at its opening. The seizure of Castel d'Aiano and the surrounding high ground deprived the enemy of a supply and communication center, besides providing our forces with a hub from which the last high ground separating them from the approaches to the Po Valley could be assaulted. When the battle was over, the ridge of high ground paralleling Highway #64 from Mt. Belvedere north to Castel d'Aiano had been cleared, excepting only the Montese mass at L-5625. To the right of the ridge, Monte Valbura - L-6424 - and another M. Belvedere - L-6524 - were taken, with the line extending to Highway #64 in the vicinity of L696245.

In spite of the fact that an astounding number of prisoners was taken during the Castel d'Aiano attack, there is no indication that the enemy has changed his attitude toward the value of his Po Valley defenses. The influx of prisoners arose from a repetition of the situation manifested in February in the Belvedere sector.

The 232nd Infantry Division had held the high ground from Belvedere to the east for many months. It had resisted our patrols and small shifts of position stubbornly, with no intention of giving up without a fight. But it was due for relief and our attack was timed, either intentionally or inadvertently, when one regiment of the 232nd was actually being replaced by the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jaeger Division. The new regiment had marched from the east for approximately a week. The men were tired; supply was poor; morale was low. The unit was thrown into the line as reserves, without any opportunity for orientation. The result was that defense from ground positions fell to pieces.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

History repeated itself at Castel d'Aiano. After the attack finally began, a very good reason appeared for its having been postponed. Whether it was the principal reason cannot be said. Somewhat less than 48 hours before our attack on 3 March, the 721st Regiment of the 114th Division had arrived in the sector to relieve additional elements of the 232nd Division. This second offensive of ours almost developed a complete rout among enemy infantry, and once again ground defense collapsed. The first two days, prisoners streamed in by the hundred, only too willing to surrender. The situation on the third day was an utter reversal.

Just as though it were two different battles on two different fronts, the nature of opposition changed. Troops from the 29th PG Division had arrived in the scene and entered the fight. Their resistance was stiff, but it was too late. By that time, we were so concentrated around our objective that they could not prevent our success.

Armor was spotted the first day of the attack as our forward elements approached Canevaccia. Three tanks were reported retreating north, but circumstances later indicated that they were assault guns from the 914th Assault Gun Battalion. Two extended columns of armor were reported on the night of 4 - 5 March, approaching from the northeast, but no attack developed. At the time of this writing, there is no indication that the enemy intends to commit his armor in a large scale counterattack. Not even small scale threats have been manifested. Anti-tank fire was received in one or two isolated cases, but throughout the attack, the main opposition was from intense artillery and mortar fire, and the newly-won positions are now being harassed constantly. As usual, aside from the eternally restrictive terrain, the armor was delayed by mines and demolitions.

The 29th PG Division had been called to action from its position in mobile reserve, and it was to be expected that it be relieved as quickly as possible so as to revert to its former role. However, it was not until the latter part of the period that PW's identified elements of the 334th Infantry Division. At the end of the period, the relief had not been completed. Now there are elements of four separate divisions represented in the sector: the 232nd Infantry Division, depleted from three regiment to two-regiment strength; the 114th Jaeger Division, weakened by casualties but rapidly being reinforced by very second-rate replacements; the 29th Panzer Division, still regarded as full-strength and top-notch; and the 334th Infantry Division, the defensive potentiality of which is excellent.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communications during the period were by radio, wire and messenger.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

2. Radio:

During the first part of the month, elements of the battalion were supporting infantry in an attack. A continuous command net was maintained between Battalion Headquarters and all attached armor. Separate companies maintained nets within each company. During the attack, the tanks and infantry communicated by means of the AN-VRC-3 in the tanks and the SCR-300 with the infantry. Results were very satisfactory. Some difficulties were experienced due to terrain features.

A BC-620 transceiver was installed in an L-5 observation plane and air-ground communication to the tanks and attached armor was established. It has not been used in any tactical situation as yet. Several test checks were made, and it was found that communication was good at great distances.

The light tank company was equipped with new M24 light tanks. No consideration for the mounting of the AN-VRC-3 had been made in these vehicles. Communications personnel are working on an improvised mounting to be placed in the turret.

Very few mechanical failures were experienced during the period.

3. Wire:

Some difficulty in maintaining wire communication between the Battalion Forward CP and higher headquarters was experienced during the first part of the period. The difficulty was due largely to the rapid advance of all elements. In one instance, however, communication was disrupted because a switchboard was moved out of its position without properly notifying units that had wire into their board. The matter was reported to proper authority and there has been no repetition of the incident.

4. Messenger:

Message Center has made two runs daily to higher headquarters, all companies, and to all attached elements. All runs were made as close to scheduled time as possible. Efficiency and results have been excellent.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 March 1945, this battalion was on the line and actively engaged with the enemy. The supply of all classes continued to be generally good. The organization still has five (5) trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, lwb, cargo, on Detached Service, and having trucks on Detached Service for an extended period of time handicaps an organization somewhat in that all dumps are quite a distance from the units using these supplies.

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

During the period it was necessary to increase the number of mules being used from seventeen (17) to sixty (60). These mules have, in many instances, been the only means available for the transporting of supplies, ammunition, gasoline, etc. to tanks located on the utmost heights of mountains. Half-tracks from the Mortar Platoon have been used to supply tanks in positions that $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton's, $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton's and $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks could not reach. However, tracks were very rapidly chewed up on the rocky slopes of the mountains and necessitated the changing of tracks quite frequently.

2. Rations:

The rations used by the battalion for the period were the "B" type and the 10 in 1 type rations. Authority was received through higher headquarters to draw one extra ration per day for each light tank crew. This is necessary because it is impossible to break down to a four-man tank crew four-tenths of a ration, it being very easy to break a 10 in 1 in half. This authority is the answer to the problem. However, the 5 in 1 ration is the ideal ration for a tank crew because it has a greater variety of food.

3. Clothing:

The supply of clothing during the period has been exceptionally good. This organization has received notice of turning in its winter clothing with a date set as deadline.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of gasoline, oil and ammunition has been plentiful and readily available during the period. This battalion has had attached to it during the period one (1) TD company and one (1) medium tank company for supply. These companies came to this battalion with transportation adequate only for supplying their respective units from dumps established by this organization.

The servicing of a TD company called for the carrying of deisel fuel in our dumps. This placed a burden on the few cans that this organization has. Permission was obtained, however, from a higher headquarters to draw four hundred (400) cans for the purpose of supplying deisel fuel. Again, in this instance, enters the need for an organization to have all of its transportation available. Class III dumps nearest to the using units are approximately forty (40) miles one way.

5. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

3 - Gun, submachine, cal. .45, M1
2 - Launcher, rocket, AT, M1A1
1 - Tank, medium, M4A3
1 - Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, Truck, L4L4

b. Signal:

1 - Radio Set, SCR-528

Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

During the past month, there was a great increase of third and fourth echelon work on both armored and general purposes vehicles. This is due to the extremely difficult terrain in which the companies have been operating.

There was a complete change-over of light tanks (M5 and M5A1) for the new M24 light tanks. The crews of these vehicles were put through a three and a half day course on proper first and second echelon maintenance, driving, and gunnery by Lt. Clenebenning of the AFHQ.

We received five (5) more new 2½-ton 6x6 cargo vehicles and five (5) new ¼-ton 4x4 vehicles to replace war-weary vehicles.

Due to enemy mines, one (1) tank (M4A3) was knocked out and destroyed by fire on 23 March, at coordinate 518175. This tank was replaced the following day. One (1) ¼-ton truck was stolen in the vicinity of Riola on 21 March; to date it has not been recovered. Request for replacement has been submitted.

There has been a great improvement of first and second echelon maintenance on armored vehicles and a decrease in same on general purposes vehicles throughout the battalion.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Silver Star

Sanders, Ralph Tec 5 37 408 844 Company "D"

Bronze Star (Posthumous)

Emigh, James T. Sgt. 16 100 686 Company "A"

Commendation

751st Tank Battalion, from Commanding General IV Corps, Major General Crittenberger, for action in the capture of Mt. Belvedere.

Battlefield Appointment

Smallwood, James Elton, Tec 4, 35 021 682, to Second Lieutenant.

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A. AND M.I.A.

None

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Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

ROWLEY, JAMES S. 1ST LT 01 018 284 Co "C" 1 Mar 1945

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

None

I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Harville, Kenneth L.	Cpl.	6	576	562	Co "B"	22 Mar 1945
Gerber, Frederick L.	Tec 5	37	515	397	Co "B"	22 Mar 1945
Burkhart, Walter J. Jr.	Pfc	35	760	350	Co "B"	22 Mar 1945
Hermanson, Raymond L.	Pfc	36	305	860	Co "C"	10 Mar 1945
Holloway, LeRoy	Pvt.	15	336	323	Co "B"	22 Mar 1945
Moore, Thomas D.	Pvt.	15	047	949	Co "B"	22 Mar 1945

I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Danieli, Anthony Pvt. 31 308 337 Co "C" 3 Mar 1945

Note: Tec 4 John Dushensky reported MIA on February report has been reported as KIA as of 20 February 1945.

3. Comments:

a. The period has been relatively quiet permitting the personnel to enjoy more frequent periods at the Army Rest Centers. The increased rest quota for both officers and enlisted men has contributed to the splendid existing morale, and the fact that we have been in support of the 10th Mountain Infantry Division, a well-trained, spirited organization, has been an additional factor in accounting for the high state of morale.

b. The current policy prohibiting the requisition for anticipated losses retards the fighting effectiveness of an organization of this type. When actively engaged, it requires the minimum of seventy-two (72) hours from the time of casualty to obtain and assign a battle replacement. A tank cannot operate efficiently without a complete crew.

c. The receipt of the M24 light tanks presents a personnel problem. The present T/O for a light tank company provides for four men per vehicle. The new tank is designed for a five-man crew. Every effort to increase the T/O for a light tank company accordingly is recommended.

Appendix "B" - Personnel Statistics.

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Report of Action for month of March, Cont'd.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

During the last operation, it has been found highly desirable to attach a platoon of infantry to each company of tanks. The normal procedure in the assault was to establish a base of fire, and advance the leading platoon with the infantry. All potential strongpoints were battered until a white flag appeared or they were completely neutralized. Then with the tanks overwatching, the infantry took charge of the prisoners. From one such strongpoint, forty (40) prisoners were secured. The enemy, however, in witnessing this mass surrender, mortared their own troops killing ten (10) and wounding six (6). Hedge rows were found to be particularly prolific as hideouts for German snipers. Spraying such features with machine guns paid big dividends.

In the initial phases of the operation, mines were found in profusion. They were the non-metallic Topf mines. They were deeply buried and found in piles of three or more. They were sometimes connected to the surface by a three-foot post and protected by Schu mines. It was impossible to disarm them as they were self-igniting upon the removal of the fuse.

Panzerfausts (Bazookas) were found in profusion. Also, Pak 40's were located in strategic positions. No casualties resulted, however, from these sources because of the splendid infantry support and the alertness of the "overwatching" tanks.

Initially, all armor was preceded by engineers. However, after the main enemy fortifications were breached, the tankers saw fresh vehicle tracks, and from that point onward, they proceeded without engineer assistance. Their advance was so rapid that the enemy was unable to detonate two (2) one-thousand pound demolitions placed on two bridges on the main highway. The moral is that whenever the enemy is knocked off balance, it is best to capitalize on the circumstances by not being too conservative and greater success will be achieved while fewer losses will be sustained.

C. J. Madden
C. J. MADDEN,
Major, 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding

5 Incls.

Incl. #1-Maps (Italy, 1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II; 98 III, IV

Incl. #2-Maps (Italy, 1/25,000) Sheet 97 I SE, II NE;
98 III NW, IV NW, SW, NE.

Incl. #3-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 March 1945.

Incl. #4-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 31 March 1945.

Incl. #5-Unit Journal and File.

SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY MISSIONS FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH 1945

ASSAULT PLATOON

DATE	C/B		HARASSING		REGISTRATION		MORTARS		DESTRUCTION		PERSONNEL		PROPAGANDA		VEHICLES		TOTAL	
	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds	Mission	Rds
1st/2nd					4	66											4	66
2nd/3rd																		
3rd/4th	2	118			1	8					1	58					4	184
4th/5th			3	201	1	10					1	69					5	280
5th/6th			4	256	2	16					1	68					7	340
6th/7th			2	38	1	10					8	151					11	199
7th/8th	3	105	2	69													5	174
8th/9th			4	134													4	134
9th/10th			2	63													2	63
10th/11th					1	23											1	23
11th/12th			1	25	5	65											6	90
12th/13th			2	41									1	50			3	91
13th/14th			1	9							1	32					2	41
14th/15th											1	98					1	98
15th/16th			1	39							1	40					2	79
16th/17th			1	77													1	77
17th/18th	1	45	1	45													2	90
18th/19th			1	73	1	8											2	81
19th/20th			2	93													2	93
20th/21st			1	37							1	36					2	73
21st/22nd			1	43													1	43
22nd/23rd					1	11											1	11
23rd/24th			3	28	1	4											4	32
24th/25th					4	40											4	40
25th/26th			4	110	1	10											5	120
26th/27th			3	140							2	87					5	227
27th/28th *																		
28th/29th																		
29th/30th																		
30th/31st																		
TOTAL FOR MONTH	6	268	39	1521	23	271					17	639	1	50			86	2749

* Relieved 28th March 1945.

PERSONNEL STATISTICS

ENLISTED MEN:

COMPANY AND T/O STRENGTH	OVERSEAS 32 MONTHS	OVERSEAS 22 MONTHS	OVERSEAS LESS THAN 22 MONTHS	MEN ROTATED TO U.S.A.	MEN ON TDY IN U.S.A.
HQ & HQ CO 131 EM	78 (59%)	18 (13%)	35 (28%)	16 (12%)	6 (4%)
SV CO 108 EM	83 (76%)	13 (12%)	12 (12%)	16 (14%)	6 (5%)
CO "A" 112 EM	33 (29%)	34 (30%)	45 (41%)	16 (14%)	6 (5%)
CO "B" 112 EM	35 (31%)	26 (23%)	51 (46%)	15 (13%)	6 (5%)
CO "C" 112 EM	35 (31%)	33 (29%)	44 (40%)	15 (13%)	6 (5%)
CO "D"* 89 EM	31 (34%)	17 (18%)	41 (48%)	10 (11%)	3 (3%)
MED DET 18 EM	12 (66%)	2 (11%)	4 (23%)	3 (16%)	1 (5%)
BN TOTAL 682 EM	307 (45%)	143 (20%)	232 (35%)	91 (13%)	34 (5%)

*-Co "D" activated Dec 1943. Note: Some percent figures are necessarily approximate.

OFFICERS:

<u>TIME OVERSEAS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Under 18 Months	13
22 Months	11
23 Months	7
24 Months	1
26 Months	4
27 Months	1
32 Months	6
Total	43
Returned on TDY to U.S.	4
Returned to U. S., CGS School	1
Total	48
Rotated to the U. S.	13
Returned to U. S. Reassigned	2

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HEADQUARTERS 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

12 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of April.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for month of April is submitted:

Map Reference: Italy - (1/200,000) Sheet Nos. 5, 8 and 11.
(1/50,000) Sheet 97 I, II.
(1/25,000) Sheet 87 III SE, SW.
98 IV NE, NW.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period
1 - 30 April

At the opening of the period, the armor in the right sector of IV Corps was divided under Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion and Headquarters 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion, with Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion, Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, Company "B", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company "C", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company "C", 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were in support of 10th Mountain Division and 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Company "B", Company "C", and Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, were under Headquarters 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion in support of BEF. Our units were displaced as follows: In support of 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; Company "A", 1st Platoon - 662207, 2nd Platoon - 672232, 3rd Platoon - 689227. In support of BEF, under command Headquarters 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company "B", 1st Platoon - 491151, 2nd Platoon - 519170, 3rd Platoon - 506166 and 499168; Company "C", 1st Platoon - 565226, 2nd Platoon - 572207, 3rd Platoon - 553195; and Company "D", 1st Platoon - 535183, 2nd Platoon - 531178 and 527176. The Assault Platoon and Mortar Platoon - 580123; Battalion CP - 582231; Forward Echelon - 580123; Rear Echelon - 587144. The attached armor to this Headquarters, in support of 10th Mountain Division, at opening of period were displaced as follows: Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, 1st Platoon - 623253 and 617242, 2nd Platoon - 603252, 3rd Platoon - 577188; Company "B", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 1st Platoon - 604253 and 601244, 2nd Platoon - 573222, 3rd Platoon - 609253; Company "C", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, in artillery positions - 603236; Company "C", 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 1st Platoon - 603238, 2nd Platoon - 592243 and 603238, 3rd Platoon - 581239 and 588244.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

The period 1 - 12 April was spent generally in defense of sectors - 10th Mountain Division, BEF, and 81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. The platoons of each company fired many direct fire missions on enemy positions in these sectors. One tank destroyer company remained in artillery position and fired indirect fire missions under direction IV Corps Artillery. The tank destroyer companies under our control were rotated in the artillery role. At the beginning of the period orders were received for Company "D" to turn over to 1st Armored Division the newly drawn M24 light tanks. It was necessary to draw the complete company out of line for the exchange. To relieve Company "D", one platoon of Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion, and one platoon of Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion were withdrawn from company reserve positions.

On 5 April, we received Field Order Number 4 from 10th Mountain Division in regards to plans for an attack on 12 April. The plan for the operations was for Company "A" to be attached to 87th Mountain Regiment, Company "B" to 85th Mountain Regiment, and Company "C" to 86th Mountain Regiment. Company "D" was to be placed in Division reserve subject to attachment, on Division order, to a pursuit group consisting of 3rd Battalion of 86th Mountain Regiment, 10th Mountain Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, and Reconnaissance Company of 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. The Company Commanders immediately began to contact the Regimental Commanders and Battalion Commanders that their companies would be supporting. The plan of attack was formed and problems pertaining to communications and liaison were solved.

The relief and movement of some of our elements and attached elements was begun on the night of 8 - 9 April. Company "C", 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion relieved Company "B" and Company "C", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 1st Platoon of Company "C", 751st Tank Battalion. Company "B" and Company "C", 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion reverted to parent control. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Company "A", 751st Tank Battalion, were relieved by elements of 1st Armored Division. The 1st Platoon, Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion, was relieved and moved to company area. The rest of Company "C" (1st and 3rd Platoons) closed into company area. Both Company "B" and Company "C" reverted to parent control at 090600B. Company "A", 760th Tank Battalion, was detached this Headquarters and attached to 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion at 090600B, and at the same time Company "C", 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, reverted to parent control. To complete the detachments, Company "D", 751st Tank Battalion, reverted to control this Headquarters at 090600B. On the night of 9 - 10 April, our remaining elements which had not been relieved (1st Platoon, Company "A", and 2nd and 3rd Platoons of Company "B") were relieved by elements of 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

All companies closed into final assembly areas by 120015B. Company "A" - 618244, Company "B" - 605249, Company "C" - 637237, and Company "D" - 594229. Plans had been completed for the employment of the armor with each unit and all Liaison Officers had reported to the proper Headquarters. The plan called for the armor with each regiment to be divided into two forces. One force commanded by Company Commander from 751st Tank Battalion and the other commanded by Company Commander from 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Each of the companies, except Company "D", attached one platoon of 75mm Guns to the Tank Destroyer Company operating with the same regiment, and in turn received one platoon of 3-inch Tank Destroyer Guns. Each of these forces would support one battalion of infantry in the regiment.

"H"-hour, "D"-day was scheduled for 12 April at 0700B, but several postponements were made and the final attack began on the morning of 14 April. The first day of the attack was a bitter day. The tanks made very slow progress because of the bad terrain. Engineers had to repair or build a road almost every foot of the distance the tanks covered. The tracks on many tanks were thrown trying to move in this mountainous terrain. As a result, the tanks were not able to give the infantry close support, but were able to give initial support from high ground. The infantry suffered high casualties and made slow progress during the first day, taking only a few of the objectives. The enemy seemed determined to remain in his well prepared defenses, taking advantage of the tanks not being able to give close support to the infantry.

During the second day of the attack, the tank columns moved a little faster, but still the progress was slow at various points and the tanks were still not able to give close support. It was not until the third day, that the tanks were able to "break loose" and attack in front of the infantry. Company "A" was the first to accomplish this on the assault of TOLE (6532). At this time, Company "C" was being halted by demolition just south of point where Company "A" was able to advance without engineer assistance. The road was later repaired and Company "C" moved up in position vicinity TOLE. Company "D" was ordered to move to an area just south of TOLE.

On the morning of 17 April, Company "A", supporting one battalion of 87th Mountain Regiment, attacked toward SAN PROSPERO (665346). It was expected that little resistance would be met, but the attack was a bitter one. Because of the terrain, only a small number of tanks could be employed at one time. The tanks received direct anti-tank fire, artillery fire, and heavy mortar fire. Several tanks were lost. One tank blocked the road at a point so that other tanks could not move around it. Another route was found, however, and the tanks moved on to the objective. Hundreds of prisoners were taken on this objective. Company "C", at the same time, was making fast progress to the north and northeast of TOLE. The company had a "Field Day" killing many Germans and capturing hundreds of prisoners. Company "B", with the 85th Mountain Regiment, was protecting the left flank up to a point south of TOLE. Orders were received, however, detaching company from 10th Mountain Division and attaching it to 337th Infantry Regiment of 85th Infantry Division.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

On the morning of 18 April, Company "A" and Company "C" continued the attack further on to the north and northeast. Stiff resistance was still being met. Several tanks were lost. The terrain had improved considerably for use of tanks, but we were still in the mountains and movement was restricted. Company "D" was attached to 86th Mountain Regiment, but other orders were received after the company had moved to new assembly area vicinity 723368, attaching Company "D" to 85th Mountain Regiment and placed in support of 1st Battalion. On the night of 18 - 19 April, Company "B" assembled in area vicinity 712333, and Company "C" was placed in division reserve with 86th Mountain Regiment.

In the late afternoon of the following day, orders were received to assemble all units, except Company "B", immediately, to exploit breakthrough to Po Valley. Company "D" was attacking during the day along the main axis of advance, and at close of day was north of the assembly area for the tanks. Company "A" and Company "C" assembled vicinity 7643 and was re-serviced prior to hour of attack which was scheduled for the morning of 20 April.

The attack was made on the morning of 20 April. The advance to the Po Valley was rapid with our tank companies being the first to cut Highway Number 9 near PONTE SAMOGGIA (733567). A number of enemy tanks and self-propelled Guns were destroyed and large artillery pieces captured. On the capture of Highway Number 9, German forces were split and many "cut off". Large groups of prisoners began to surrender in groups. For the tank companies, the prisoners became a problem. It was apparent that the cutting of Highway Number 9 was the "break-through" and advantage thereof was taken immediately.

Advantage was taken of the situation. During the night, a task force was formed around Company "D" with the mission of moving and seizing BOMPARTO BRIDGE (6575). This task force was "TF DUFF" and consisted of Company "D", one company engineers, one battalion of infantry, and one platoon of Tank Destroyers. The main force, with the same mission as the Task Force, consisted of Company "A" with 86th Mountain Regiment, and Company "C" with 85th Mountain Regiment. The task force passed the IP at 0700B and the main force, one hour later on 21 April. The advance was rapid, moving initially over the secondary roads, thereby, by-passing possible strong points along main routes of advance and around large towns. At the same time, Company "B" was supporting the 337th Infantry Regiment of 85th Infantry Division on right of 10th Mountain Division in vicinity 773545.

Orders were received for Company "A" to report to Commanding General, 85th Infantry Division. The company was assembled (less 2nd Platoon) and started movement to 85th Infantry Division sector. Upon arrival, Company "A" was attached to 338th Infantry Regiment.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

The attack with 10th Mountain Division was resumed the following morning with Company "D" and 2nd Platoon of Company "A" with "TF Duff" and Company "C" supporting main body. The objective was to secure bridgehead vicinity CAMATTA (598128) which is on Po River near S. BENEDETTO PO. This advance on 22 April was even more spectacular than the advance of the previous day. The advance was faster, more equipment captured, and more prisoners captured. Prisoners were lining the roads, marching in large groups without guard to the Prisoner of War Cages. The enemy was confused and did not know which way to turn. German convoys were found turning into our own main-axis route. One armored column of Company "C" was moving north when two enemy tanks and a flak wagon pulled into another column moving north on parallel road three hundred yards away. The enemy tanks turned and fired on our column. Our tanks then turned their guns and destroyed the two tanks and flak wagon. One other tank of Company "C" captured a tank complete with crew. As the tank turned to fire at the enemy vehicle, the crew jumped out and surrendered.

On the morning of 23 April, Company "C" and Company "D" supported the crossing of the Po River by 10th Mountain Division vicinity 6012, near S. BENEDETTO PO, from the south bank of the river. Enemy artillery fire was very intense. Company "A" and Company "B" supported the advance of the 337th Regiment, objective of Company "A" and Company "B" being QUINGENTOLE (6709) and REVERE (7411) respectively. Around mid-day, air OP dropped a note stating approximately forty (40) enemy vehicles were attempting to cross Po River at 6413. One platoon from Company "D" moved immediately to the point and captured twelve (12) prisoners and fifty (50) vehicles waiting for evacuation by ferry boat across river. The cable crossing was intact, but the ferry boat was blown on opposite side of river soon after the tanks captured the point. The light tanks guarded the cable crossing until infantry and engineers arrived several hours later. During the night 23 - 24 April, Company "D" furnished six road blocks to the south and southeast of BENEDETTO PO in conjunction with the Tank Destroyers. Company "C" remained on alert to move and assist the 10th Anti-Tank Battalion to the west and southwest. The next morning the light tanks patrolled road net to the northwest, west, and southwest.

At this time, infantry of the 10th Mountain Division had crossed the Po River in boats, but no bridges had been completed for tanks. The tanks were placed in assembly areas near point of crossing. Later, the process of ferrying tanks across river was begun, but this was a slow process.

The 13th Tank Battalion of the 1st Armored Division was attached to 10th Mountain Division, with plans for the armored battalion to be the assault force with 86th Mountain Regiment. This assault group was designated "Task Force Darby". The mission of Company "C" and Company "D" was to advance with assault group and provide road blocks along route. The Division mission was to seize and hold VERONA (6555).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

In the meantime, Company "B" supported the crossing of the Po River by 85th Infantry Division vicinity QUINGENTOLE (6709). Company "A" received orders to move entire company, west, to vicinity GONZAGA (4901) to stop reported enemy tank column operating toward the northeast. Upon arrival near GONZAGA, the column was identified as being elements of 1st Armored Division. Company "A" did not return to QUINGENTOLE, but instead moved to assembly area vicinity S. BENEDETTO PO to await crossing of Po River. Company "B" also began movement to an assembly area near S. BENEDETTO PO preparatory to crossing the Po River, as there were to be no bridges to support tanks built across Po River in 85th Infantry Division sector.

Orders were received for one platoon of Company "D" and for one section of tanks from Company "C" to be moved across by ferry with top priority. These were to be used as security for troops already across river, as no tanks had crossed river. This was accomplished. After crossing river, the platoon of lights and section of mediums moved out with 85th Mountain Regiment during night to secure IP for 13th Tank Battalion and 86th Mountain Regiment. Little or no resistance was met so the Commanding General ordered the advance until stopped by enemy resistance. At noon on 25 April, this column was reported vicinity S. LUCIA (491325) on Highway Number 64 about half the distance to the objective. Our light tanks and two medium tanks continued to advance on the objective because all of the 13th Tank Battalion was not across river and the Battalion Commander did not wish to commit only part of his organization. These tanks continued to spearhead the advance until VILLA FRANCA (5345) was reached. Enemy elements vicinity airfield offered some resistance. Our tanks destroyed one (1) Focke Wolfe, six (6) trucks, four (4) anti-tank guns, and captured fifteen (15) prisoners.

It was the night of 25 - 26 April when Company "A", Company "C", and Company "D" finally crossed the river. Company "B" crossed the river on the morning of 26 April and joined the 338th Infantry Regiment at VERONA (6554) and went into an assembly area on the south side of VERONA (6554). Company "C" and Company "D" immediately formed necessary road blocks on route, and Company "A" moved northeast, joined the 338th Infantry Regiment vicinity VIGASIO (6041), supported their advance to VERONA (6554), and went into an assembly area southwest of VERONA.

Orders were received from 10th Mountain Division stating Company "C" and Company "D" were released from road blocks and ordered to assemble south of VILLA FRANCA (530450) and prepare to support 87th Mountain Regiment in their advance. The two companies assembled and moved out with 87th Mountain Regiment to vicinity SANDRA (489575). This point was reached during night and road blocks were formed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

The 10th Mountain Division formed a plan which stated the division would advance twenty-four hours a day by rotating the three regiments for eight-hour periods, and by rotating the Tanks of the 751st Tank Battalion with the Tank Destroyers of 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion for twelve-hour periods. 751st Tank Battalion drew the night assignment with hours from 2000B to 0800B. During the twelve-hour rest period, the tanks were to furnish necessary road blocks. The plan was put into effect on 27 April with Company "C" and Company "D" forming road blocks until it was necessary to start movement up the Lake Garda road to vicinity GARDA (433702) to relieve 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Company "C" and Company "D" made good progress during the night, but were stopped by demolition during the early morning vicinity NAVENE (544948). Our tanks were promptly relieved by 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company "C" and Company "D" assembled in MALCESINE (519907). No progress was made on the main lake road during the rest of April. One platoon from both Company "C" and Company "D" was sent to vicinity PESINA (471727) to report to 87th Mountain Regiment, but were shortly returned to company assembly area on 30 April. One platoon of Company "C" supported a landing made by one company of 85th Mountain Regiment on western shore of Lake Garda.

Company "A" and Company "B" were detached 85th Infantry Division and placed in support of the Legnano Group (Italian) on 30 April. The companies moved to vicinity MONICHLARI (F180530) to join the Group. Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion was detached 10th Mountain Division and attached to IV Corps. Battalion Headquarters moved to join IV Corps Headquarters northeast of MILANO (K325745).

Each company employed the assigned assault gun of the company with the unit. The Assault Platoon was attached to the various companies upon request and during the past period, fired only direct fire missions. The platoon lost one gun in action. The Mortar Platoon was not employed as a unit during the period.

At the close of the period, our units were displaced as follows: In support of the Legnano Group (Italian), Company "A" (less 2nd Platoon) - K630875, 2nd Platoon - K2565; Company "B" - K050680. Attached to 10th Mountain Division, Company "C" - F519907; Company "D" - F519907. Battalion CP located K325745; Forward Echelon - F050680; Rear Echelon - F050680.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
Summary of Enemy Operations
1 - 30 April

During the period, the enemy situation passed through a series of upheavals that terminated in utter collapse of resistance. At the opening of the month, the defense line in this battalion's sector remained fairly stable on the general line east of MONTESE - L5625, M. DELLA SPE, MONTE VALBURA - L6424, MONTE BELVEDERE - L6524, and joining Highway Number 64 at L696245.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

There was still no indication that the enemy had altered his intention to defend that line determinedly, and to withdraw judiciously once his initial defenses were breached. In the comparatively dormant period before our offensive on 14 April, enemy artillery was active, but the absence of heavy calibre fire was noticed, particularly in rear areas that had been harassed for many months. It seemed likely that the Germans had placed their heavy artillery in the Bologna area, expecting a breakthrough in that sector. Light and medium artillery, and mortar fires were intensified all across the front. German patrolling was not increased, and as the time approached for our attack, reconnaissance revealed areas devoid of enemy that had previously been very sensitive to patrols.

Advance was slow during the first three days of the offensive. The period of waiting through half of March and the early part of April had given the enemy time to practice his diabolical habit of tying his defenses together with mines. The terrain was perfect for defense and, through experience, the enemy was able to make the most of it. From the very beginning, mines proved to be the main deterrent to infantry as well as to tanks. This obstacle, coupled with terrain unfavorable to armor, allowed the tanks to move only as rapidly as a way was cleared for them by engineers. Only the weather was in our favor.

At the end of the fourth day, any continuous frontline had dissolved. The bulk of the enemy forces had been either annihilated or captured and what had been an organized withdrawal in the mountains turned into a general retreat. This did not mean, however, that all resistance was broken. Strong points were left here and there, garrisons well fortified in a town or on a good terrain feature, which at times cost us dearly to reduce. For instance, the assault on the town of MONGIORGIO cost a platoon of tanks, with a proportionate number of casualties.

On 20 April, men and materiel in this sector began pouring into the Po Valley. The enemy had been routed and the pursuit had begun. Prisoners streamed in constantly and a quick armor-infantry thrust to the northwest cut in behind fleeing forces of four enemy divisions and those units were eliminated as organized fighting elements. Thus, the race continued across the entire Valley, with only a slight pause at the Po River. Thousands of isolated enemy were left behind in pockets, to be cleaned out later by Partisans. Equipment was abandoned by the truckload because there was neither fuel nor time to salvage it. A medical unit was captured while waiting to be ferried across the river. A convoy of supply trucks was taken when it found its route to the west severed by our thrust northward. Three (3) 170mm guns with personnel carriers were abandoned after being caught traveling north on our own MSR. Armor appeared only in isolated cases and in small numbers. Nor was AT defense general.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

The pursuit continued till the end of the period and toward the end consisted largely of mopping up islands of resistance and negotiating for the surrender of scattered units. As the month ended, it was obvious that the enemy could fight little more and, of course, it has since been learned that even then the surrender of all enemy forces in Italy had been effected.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communications during the period were by radio, wire and messenger.

2. Radio:

Radio communication was maintained with higher headquarters and with elements of the battalion. Individual company nets were kept open as well as the battalion command net. The operation moved so rapidly that it was impossible to keep contact with the companies on the command net. At times the individual companies were separated so widely that company nets could not properly be maintained.

Very few mechanical failures were experienced. Distance was almost entirely to fault for the lack of constant contact.

3. Wire:

During the first part of the period wire communication was very satisfactory. After the offensive started, progress was so rapid that it proved impossible to maintain a wire.

4. Messenger:

Regular messenger runs were made to all companies and higher headquarters during the first half of the month. The fast moving offensive and the widely separated elements of the battalion made it impossible to make any regular runs.

5. Remarks:

Panel sets AP-50 were used to mark vehicles for identification from the air during the operation.

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Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945, this organization was on the line and actively engaged with the enemy. The first part of the period was spent in cracking the line and preparing for the pursuit of the enemy across the Po Valley. Mules that were used for the servicing of the battalion during the winter were turned in. The battalion was still required to furnish five (5) trucks, 2½-ton, lwb, cargo, to a corps provisional truck company. These trucks on continued detached service seriously handicapped the efficiency of the organization, in that remaining trucks and men were required to operate twenty-four (24) hours a day. This resulted in accidents to remaining vehicles and did not allow for any maintenance whatsoever on trucks so necessary in the operation of a tank battalion. Dumps were so far in the rear that, in many cases, trucks were required to travel as much as seventy-five (75) miles one way to replenish basic loads. In the breaking out of the mountains, the road nets were almost nil. Main supply routes were, in many cases, the only route to and from the front, and were one way for as much as four (4) to six (6) hours. Trucks were broken down into company supply trains and traveled with the tanks of each company. The cargo of these trucks consisted of two (2) trucks of gasoline and one (1) truck of assorted ammunition. Because of the shortage of trucks, each truck was overloaded.

2. Rations:

The principal ration used during the period was the "C" type ration and the 10 in 1 type ration. Because army dumps were so far in the rear, this organization drew rations from the division it was supporting. It is still felt by members of this organization that the old 5 in 1 type ration is the better ration. The popularity of this ration is based upon the variety contained therein and because of the convenience in break-down to the tank crew.

3. Clothing:

Because of the rapid situation, little clothing was drawn or salvaged by this battalion.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

It was difficult to supply our unit with gas, oil, and ammunition. Dumps were a great distance in the rear, and road traffic made it difficult for a truck to cover the distance in the time required.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

5. Ordnance:

General purposes vehicles were replaced slowly due to inadequate communications between this battalion and the supporting ordnance company. The supporting ordnance company was a great distance in the rear, and this organization moved so rapidly that the ordnance contact party found it difficult to maintain contact with this organization. Armored vehicle replacements were adequate, but general purposes vehicles, so necessary for a unit to function, were not received and the use of captured vehicles was utilized.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

- 1 - Tank, medium, M4A3, w/105mm How.
- 6 - Tank, medium, M4A3, w/76mm Gun.
- 2 - Tank, medium, M4, w/75mm Gun.
- 2 - Tank, medium, M4A1, w/75mm Gun.
- 2 - Tank, medium, M4A1, w/75mm Gun, w/dozer blade.
- 1 - Tank, light, M5, w/37mm Gun.
- 12 - Gun, submachine, cal. .45, M1
- 1 - Watch, wrist, 15-jewel, Bulova
- 2 - Binocular, M13

b. Signal:

- 13 - Radios, SCR-528
- 1 - Telephone, EE-8

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

During the past month, all of the new M24 light tanks that were drawn during latter part of March were turned over to 1st Armored Division. We, in turn, drew the 1st Armored's old M5 and M5A1 light tanks. The condition of these M5 and M5A1 light tanks were very poor and caused considerable trouble in the course of our fast moving action. We also received seventeen (17) new M4A3 (w/76mm gun) on 2 April as a reserve stock for coming operations.

Our losses during period due to enemy action are as follows:

- 2 - M4 Medium Tanks
- 3 - M4A1 Medium Tanks
- 6 - M4A3 Medium Tanks (76mm gun)
- 1 - M4A3 Assault Gun (105mm gun)
- 1 - M5 Light Tank.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

Our losses during period due to mechanical failure are as follows:

- 1 - M4 Medium Tank
- 5 - M4A1 Medium Tanks
- 2 - M5 Light Tanks
- 1 - M5A1 Light Tank

Eleven (11) general purposes vehicles were turned in to ordnance to be replaced. All have been replaced except, one (1) 2½-ton, 6x6, GMC Truck, and two (2) ½-ton, 4x4 Trucks.

Due to the long road marches, there has been considerable wear on tracks and bogie wheels.

SECTION VI - PERSONNEL

1. Awards:

Dronze Star

LING, WILLIAM S. M. CAPT. O 427 233 Medical Corps

Commendations

751st Tank Battalion, from 10th Mountain Division, dated 28 March 1945, with 1st Indorsement, Headquarters IV Corps, dated 3 April 1945, for action from 19 February to 10 March 1945 at MT. BELVEDERE and vicinity.

3rd Platoon, Company "B", 751st Tank Battalion, per Section VII, General Orders Number 39, Headquarters Fifth Army, dated 9 April 1945, for action from 24 to 28 November 1944, at CORONA, Italy.

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

HAMPTON, WILLIAM F.	1ST LT.	01 015 430	Co. "A"	18 Apr 1945
HANSMANN, WALTER C.	2D LT.	01 015 681	Co. "D"	22 Apr 1945
Brodie, James R.	Tec 5	35 020 948	Sv. Co.	18 Apr 1945
Charpentier, Arjis P.	Pfc	34 151 163	Sv. Co.	18 Apr 1945

M.I.A.

Albrewczynski, Joseph S	Sgt.	33 434 230	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Cope, Johnnie B.	Pfc	34 509 932	Co. "A"	18 Apr 1945

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Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

FOX, WILLIAM E. II	1ST LT	01 043 946	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
PIERES, GERALD A.	1ST LT	01 010 660	Co. "D"	21 Apr 1945
SHAMBLIN, HOWARD C.	1ST LT	01 013 256	Co. "A"	18 Apr 1945
CAULFIELD, JOHN J.	2D LT	01 013 737	Co. "B"	20 Apr 1945
SCANDELL, ROY H.	2D LT	01 318 832	Co. "B"	19 Apr 1945
Lange, Walter W.	St Sgt	33 067 132	Co. "B"	19 Apr 1945
Bonino, Frederick T.	Sgt.	34 390 966	Co. "C"	17 Apr 1945
Coulter, Fred L.	Tec 4	37 510 418	Co. "A"	16 Apr 1945
(DOW on 16 Apr at hosp)				
Morris, Robert V.	Tec 4	33 554 985	Co. "A"	23 Apr 1945
Spurlock, Mark M.	Tec 4	35 019 968	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Swanson, Frank C.	Tec 4	13 153 442	Co. "A"	22 Apr 1945
Jacobs, Frank	Cpl.	39 279 619	Co. "A"	22 Apr 1945
Payne, Arthur M.	Cpl.	36 180 988	Co. "A"	18 Apr 1945
Androwski, Stanley F.	Tec 5	32 082 096	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Crumpler, Thomas B.	Tec 5	34 645 636	Co. "C"	22 Apr 1945
Jalbert, Pierre J.	Tec 5	31 320 391	Co. "B"	26 Apr 1945
(DOW on--Pittman, Andrew W.				
25 Apr) Rice, Herbert M.	Tec 5	20 631 018	Co. "A"	22 Apr 1945
Garrison, Richard R.	Pfc	37 511 029	Co. "D"	19 Apr 1945
Hanson, Merlin L.	Pfc	36 297 677	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Kaylor, John	Pfc	35 260 000	Hq. Co.	23 Apr 1945
McDowell, George B.	Pfc	36 550 895	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Smart, Harold G.	Pfc	37 122 452	Co. "C"	22 Apr 1945
Stolz, Fred A.	Pfc	35 544 857	Co. "A"	19 Apr 1945
Turley, Robert L. Jr.	Pfc	35 737 594	Co. "B"	22 Apr 1945
Amodeo, Stephen C.	Pvt.	42 175 405	Co. "A"	25 Apr 1945
Buziak, Andrew J.	Pvt.	33 578 494	Co. "B"	22 Apr 1945
Colvin, William A.	Pvt.	7 041 313	Co. "A"	18 Apr 1945

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Jones, Dudley J. L.	Tec 5	32 099 815	Sv. Co.	17 Apr 1945
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I.I.A. (Hospitalized)

Stacks, James E.	1st Sgt	6 274 925	Co. "B"	24 Apr 1945
Erickson, Robert T.	St Sgt	36 048 338	Co. "B"	14 Apr 1945
Mak, Stephen A.	Sgt.	35 014 763	Co. "D"	19 Apr 1945
Borba, Joseph G.	Tec 4	39 000 370	Co. "D"	25 Apr 1945
Hendershot, Loren	Cpl.	35 155 757	Co. "B"	26 Apr 1945
Davis, Robert J.	Tec 5	37 509 777	Hq. Co.	19 Apr 1945
DiPietro, Mario A.	Pfc	32 764 964	Hq. Co.	20 Apr 1945
Pancoast, Kenneth B.	Pfc	32 488 917	Co. "B"	21 Apr 1945
Moore, Thomas D.	Pvt.	15 047 949	Co. "B"	22 Apr 1945

I.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

Reed, Robert D.	Tec 5	37 500 208	Co. "D"	19 Apr 1945
Melazzo, Charles	Pfc	34 707 709	Co. "B"	14 Apr 1945
Weech, Reginald B.	Pvt.	34 934 191	Co. "D"	19 Apr 1945

Report of Action for month of April, Cont'd.

3. Comments:

a. The assignment of surplus personnel prior to the period of actual operations proved to be highly successful. The ready presence of casualty replacements with the organization permitted the combat elements to retain full combat strength at all times, and consequently sustained the combat efficiency of the battalion.

b. The availability of replacements eliminated the demoralizing practice of switching and juggling crews as casualties occurred. This fact contributed to a great extent in upholding splendid fighting spirit of the personnel.

Appendix "A" - Casualty Statistics

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

The new synthetic rubber bogie wheels did not hold up under the long hard drives engaged in during pursuit operations. The rubber seemed to disintegrate when subjected to the heat transmitted from the steel tracks.

An aggressive attitude and rapid exploitation of all successes is the keynote to maximum achievement with minimum losses. A continuous rapid advance without giving the enemy time to reorganize and get set has been found to be the best defensive strategy.

Communication agencies provided in the TO & E are not adequate to insure proper liaison between Division Headquarters and the supporting armor. During the last operation, combat units were out of contact a great deal of the time. In the rapid advance over good roads, it is believed that armored cars should supplement the light tanks and the 1/4-ton trucks. These M20 vehicles would also provide a means for establishing relay stations along the route of advance, insuring excellent communication.

It is recommended that the TO & E be changed so that two of the three medium tanks in Battalion Headquarters could be exchanged for M20 armored cars. Because of the widely dispersed locations of the combat elements, this change would provide a means for better supervision and control.

In all combat missions, it is recommended that a platoon of infantry be attached to a company of tanks. This provides better cooperation and liaison between armor and foot troops.

6 Incls.

- Incl. #1-Maps (1/200,000)
Sheets Nos. 5, 8, and 11
- Incl. #2-Maps (1/50,000)
Sheet 97 I, II

C. J. Madden
 C. J. MADDEN,
 Lt. Col, 751st Tk Bn,
 Commanding

- Incl. #3-Maps (1/25,000) Sheet 87 III, SE, SW.
- Incl. #4-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Apr '45
- Incl. #5-Overlay - Position of Elements as of 1 Apr '45
- Incl. #6-Unit Journal and File.

Appendix "A" - Casualty Statistics.

Casualties of the 751st Tank Battalion from 1 April 1945 through 30 April 1945 inclusive.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA (Hosp)</u>	<u>WIA (Not Hosp)</u>	<u>IIA (Hosp)</u>	<u>(IIA (Not Hosp)</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Company	0	0	2	0	2	0	4
Service Company	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
Company "A"	1	2	15	0	0	0	18
Company "B"	0	0	6	0	5	1	12
Company "C"	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Company "D"	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	4	2	28	1	9	3	47

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DUPS

HEADQUARTERS 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

14 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Action Against the Enemy for the month of May.

THRU : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO #464, U. S. Army.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington #25, D. C., U. S. Army.

1. In compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105, as amended by Changes #1, dated 9 March 1943, the following report of action against the enemy for the month of May is submitted:

**DOWNGRADED TO:
CLASSIFICATION REMOVED**

Map Reference: Italy - (1/200,000) Sheet Nos. 2 and 5.

BY AUTHORITY OF TAG Tom

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Summary of operations for the period
1 - 31 May

13 May 46 HSD
Date Initials

At the opening of the period, the units of this headquarters were split into two groups, Company "A" and Company "B" attached to IV Corps, in support of Legnano Group (Italian), and Company "C" and Company "D" attached to 10th Mountain Division. Displacement of the units were as follows: In support of the Legnano Group, Company "A" (less 2nd Platoon) - K630875, 2nd Platoon - K2565; Company "B" - K0568. Attached to 10th Mountain Division, Company "C" - F5291; Company "D" - F5291.

The fast moving action experienced during the previous period began to slow down considerably at the first part of the period. This was to be expected at this time because of several reasons. First, our elements were now entering a mountainous section of Italy. The enemy was able to fight a delaying action in the mountains. Second, our elements had traveled very fast across the valley and split the enemy forces. We now had to move west to prevent enemy forces from moving north. Third, during our fast moving operation, many enemy units were by-passed and the area to our flanks and rear had to be "mopped up" before proceeding further on.

On 1 May, Company "A", less the 2nd Platoon, moved to BERGAMO (K6387) in support of the Special Regiment of the Legnano Group (Italian). The 2nd Platoon of Company "A", which was attached to "Task Force Dewey", continued in the clearing of the city of MILANO. Company "A", less one platoon, moved to BRESCIA (F0568) to support the 68th Regiment of the Legnano Group. One platoon of Company "B" was in support of 1st Battalion of Special Regiment and moved to BERGAMO (K6387). This platoon returned to BRESCIA the following day and another platoon was sent on a Task Force to LAGO DI ICRO (F2589) with 1st Battalion of 68th Regiment. The Task Force returned to BRESCIA two days later.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

Company "C" began to ferry a few tanks up LAKE GARDA to by-pass tunnels on 2 May. This was a slow process and before many were gotten around, the tunnels were completely cleared and our armor started to move through en route to BOLZANO (A9772) at 1400B on 4 May. The German Armies in Italy had now surrendered and the missions of the two tank companies were to reach the Swiss-Italian and Austrian-Italian borders and to guard the border. During the night the tanks proceeded with full headlights for the first time since training days in the United States. The distance covered on first leg of journey from MLCESINE (F521921) to BOLZANO was seventy miles. BOLZANO was reached around midnight, at which point the tanks refueled and then continued on to SLUDERNO (A3993). The tanks arrived in SLUDERNO at 0600B, at which point they again refueled and rested until 1730B, 5 May.

On 6 May, road blocks were established with the mission of preventing movement of all civilians and German soldiers and protecting the Germans from Partisans.

Battalion Headquarters moved to new location vicinity MILANINO (K251741) at 041830B. On 7 May, message was received stating that Company "C" and Company "D" were to return to parent unit control upon entering IV Corps area. Movement was started and the units closed in following areas on 12 May: Company "C" at LAISE (F4567), Company "D" at BERGAMO (K6387), and Headquarters Company at MILANINO (K2574). On 15 May, Company "D" closed into MILANINO (K2574). Upon arrival, Company "D" relieved Partisan Guards on ammunition dump one mile west of NOVATE (K2271). The guard consisted of twelve men and two light tanks. The 2nd Platoon of Company "A", which supported "Task Force Dewey" on clearing up MILANO, was attached, on 16 May, to 2nd Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment, to be part of Honor Guard in the city of MILANO.

On 17 May, a call from G-3 IV Corps stated that Company "A" and Company "B" revert to control of parent unit and will start movement immediately to join rest of organization at MILANINO. This news was welcome as it had been almost a year since all the companies of the battalion had been together in one area. Tank gliders were gotten immediately and movement began the following day. Training was begun in all companies and the equipment cleaned thoroughly. A message was received on 26 May placing the battalion under operational control of Milano Military Area. This did not effect the disposition of troops, however, except in the case of Company "B", which was moved to Via Guiseppe Rovari in MILANO to be employed as Military Police in conjunction with Company "C", 101st Military Police Battalion. 6th S. A. Armored Division also assumed responsibility of the ammunition dump on this date.

On 30 May, all of our combat elements were alerted to move in thirty minutes in case disturbances increased in MILANO. The elements were relieved from alert status several hours later. Again on 31 May, one light platoon was placed on alert, but was not used and relieved from alert the same day.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

At the close of the period, all of our elements, with exception of Company "B", was attached to IV Corps and under operational control of Headquarters Milano Military Area. All of these elements were located vicinity MILANO (K2574). Company "B" was placed under further operational control of Provost Marshal IV Corps and Company "C", 101st Military Police, and was located in MILANO at Via Guiseppe Rovari.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE

Summary of Enemy Operations

1 - 31 May

The beginning of the period was marked by the apparent imminent collapse of the enemy. When official surrender occurred, the battalion assumed the role of the "big stick" for the purpose of retarding precipitous killings and to extend protection to property rights.

The Partisan elements in the city were well organized. The majority of the responsible members returned to their families when their mission was completed, leaving a "hoodlum" element to constitute the majority. This element, in turn, intimidated and generally conducted their reprisals in a malicious and disorderly fashion.

At the close of the period, the Allies display of strength and manifestation to control has accounted for the bulk of the Partisans to return into the outlying districts of the city proper.

SECTION III - SIGNAL

1. General:

Communication during the period was maintained by radio, wire and messenger.

2. Radio:

During the first quarters of the month, all companies kept radio nets open. The companies were so widely separated that it was impossible to keep contact with them on a unit command net. Company nets functioned normally and with a minimum of difficulties. Mechanical failures were at a minimum. Distance and terrain were the two main difficulties. A C-W net was maintained between Headquarters and Service Companies.

Since hostilities ceased, all radio nets have been closed. A training schedule has been put into effect for the purpose of training new personnel in procedure, operation of F. M. and A. M. radios, and in radio maintenance.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

3. Wire:

It was impossible to maintain wire communication during the first part of the period. All elements were moving too rapidly to warrant the laying of wire.

Since hostilities ceased, all units are in a fairly stable state, and extensive wire nets have been established. Wire communication to higher headquarters and to all companies during the latter half of the period proved to be very satisfactory.

4. Messenger:

Messenger service was maintained throughout the period. Scheduled runs to higher headquarters and all companies were made daily.

Distances between companies during the first half of the month made it impossible to make daily runs on schedule. Messenger service during the last half of the period was very satisfactory.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY

1. General:

During the period 1 - 31 May 1945, this organization returned to normal garrison duties. The end of the war in Italy found the S-4 section in ERESCLIA. From there, S-4 moved to BERGAMO and, later in the month, to MILANINO, near MILANO. During the first week of May, the new T/O and E was received, and the reorganization of the battalion started. Showdown inspection and final certificates on droppage for battle losses disclosed all shortages of equipment. Immediate steps were taken to replace all losses. In accordance with current regulations, new property books were issued to all companies and are now in the process of being completed. Company "C" and Company "D" were the only units of this battalion in action. Both companies took part in the campaigns in Austria and were supplied by the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. The companies returned to the battalion in the middle of May. The 1st Trucking Company of IV Corps was furnished an additional four (4) trucks with drivers for DS from this organization.

2. Rations:

All supply dumps were well in the rear but the supply of rations was regular and normal. The principal rations used during the period was the "B" type ration. All reserve rations were turned in except one day of 10 in 1 rations which were kept as reserve and are now with the kitchens of the units.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

3. Clothing:

Supply of clothing was adequate. All battle losses and salvaged clothing were replaced. Bags, sleeping wool, and excess clothing were turned in. Insect control equipment, individual and organizational, was issued.

4. Gas, Oil, and Ammunition:

The supply of fuel has been regular. The companies have now twenty (20) five-gallon cans of gasoline on hand. All excess cans were turned in. Ammunition is still being carried with the battalion. However, the shortage of organizational transportation makes the movement of ammunition difficult. It is felt that authority for the turning in of ammunition should be granted.

5. Ordnance:

General purposes vehicles were replaced while replacements for combat vehicles were not issued. A new system of handling ordnance equipment was set up by Army. The system of supporting ordnance units was discontinued and Northern Italy was divided in four sections, this battalion being served by Section IV. Because only one Ordnance Company is available, the supply of parts and the handling of maintenance work has been slow.

6. Battle Losses:

a. Ordnance:

- 2 - Tank, Medium, M4A3, w/76mm Gun.
- 3 - Watch, wrist, 7 - 9 Jewel.
- 6 - Watch, wrist, 15 Jewel.
- 10 - Binocular, M3
- 50 - Gun, sub-machine, cal. 45, M1
- 1 - Knife, Trench, M1 w/scabbard
- 3 - Light Aiming Post M14
- 2 - Tool Set, Gen. Mech.
- 1 - Gun, Mach. cal. .50 M2 HB
- 1 - Circle, Aiming, M1
- 2 - Launcher, Grenade M8

b. Signal:

- 72 - Flashlights, TL-122
- 1 - Radio, SCR-300
- 3 - Axle, RI-27
- 2 - Tool Equipment, TE-44
- 1 - Reel Unit, RI-31
- 3 - Radio Set, AN/VRC-3

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

c. CWS:

- 24 - Mask, Gas Serv.
- 79 - Respirator, Dust

d. Quartermaster:

- 31 - Jacket, Combat
- 1 - Bag, Canvas, water Ster ilizing
- 7 - Stoves, Cooking, 1 burner
- 12 - Whistles, Thunderer
- 16 - Cutters, wire
- 8 - Cot, Canvas Folding
- 1 - Tool Set, Carpenters #1
- 1 - Tent, Small wall
- 2 - Bag, Sleeping Mtn.
- 1 - Screen, Latrine

SECTION V - MAINTENANCE (MOTOR)

During the first two weeks of the period, maintenance operations consisted largely of repair, cleaning and inspecting of equipment used during the April offensive. Equipment was found to be in outstanding condition in spite of a lack of 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance necessitated by the tactical situation of the previous month.

A thorough inspection of vehicles disclosed that light tanks were in very poor condition, necessitating third and fourth echelon maintenance.

The largest problem was encountered with new style, roller-bearing type bogie wheels. The rubber on these wheels was found to be very unsatisfactory, the tire blowing with apparently no heat or abnormal pressure involved. The seals on this type of bogie also will not hold grease regardless of weight.

It was found also that the new style disc type idler (medium tanks) is not sufficiently stressed to stand the torque of normal usage. These wheels cracked about an inch from the rim completely around the circumference. Welding was found to be only a temporary repair.

There was almost a complete lack of repair parts issued during the first two weeks of the month, with the situation improving slightly during the latter two weeks.

Concentrated efforts of first echelon maintenance were made by all companies.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

SECTION VI - PERSONNAL

1. Awards:

Silver Star

Clayton, William A. S Sgt 34 169 116 Co "A"

Oak Leaf Cluster to Bronze Star

MADDEN, C. J. MAJOR 0 250 761 CO, 751st Tk Bn

Bronze Star

MOYER, WENDELL M. CAPT. 01 013 020 Hq Co

2. Casualty List:

K.I.A.

*Boles, Orin K.	Sgt	35 020 951	Co "D"	23 April 1945
*Bailey, Vernon J.	Pfc	39 683 415	Co "D"	23 April 1945
*Hill, Donald E.	Pfc	35 682 752	Hq Co	28 April 1945
*Grubiak, Frank	Pvt	32 681 700	Hq Co	28 April 1945
*Travis, Edwin	Pvt	38 658 105	Co "B"	22 April 1945
*Zielinski, Frank Jr.	Pvt	33 901 698	Hq Co	28 April 1945

M.I.A.

None

W.I.A. (Hospitalized)

*HERNANDES, FRANCIS A. 1ST LT 01 016 506 Hq Co 28 April 1945

W.I.A. (Not Hospitalized)

I.I.A. (Hospitalized and Not Hospitalized)

None

* Not reported at time prior report was submitted.

NOTE: Albrewczynski, Joseph S. and Cope, Johnnie B. reported MIA on prior report was changed to KIA on date men were reported MIA.

Androwski, Stanley F. reported WIA (Hospitalized) on prior report, died of wounds on 27 April 1945.

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Report of Action for month of May, Cont'd.

3. Comments:

a. In compliance with theatre policies, a program to improve and perfect the records of this organization was set in motion.

b. All key personnel with a high adjusted service rating score were given an understudy with a low adjusted service rating score. This plan has already proven its worth. Men who have gone home are now replaced with competent successors. Using this plan, there will not be any time when this organization cannot function efficiently.

SECTION VII - COMMENTS

After the cessation of hostilities, there was a brief period of transition in which the organization changed from a combat status to a rehabilitation-unit training program. Maintenance, discipline, and administration were stressed. All personnel were completely reequipped and the vehicles were inspected, repaired and repainted. Every effort was made to review the history and combat performance of the Battalion in order to obtain a high "Esprit de Corps".

An intensive training program was established for the training of the new replacements. All fundamentals were stressed and the individuals tested. Athletics and recreation was given a place of paramount importance in the schedule.

C. J. Madden
C. J. MADDEN,
Lt. Col, 751st Tk Bn,
Commanding

3 Incls.

Incl. #1-Maps (1/200,000)
Sheets Nos. 2 and 5

Incl. #2-Overlay - Position of elements as of 1 May 1945

Incl. #3-Unit Journal and File.

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ARMY GROUND FORCES BOARD
MTOUSA

Report No. 481

~~TOP SECRET~~
16 June 1945

REPORT OF ACTION OF 751ST TANK BATTALION
DURING PO VALLEY OFFENSIVE

(Reported by Colonel T. Q. Donaldson, Jr., Cavalry)

Observer's Note: 1. The attached Report of Action of the 751st Tank Battalion during the period 14 April - 4 May 1945, (Po Valley Offensive) was obtained from Lt. Colonel C. J. Madden, the battalion commander.

2. For this operation, as on previous occasions, the 751st Tank Battalion was attached to the 10th Mountain Division, of the IV Corps, Fifth Army. Despite slow progress occasioned by the mountainous terrain, during the first few days after the jump-off of the 10th Mountain Division, the tanks gradually increased their pace and support of the infantry troops until, on the morning of 20 April 1945, tank companies of this battalion were the first to cut Highway No. 9, the life-line of the German forces.

3. For its outstanding performance, the 3d platoon of Company "B" was commended for meritorious performance of duty by the Army Commander, (General L. K. Truscott). Major General George F. Hays, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, also commended all members of the battalion. This commendation being indorsed and further commended by the IV Corps Commander, Major General W. D. Crittenberger.

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"C" and Company "D" assembled in Malcesine (519907). No progress was made on the main lake road during the rest of April. One platoon from both Company "C" and Company "D" was sent to vicinity Pesina (471727) to report to 37th Mountain Regiment, but were shortly returned to company assembly area on 30 April. One platoon of Company "C" supported a landing made by one company of 85th Mountain Regiment on western shore of Lake Garda.

Company "A" and Company "B" were detached 85th Infantry Division and placed in support of the Legnano Group (Italian) on 30 April. The companies moved to vicinity Monichiari (F180530) to join the group. Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion was detached 10th Mountain Division and attached to IV Corps. Battalion Headquarters moved to join IV Corps Headquarters northeast of Milano (K325745).

Company "A" moved to Bergamo (K6387) with the 1st and 3rd platoons, and the 2nd platoon moved into Milano (K2565) with a task force. Company "B" moved to Brescia (K0568). One platoon of Company "B" moved with Goito Battalion to Bergamo, but returned to Brescia on the afternoon of 2 April. There was still no change in disposition of Company "C" and Company "D" when hostilities ended in Italy.

COMBAT LESSONS

1. Technique to particular or unusual situation.

a. In advancing upon an objective, a platoon of medium tanks encountered an obvious hasty mine field. The platoon leader estimated and established the pattern of the field, whereupon, he cautiously led one vehicle completely through the obstacle. Thereafter, the other vehicles were instructed to follow in the tracks established by the lead vehicle. This technique permitted the platoon to safely secure their objective with the minimum amount of delay.

2. Methods employed for tank-infantry cooperation and instance of use of tub plane.

a. Upon approaching the Po River, the air OP reported enemy ambulances crossing the river in the vicinity of the sector occupied by the light tank company. The subject company proceeded to the designated point and captured an enemy motor pool of approximately fifty vehicles and an enemy ferry site.

b. In view of limited and obstructed vision characteristics of tanks, the infantryman can assist the tankster in locating targets. A platoon leader of Company "A" reports that he was compelled to button up because of heavy enemy HE fire. An alert doughboy, in a position to observe the location of the enemy gun, fired tracers in the direction of the gun. The tank gunner by this aid was able to bring counter-fire upon the enemy and destroy him.

c. Infantry riding tanks is a cooperative and effective means of travel. The tank platoon leaders suggest, however, that the infantryman refrain from riding the front of the tanks for the reason that vision is obstructed and they are unnecessarily exposing themselves. The infantrymen should be

instructed not to place their packs over the air-intake vent cover as this tends toward overheating the engine.

3. Organization and employment of armored teams and task forces.

a. In composing a task force, the armor should not be dispersed so as to hinder its control and the basic tactical principle of operating in sections of two or more vehicles. When advancing at night, the armor should not be in the advance element. On the night of 22 April 1945, a platoon of medium tanks, part of a task force, were moving in the general direction of Mirandola. The tank platoon leader was compelled to place his command tank at the point of the force and his remaining tanks interspaced well back in the column. The platoon leader's justifiable complaint was that tanks should not have been used in the designated position for tanks are relatively blind at night and an easy prey to infantry AT weapons; the platoon was completely separated, and consequently weakened and so placed that they could not be controlled as a unit.

4. Brief accounts of individual initiative and leadership displayed by junior officers.

a. Recent operations afforded the opportunity to appraise the qualities of leadership and initiative in platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers. One company commander reports that a platoon leader in his company invariably arrived on his objective with all his vehicles while the other two officers would straggle in with two or three vehicles. The good platoon leader insisted that his crews performed the necessary maintenance on their tanks whenever it was within their scope. Other platoon leaders allowed vehicles to fall behind for trivial mechanical failures which could have easily been corrected by the crews themselves.

b. In a fast moving situation, company maintenance and supply must remain as close to the combat platoons as possible. This was true in one particular company. As soon as the tanks and infantry cleared an objective, the maintenance officer moved on to it. By this method a high percentage of that company's tanks remained in action, fully serviced.

c. On one occasion, a radio repairman remained in the turret of a tank fixing a defective radio, while the tank was engaged in a fire fight with the enemy.

d. A tank in one of the companies ran out of gas while in enemy territory. The platoon leader kept the crew in the tank constantly traversing the turret as though searching for a target. In a short time, twenty-six (26) Germans came out of the nearby woods and surrendered.

COMMENTS

The new synthetic rubber bogie wheels did not hold up under the long hard drives engaged in during pursuit operations. The rubber seemed to disintegrate when subjected to the heat transmitted from the steel tracks.

An aggressive attitude and rapid exploitation of all successes is the keynote to maximum achievement with minimum losses. A continuous rapid advance

RESTRICTED

started movement to 85th Infantry Division sector. Upon arrival, Company "A" was attached to 338th Infantry Regiment.

The attack with 10th Mountain Division was resumed the following morning with Company "D" and 2nd platoon of Company "A" with "TF DUFF" and Company "C" supporting main body. The objective was to secure bridgehead vicinity Camatta (598128) which is on Po River near S. Benedetto Po. This advance on 22 April was even more spectacular than the advance of the previous day. The advance was faster, more equipment captured, and more prisoners captured. Prisoners were lining the roads, marching in large groups without guard to the prisoner of war cages. The enemy was confused and did not know which way to turn. German convoys were found turning into our own main-axis route. One armored column of Company "C" was moving north when two enemy tanks and a flak wagon pulled into another column moving north on parallel road three hundred yards away. The enemy tanks turned and fired on our column. Our tanks then turned their guns and destroyed the two tanks and flak wagon. One other tank of Company "C" captured a tank complete with crew. As the tank turned to fire at the enemy vehicle, the crew jumped out and surrendered.

On the morning of 23 April, Company "C" and Company "D" supported the crossing of the Po River by 10th Mountain Division vicinity 6012, near S. Benedetto Po, from the south bank of the river. Enemy artillery fire was very intense. Company "A" and Company "B" supported the advance of the 337th Regiment, objective of Company "A" and Company "B" being Quingentole (6709) and Revere (7411) respectively. Around mid-day, air OP dropped a note stating approximately forty (40) enemy vehicles were attempting to cross Po River at 6413. One platoon from Company "D" moved immediately to the point and captured twelve (12) prisoners and fifty (50) vehicles waiting for evacuation by ferry boat across river. The cable crossing was intact, but the ferry boat was blown on opposite side of river soon after the tanks captured the point. The light tanks guarded the cable crossing until infantry and engineers arrived several hours later. During the night 23 - 24 April, Company "D" furnished six road blocks to the south and southeast of Benedetto Po in conjunction with the tank destroyers. Company "C" remained on alert to move and assist the 10th Antitank Battalion to the west and southwest. The next morning the light tanks patrolled road net to the northwest, west, and southwest.

At this time, infantry of the 10th Mountain Division had crossed the Po River in boats, but no bridges had been completed for tanks. The tanks were placed in assembly areas near point of crossing. Later, the process of ferrying tanks across river was begun, but this was a slow process.

The 13th Tank Battalion of the 1st Armored Division was attached to 10th Mountain Division, with plans for the armored battalion to be the assault force with 86th Mountain Regiment. This assault group was designated "Task Force Darby". The mission of Company "C" and Company "D" was to advance with assault group and provide road blocks along route. The Division mission was to seize and hold Verona (6555).

In the meantime, Company "B" supported the crossing of the Po River by 85th Infantry Division vicinity Quingentole (6709). Company "A" received orders to move entire company west, to vicinity Gonzaga (4901) to stop reported enemy tank column operating toward the northeast. Upon arrival near Gonzaga,

the column was identified as being elements of 1st Armored Division. Company "A" did not return to Cuingentole, but instead moved to assembly area vicinity S. Benedetto Po to await crossing of Po River. Company "B" also began movement to an assembly area near S. Benedetto Po preparatory to crossing the Po River, as there were to be no bridges to support tanks built across Po River in 85th Infantry Division sector.

Orders were received for one platoon of Company "D" and for one section of tanks from Company "C" to be moved across by ferry with top priority. These were to be used as security for troops already across river, as no tanks had crossed river. This was accomplished. After crossing river, the platoon of lights and section of mediums moved out with 85th Mountain Regiment during night to secure IP for 13th Tank Battalion and 86th Mountain Regiment. Little or no resistance was met so the Commanding General ordered the advance until stopped by enemy resistance. At noon on 25 April, this column was reported vicinity S. Lucia (491325) on Highway No. 64 about half the distance to the objective. Our light tanks and two medium tanks continued to advance on the objective because all of the 13th Tank Battalion was not across river and the battalion commander did not wish to commit only part of his organization. These tanks continued to spearhead the advance until Villa Franca (5345) was reached. Enemy elements vicinity airfield offered some resistance. Our tanks destroyed one (1) Focke Wolfe, six (6) trucks, four (4) antitank guns, and captured fifteen (15) prisoners.

It was the night of 25 - 26 April when Company "A", Company "C", and Company "D" finally crossed the river. Company "B" crossed the river on the morning of 26 April and joined the 338th Infantry Regiment at Verona (6554) and went into an assembly area on the south side of Verona (6554). Company "C" and Company "D" immediately formed necessary road blocks on route, and Company "A" moved northeast, joined the 338th Infantry Regiment vicinity Vigasio (6041), supported their advance to Verona (6554), and went into an assembly area southwest of Verona.

Orders were received from 10th Mountain Division stating Company "C" and Company "D" were released from road blocks and ordered to assemble south of Villa Franca (530450) and prepare to support 27th Mountain Regiment in their advance. The two companies assembled and moved out with 87th Mountain Regiment to vicinity Sandra (489575). This point was reached during night and road blocks were formed.

The 10th Mountain Division formed a plan which stated the division would advance twenty-four hours a day by rotating the three regiments for eight-hour periods, and by rotating the tanks of the 751st Tank Battalion with the tank destroyers of 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion for twelve-hour periods. 751st Tank Battalion drew the night assignment with hours from 2000B to 0800B. During the twelve-hour rest period, the tanks were to furnish necessary road blocks. The plan was put into effect on 27 April with Company "C" and Company "D" forming road blocks until it was necessary to start movement up the Lake Garda road to vicinity Garda (433702) to relieve 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Company "C" and Company "D" made good progress during the night, but were stopped by demolition during the early morning vicinity Navene (544948). Our tanks were promptly relieved by 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company

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HEADQUARTERS 751ST TANK BATTALION
APO #464, U. S. ARMY

REPORT OF ACTION - 14 April - 4 May 1945

OPERATIONS

The 751st Tank Battalion was attached to the 10th Mountain Division for the operation which was scheduled for 12 April. The plans for the employment of the armor with the Division, which consisted of armor from Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion and Headquarters 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, were for each organization to attach one company to each regiment. The armor of each regiment would be divided into two forces, and each unit would support one assault battalion. Each of the companies, except Company "D", attached one platoon of 75mm guns to the tank destroyer company operating with the same regiment, and in turn received one platoon of three-inch tank destroyer guns. Company "A" was attached to 87th Mountain Regiment, Company "B" to 85th Mountain Regiment, and Company "C" to 86th Mountain Regiment. Company "D" was placed in Division reserve subject to attachment, on Division order, to a pursuit group consisting of 3rd Battalion of 86th Mountain Regiment, 10th Mountain Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, and Reconnaissance Company of 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

All of our units closed into final assembly areas, near line of departure, on the night of 11 - 12 April. The unit locations were as follows: Company "A" - 618244, Company "B" - 605249, Company "C" - 637237, and Company "D" - 594229.

Several postponements were made, and the final attack began on the morning of 14 April. The first day of the attack was a bitter day. The tanks made very slow progress because of the bad terrain. Engineers had to repair or build a road almost every foot of the distance the tanks covered. The tracks on many tanks were thrown trying to move in this mountainous terrain. As a result, the tanks were not able to give the infantry close support, but were able to give initial support from high ground. The infantry suffered high casualties and made slow progress during the first day, taking only a few of the objectives. The enemy seemed determined to remain in his well prepared defenses, taking advantage of the tanks not being able to give close support to the infantry.

During the second day of the attack, the tank columns moved a little faster, but still the progress was slow at various points and the tanks were still not able to give close support. It was not until the third day, that the tanks were able to "break loose" and attack in front of the infantry. Company "A" was the first to accomplish this on the assault of Tole (6532). At this time, Company "C" was being halted by demolition just south of point where Company "A" was able to advance without engineer assistance. The road was later repaired and Company "C" moved up in position vicinity Tole. Company "D" was ordered to move to an area just south of Tole.

On the morning of 17 April, Company "A", supporting one battalion of 87th Mountain Regiment, attacked toward San Prospero (665236). It was expected

that little resistance would be met, but the attack was a bitter one. Because of the terrain, only a small number of tanks could be employed at one time. The tanks received direct antitank fire, artillery fire, and heavy mortar fire. Several tanks were lost. One tank blocked the road at a point so that other tanks could not move around it. Another route was found, however, and the tanks moved on to the objective. Hundreds of prisoners were taken on this objective. Company "C", at the same time, was making fast progress to the north and north-east of Tole. The company had a "Field Day" killing many Germans and capturing hundreds of prisoners. Company "B", with the 85th Mountain Regiment, was protecting the left flank up to a point south of Tole. Orders were received, however, detaching company from 10th Mountain Division and attaching it to 337th Infantry Regiment of 85th Infantry Division.

On the morning of 18 April, Company "A" and Company "C" continued the attack further on to the north and northeast. Stiff resistance was still being met. Several tanks were lost. The terrain had improved considerably for use of tanks, but we were still in the mountains and movement was restricted. Company "D" was attached to 86th Mountain Regiment and placed in support of 1st Battalion. On the night of 18 - 19 April, Company "B" assembled in area vicinity 712333, and Company "C" was placed in Division reserve with 86th Mountain Regiment.

In the late afternoon of the following day, orders were received to assemble all units, except Company "B", immediately, to exploit breakthrough to Po Valley. Company "D" was attacking during the day along the main axis of advance, and at close of day was north of the assembly area for the tanks. Company "A" and Company "C" assembled vicinity 7643 and were reserviced prior to hour of attack which was scheduled for the morning of 20 April.

The attack was made on the morning of 20 April. The advance to the Po Valley was rapid with our tank companies being the first to cut highway No. 9 near Ponte Samoggia (733567). A number of enemy tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed and large artillery pieces captured. On the capture of Highway No. 9, German forces were split and many "cut off". Large groups of prisoners began to surrender in groups. For the tank companies, the prisoners became a problem. It was apparent that the cutting of Highway No. 9 was the "breakthrough" and advantage thereof was taken immediately.

Advantage was taken of the situation. During the night, task force was formed around Company "D" with the mission of moving and seizing Bomparto Bridge (6575). This task force was "TF DUFF" and consisted of Company "D", one company engineers, one battalion of infantry, and one platoon of tank destroyers. The main force, with the same mission as the task force, consisted of Company "A" with 86th Mountain Regiment, and Company "C" with 85th Mountain Regiment. The task force passed the IP at 0700B, and the main force, one hour later on 21 April. The advance was rapid, moving initially over the secondary roads, thereby, by-passing possible strong points along main routes of advance and around large towns. At the same time, Company "B" was supporting the 337th Infantry Regiment of 85th Infantry Division on right of 10th Mountain Division in vicinity 773545.

Orders were received for Company "A" to report to Commanding General, 85th Infantry Division. The company was assembled (less 2nd Platoon) and

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without giving the enemy time to reorganize and get set has been found to be the best defensive strategy.

Communication agencies provided in the TO & E are not adequate to insure proper liaison between division headquarters and the supporting armor. During the last operation, combat units were out of contact a great deal of the time. In the rapid advance over good roads, it is believed that armored cars should supplement the light tanks and the $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks. These M20 vehicles would also provide a means for establishing relay stations along the route of advance, insuring excellent communication.

It is recommended that the TO & E be changed so that two of the three medium tanks in battalion headquarters could be exchanged for M20 armored cars. Because of the widely dispersed locations of the combat elements, this change would provide a means for better supervision and control.

In all combat missions, it is recommended that a platoon of infantry be attached to a company of tanks. This provides better cooperation and liaison between armor and foot troops.

The assignment of surplus personnel prior to the period of actual operations proved to be highly successful. The ready presence of casualty replacements with the organization permitted the combat elements to retain full combat strength at all times, and consequently sustained the combat efficiency of the battalion.

The availability of replacements eliminated the demoralizing practice of switching and juggling crews as casualties occurred. This fact contributed to a great extent in upholding splendid fighting spirit of the personnel.

/s/ C. J. Madden
/t/ C. J. MADDEN
Lt. Col, 751st Tank Bn,
Commanding.