

CHAPTER IV * * * * *

Army Staff Operations

ORGANIZING, equipping, supplying, controlling, and “fighting” a modern army in the field requires the sweat and toil of every individual member of it. This applies not only to every officer and man who is assigned directly to one of its combat or service units but also to every individual member of the various staffs which plan and direct the activities of those units. Experience has demonstrated only too plainly that the performance of a military organization can be either greatly helped or greatly hindered by the way its staff functions. The staff of Fifth Army, with long experience in combat, had been organized best to meet the problems that faced it and had learned to function smoothly and efficiently.

In addition to the four standard general staff sections — 1, 2, 3, and 4 — and the usual special staff sections Fifth Army operated with a number of other sections which had been found necessary for special needs. One other numbered section — G-5 — was added to deal with the multiplicity of problems of civil administration in occupied territory, as were several specially organized operating sections. Besides its American personnel the Army Headquarters included British, French, and Italian increments, which assisted in the supervision of the administration of troops of those nationalities which were assigned to the Army. These increments were incorporated in and functioned as an integral part of the headquarters in all dealings with their respective units. In the British Increment, which was the largest, the British personnel in many cases worked with the Americans within the frame of our staff system; the British system of supply and administration, however, differed too greatly from American practice for complete integration in the G-1 and G-4 sections. When General Truscott assumed command of Fifth Army he instituted both a regular daily and a weekly meeting of the chiefs of all staff sections, at which each section chief submitted a report on the activities of his section for the preceding 24-hour or 7-day period, respectively. Thus each staff section obtained a knowledge and un-

derstanding of the problems and operations of all other sections through which it could intelligently coordinate its activities with relation to them.

Several changes were made in the staff organization prior to the spring offensive. A new special staff section, the armored fighting vehicle section, was established on 22 February. This section was made responsible from the staff point of view for all matters pertaining to armored equipment and weapons and for recommendations regarding their employment. Other duties prescribed for the section were the assembling of information concerning the status of armor in the Army and the availability of trained replacements for crews. The section chief was placed in charge of all armored vehicle schools, was to supervise tests and experiments with armor, and was to establish policies concerning adoption of modifications for such vehicles, as well as screening all requests for equipment peculiar to armored units and recommending priorities for issue of matériel.

A. OPERATION OF THE G-3 SECTION

The G-3 section was made up of six subdivisions: operations, planning, organization, air-ground liaison, training, and information and education. The first four of these subsections were maintained at the command post, while the other two were located at the Army rear echelon. The head of the section was Col. Ben Harrell. As assistant chief of staff, G-3, he coordinated the work of the subsections and acted as a chief adviser to the Army commander on operational matters. The executive of the section administered and supervised the operations of the subsections, freeing the section chief of matters that did not require his personal decision. Information, requests, and other pertinent business which fell within the scope of his responsibility cleared through the executive, who either discussed it with the G-3 beforehand or assigned it directly to the proper subsection for action before its presentation to the G-3 in final form. Each morning the executive held a meeting of the subsection heads to discuss the work on hand. (*See Annex No. 4H.*) Each evening at 2200 he prepared a brief summary of the day's activity in the section. Another of his functions was the supervision of a monitoring switchboard which was set up whenever the situation permitted. At this switchboard stenographers obtained verbatim all telephone conversations and thereby retained an exact record of business transacted.

The operational nerve center of the Army was located in the operations subsection of G-3. Into the "war room" maintained by its personnel flowed reports from the divisions, corps, and separate units of the Army. Locations of friendly and enemy troops, reports of results of battle, and future plans and intentions were col-

lected and maintained up to date on maps and charts. Reports from the corps were received every 6 hours, and more often during periods of intensive action. These situation reports (sitreps) (*See Annex No. 4E*) followed a standardized three-paragraph form. The first part pictured the actual development of operations; the second listed the commander's intentions; the third indicated changes in the location of command posts or changes in attachment of troops. Twice daily, at 0300 and 1500, the G-3 operations subsection compiled Army sitreps for submission to 15th Army Group. In addition a daily summary of operations, a semimonthly report, and monthly reports were prepared.

Various types of information maps were kept in the war room. These maps included not only information compiled in the G-3 section but also all other data obtained from other sections necessary to a complete understanding of the situation at any time. The master map indicated graphically each friendly move, contemplated move, and all reported enemy action. This map covered the entire Army sector on scales of both 1/50,000 and 1/100,000 and was repeated on portable sections on a scale of 1/25,000. Other maps listed all unit boundaries and areas on a 1/200,000 scale, showed the location of anti-aircraft defenses and fire plans, and outlined the status of various types of signal communication and line routes. A 1/50,000 scale transportation map showed at a glance the status of movements and transportation; another map gave the targets which had been or were to be bombed by the air force at the request of the Army. In addition to the war room maps, other maps were maintained for the personal use of the Army Commander and the chief of staff. A complete duplicate set of the war room maps was kept in the liaison room to which liaison officers from the various units contributed and from which they could at any time obtain the complete Army picture for their respective commanders.

In addition to reports received by telephone, radio, teletype, or in written form, information on operations was also obtained through the monitoring of radio nets, reports of liaison officers, and staff visits. Signal Intelligence and Monitoring (SIAM) platoons were attached to the headquarters of the divisions. These units listened in on the radio nets of the divisions to which they were sent to assist as well as to pass on to Army and corps — sometimes hours ahead of the time such information would proceed through normal channels — reports of progress being made by lower units to division headquarters. Liaison officers from each division and corps operated between the Army headquarters and their respective units. Each morning at 0930 representatives of the Army staff sections briefed the liaison officers at Army headquarters. The officers then took the information thus obtained to their own organizations, returning to Army headquarters in the evening with the information of unit operations they gathered during the day. Their reports for the most part duplicated the sitrep news, but often valuable additional intelligence was received

through them. These officers were available during the night as well as at all other times while at Army headquarters to act as officer messengers.

The operations subsection of G-3 processed all orders for subordinate units, even though many of the orders originated in the planning subsection. The brief operations instruction type of directive was used for all but operations requiring explicit instructions in great detail. In these cases a formal field order was issued. The operations subsection functioned 24 hours per day. During the winter months three American and one British duty officer rotated through the shifts, since the war room was usually as busy throughout the night as it was during daylight. The officer on duty between 1600 and 2400 supervised the preparation of and was responsible for the issuance of the daily G-3 report (*Annex No. 4C*), and posted onto the maps all information contained in the incoming sitreps. The duty officer on the 0001 to 0800 shift received the last light reports from front-line units and information regarding activity of the night's patrols and was responsible for transmitting the 0300 report to higher headquarters.

The chief function of the planning subsection, based on directives on projected future operations from the Army commander, was to foresee and prepare plans for all possible operations within the Army zone. When a directive for a certain project, giving its scope and assumptions, was received by the subsection from the Army commander or from the G-3, representatives from each staff section who made up the Army planning committee were called in and in turn given a planning directive indicating the pertinent studies required of them. On the basis of the most thorough study by the sections, plans for the particular operation were drawn, but only after careful studies of aerial photographs, records, maps, and terrain models had been made. As a result several possible methods for carrying out each specific operation were devised and presented to the Army commander for his consideration. These outline plans would then be discussed and defended by the committee in conference with the Army commander and the chiefs of staff sections. As an outcome one or more lines of action would follow: (1) operations instructions would be issued; (2) a draft outline plan would be disseminated; (3) subordinate units would be directed to prepare plans for their projected part in the proposed operation; or (4) the plan would be placed on file for future use.

All information which might affect future operations was available to this subsection, ranging from the present expenditure of ammunition to programs for relief and resting of units. Anything which had any bearing on the Army potential for a given operation was considered. Often, as a result of the studies of the planning subsection, factors developed which were passed directly to corps and other units to enable them to round out their plans and fit them more closely into the Army picture. Operations plans prepared by lower units were examined and evaluated to the plan-

ning group in the interest of coordinated action; findings and recommendations would then be dispatched to the units for their use.

The organization subsection of G-3, working closely with other general staff and special staff sections of the headquarters, was charged with the preparation of assignment, attachment, and movement orders and in conjunction with the adjutant general section produced the weekly station list of Army troops. The subsection also directed and supervised the many changes in organization as well as all matters connected with activation or inactivation of units. It was often necessary to obtain additional units or units of a new type for the Army. If these were not available through reassignment within the theater, the only alternative was to activate them. Due to the manpower ceiling, this often involved giving up dissimilar units of equal strength and disbanding or inactivating them in order to produce the required number of troop spaces for activation of the desired new type units. All requests for such action were coordinated by the organization subsection.

The training subsection was charged with the supervision of training and checked programs and schedules to see that they were properly drawn to prepare troops for whatever job they might be required to do. It conducted frequent inspections of training and kept careful records of the state of readiness of units for their contemplated missions. This subsection coordinated and controlled all training areas and aided units in the procurement of training aids and materials, special equipment, ammunition, and training teams. A special task during the winter was the supervision of the Brazilian replacement training center. The subsection also established schools for specialized training whenever the need existed and allocated vacancies for Army personnel at schools operated by other commands.

Placed under the G-3 section in the fall of 1944 was the air-ground liaison subsection, link between the Army and XXII Tactical Air Command (TAC), which furnished air support for the ground operations of the Army. (*For further information on air-ground cooperation see Annex No. 5.*) A daily conference between the Army commander or his representative in his absence and the chief air-ground liaison officer was held, at which the Army needs for air support were determined and requests for fighter-bomber missions were formulated. The subsection also coordinated "Rover Joe" missions of tactical aircraft. This subsection was composed of two groups, the air-ground information center and ground liaison teams, the number of which varied according to the situation. The main mission of the information center, located near and operating closely with G-3 operations, was to act as a clearing house to receive and disseminate air-ground information, notifying the air forces of the intentions of ground units and keeping the Army informed as to the plans of air units. It received and processed from subordinate units requests for air support and also was responsible for the establishment and observance of the army bomb safety line.

The ground liaison teams operated either with a forward fighter controller — “Rover Joe” — or at an airfield with an air force group which was working in direct support of the Army. The teams with the forward controller filtered requests for air support received from forward units. If accepted, the requests were passed on to the air corps for action. The liaison teams also kept the forward controller informed of locations of ground troops, ground plans, and activities, while ground units in turn were informed of air plans. Information of both air and ground plans and situations in the teams’ individual sectors was forwarded continuously to the air-ground information center. The teams at the airfields kept the air units abreast of the ground situation, briefed pilots on the location of friendly and enemy installations, informed the air-ground information center of the results of air operations, and passed on to the center any important observations made by returning air crews. (See *Annex No. 41.*)

B. *FUNCTIONING OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION*

The G-2 (intelligence) section of the Fifth Army staff as it functioned in the Apennine Mountains was evolved not only from “the book” but from the experiences of an Army which had been engaged for more than 1½ years in intensive combat operations. Basically the staff functioned according to “the book” with certain changes which had been found desirable. The section was divided into six main subsections: combat intelligence, counterintelligence, signal intelligence, air liaison, defense and target, and administration, operating under the assistant chief of staff, G-2, Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Howard.

The primary mission of the combat intelligence subsection was to assemble and evaluate all information received from immediate sources during the progress of combat operations; however, all subsections were tied so closely to combat intelligence that usually the point where actual combat intelligence ceased and long-range intelligence began was hard to determine. This long-range or strategic intelligence was furnished in large part by higher command echelons. It was quite likely, however, that Army might obtain strategic intelligence through tactical intelligence sources just as tactical knowledge might be received from agencies directed primarily on long-range missions. Closest liaison and mutual exchange of intelligence were maintained between the Army and its corps and divisions as well as with Eighth Army, 15th Army Group, and other headquarters.

The combat intelligence subsection with its staff of seven officers received the reports which were customarily sent in three times daily from the corps and separate

divisions. These intelligence summaries (ISUMS) (*Annex No. 4G*) covered the day's activity in three reports, one including the period 0730-1330, one the period 1330-1900, and one the period 1900-0730 the following morning. The summaries listed the general operations in which the corps units participated and contained factual accounts of enemy operations and reactions. Identifications of enemy units were listed. In the event of the first positive identification of an enemy unit this news was immediately sent in "flash" form, since one item of this type might have an important bearing on operational planning. Communication was for the most part by teletype, but was supplemented by telephone and radio. The daily Army summary of the enemy situation was compiled from these reports plus additional information obtained from the other sources available at headquarters. In this summary were listed the activities of various components of the hostile army and the enemy order of battle, including an overlay showing the known disposition of his forces. (*See Annex No. 4B.*)

Working under the combat intelligence subsection was the order of battle group, where all the knowledge of German units was assembled and kept up to date. The order of battle personnel maintained running accounts of the strength of enemy units, their armaments, and their personalities. A file containing the names of approximately 8,000 German officers was maintained by means of which it was often possible to secure the identification of an enemy organization. Attached to the order of battle group was a small detachment of document experts from AFHQ. All papers captured with prisoners of war or captured or found in other localities were examined by this unit, which could thus obtain field post numbers, personalities, and occasionally vital information from letters as well as from official documents. During some phases of the Italian campaign, when large numbers of prisoners were being taken and many installations overrun, the document group received as many as five mail sacks of captured letters and documents each day.

Other sources of intelligence which were assembled and catalogued by the combat intelligence subsection were reports from the Office of Strategic Services, which sent secret agents behind the enemy lines; photo reconnaissance; air tactical reconnaissance, including observations made by bomber crews and other long-distance fliers who were especially briefed to be on the lookout for news of importance to ground forces; and counterbattery reports from corps and divisions. A great deal of information was derived from prisoner of war statements, captured documents, escaped ex-prisoners of war, civilians, and refugees. Trained interrogators of prisoners of war (IPW) extracted from the enemy soldiers varying types of information at different levels. At regimental level the prisoners were usually asked only to identify their own units, those troops adjacent to them, and the location of the enemy weapons on the immediate front. At divisions and corps the IPW personnel

dug deeper into the prisoner's background; at the Army prisoner of war cages every possible scrap of information was obtained from him, including such strategic items as the state of morale both at home and in the army, improvement of weapons, location of supply dumps, and other similar pertinent subjects. These IPW reports were submitted daily to the Army G-2 office, which shunted the information contained to appropriate sections and other units.

The "eyes" of the intelligence section — which saw many things that could not possibly be observed from forward ground positions or from artillery observation planes which did not dare go far behind the enemy's front lines — fell into two groups: the tactical reconnaissance (Tac/R) aircraft and the photo reconnaissance unit (PRU) planes. The two differed widely, tactical reconnaissance being confined largely to information gathered visually. The tactical reconnaissance Spitfires and P-51's, equipped with vertical cameras, occasionally were utilized to obtain photos of small, important areas to supplement PRU coverage. The Tac/R planes flew at an average altitude of 6,500 feet, whereas the PRU aircraft normally ranged three times as high and thus obtained much more inclusive photographic cover. Vertical Tac/R photos were suitable for pin-point localities such as individual bridges or road blocks, and for supplementing the pilot's visual reconnaissance over a suspected area.

Flying in pairs, one member of the Tac/R team observed ground activity while the other provided protection against surprise attack by enemy aircraft. In addition to their normal reconnaissance missions, planes of the tactical reconnaissance squadrons adjusted targets for long-range heavy artillery and spotted for naval gunfire directed against land targets. The method by which the Tac/R operated in Fifth Army grew out of experience in the Italian campaign and differed in certain details from that described in manuals, chiefly by the centralization of all Army missions under the control of G-2. The air officer with the G-2 section received all requests for coverage from corps and divisions, determined which ones best served Army requirements, and requested the missions from XXII TAC, which retained operational control of the reconnaissance squadrons. The number of missions varied according to the Army frontage, the number of corps making up the Army, the Tac/R missions required by the air force for its own use, and the general situation. When the requests of the subordinate units were received, the air officer at Army headquarters coordinated and combined them wherever possible, assigned priorities, and then made contact with the squadrons directly, informally discussing the Army situation and explaining why certain coverage was desired.

This close coordination between Army headquarters and the air force produced excellent results. It enabled the air officer to check and coordinate the requests against information already obtained from all the other sources available to G-2, avoided repetition and duplication, and insured immediate coverage in cases of oper-

ational urgency; also the air officer at Army headquarters was in the best position to allot mission priorities to corps and apportion artillery adjustment missions in accordance with the over-all Army situation. Information obtained by the aircraft was disseminated by radio. Although wire communication was maintained between the Army and the reconnaissance squadrons, results obtained by the pilot were broadcast to Army by radio as soon as he had returned and been interrogated. This information was broadcast in the clear, and divisions and corps by monitoring this net were able to obtain the information as soon as the G-2 section. The reports were later transmitted by wire.

Owing to the great speed of the planes and the low altitudes at which they operated, the visual reconnaissance of the Tac/R aircraft was limited to readily seen movements on enemy roads or railroads, to road blocks, blown bridges, and guns in the very act of firing. The squadron supporting Fifth Army generally covered the area south of the Po River during the winter stalemate. Where the Tac/R cover ended, the detailed photographs obtained by the P-38's of the PRU provided the necessary information. These unarmed and unarmored aircraft cruised at altitudes varying between 20,000 and 23,000 feet and were normally equipped with twin cameras of 24-inch focal length, providing prints 9 inches square on an average scale of 1/11,000. The PRU squadron contained some aircraft fitted with 6-inch and 12-inch focal length oblique cameras which faced to either side or forward, or all 3 directions at once for photographs taken on runs at an elevation of less than 7,000 feet. One B-25 was used for taking oblique shots behind and along the front lines with 12-inch, 24-inch, or even 40-inch focal length cameras.

Again control was centered at Army G-2 headquarters, to which the commander of PRU was directly attached. Normally advanced planning at Army level provided for sufficient coverage to meet the demands of lower echelons. The photo interpretation detachments of each division, however, could submit specific requests to the corps detachments, which in turn passed them on to Army. The PRU officer at G-2 coordinated all the desired cover and communicated the request to the reconnaissance squadron, which was part of the 3d Photo Group, Twelfth Air Force. The 3d Photo Group also furnished the interpreters who were attached to the divisions and corps and provided trained personnel for the Fifth Army Photo Intelligence Center, located near the airfield of the reconnaissance squadron. The commanding officer of the Photo Center transmitted to the squadron the requests from PRU, and he might add additional coverage requested by the assistant counterbattery officer of each corps who was stationed at the Center. Requests such as these were the only ones which did not come directly through Army PRU.

Cover of the extended Army front during the winter months of 1944-45 was extensive; despite the bad weather it was possible on the average to obtain pictures

4 days a week. Whenever flying was possible the area along the front and extending 10 miles behind the enemy lines was covered. Communication lines and areas of German activity in the entire Po Valley area were photographed every 10 days. In the average week of 9-15 February PRU made 13,719 exposures, from which 96,800 prints were developed; the all-year average was approximately one-third of a million prints each month.

Twenty-four hour service normally was obtained on requests for cover. Late in the afternoon the Army PRU officer at G-2 assembled his requirements for the following day and presented his requests to the Photo Center; then the ground liaison officers worked out plans for the next day's flights, which began about 0900 during the winter. Good photographic light was usually available between 2 hours after sunrise and 1½ hours before sunset. The reconnaissance planes flew singly, and the first mission was back with its exposed plates within 2 hours. Three sets of prints were processed immediately at the squadron's field laboratory. By noon the prints were ready for the photo interpreters, who checked first for enemy artillery locations as requested by the corps counterbattery officers, then looked over areas of suspected gun positions, dumps, or other installations, and finally inspected the entire picture for any other useful information. The interpretation reports usually were completed by nightfall; by the following morning each corps had received a set of prints together with the interpretations. Additional sets of pictures were reproduced by an American "blue train" detachment, which could turn them out by thousands on a multiprinter or in smaller numbers on a hand printer. Copies of all prints came to Army headquarters for staff use and for the target and defense subsection with further distribution as needed. Each corps received sufficient sets to provide at least one for each division, one for corps headquarters, and one for corps artillery headquarters. Additional sets covering less territory were normally made available to divisions after the corps interpreter had broken down the prints into divisional sectors. Mosaics were made by the engineers of Twelfth Air Force both for Fifth Army and for their own unit. During the winter of 1944-45 a series of six mosaics on a scale of 1/15,000 were produced covering all German defenses in the area around Bologna and four sheets on a 1/11,000 scale showing the coastal sector south of La Spezia.

Closely coordinated with both the tactical and photographic reconnaissance as well as with all other information gathering sections of G-2 was the target and defense subsection, an organization which grew with the expansion of the Italian campaign. On arrival in Italy only the defense group was organized, but after 6 months of operation on the peninsula a separate target subsection was activated to cooperate with the defense subsection in determining location of enemy rear area installations which would provide good targets for long-range artillery or air bom-

bardment on Army request. A special photo interpreter was added to the subsection to take care of the target division, which had been increased in size until in 1945 it contained three interpreters, whose duties were to seek photographic corroboration of ground reports, to discover additional targets which had not been reported by ground sources, to issue marked target photos for use both by the Army and the air force, periodically to review the activity around these targets, and to assess bomb damage.

When analysis of the photographs revealed evidence of a worthwhile target, copies of the specially annotated photographs were prepared for transmission to XXII TAC. An index card was made for each target, containing information as to its type and importance and graded A, B, or C according to the priority value which was attached to it. Every few days the targets were reevaluated with respect to their priority rating. Bombing requests were listed daily by the target subsection, which submitted its recommendation of targets through the G-3 section at Army headquarters. From there in turn it was passed on to the tactical bombers together with the annotated photographs indicating the exact locations. For special operations in close support of the Army the target subsection assigned individual officers to make special studies of single elements of the enemy organization. Specially annotated photos were also distributed for targets which lay within artillery range or which, if near the coast, might be suitable for naval bombardment.

The defense subsection, which was somewhat overshadowed by the growth of its step-brother, the target subsection, concentrated its efforts closer to the front of the enemy lines, obtaining its information largely from the same sources, ground and photographic. The mission of the defense subsection was to determine the location of all enemy defense positions and the weapons in them. Ground and air reports were cross-checked, and overprinted maps showing location of machine guns, artillery pieces, mines, entrenchments, and other obstacles were distributed. These defense overprints were published whenever sufficient changes had been noted to warrant revision. The overprints showed positions reported from the ground as well as those discovered from aerial photos.

The counterintelligence subsection was charged with preventing the enemy from obtaining from us the same type of information as that which we sought from him. Counterintelligence detachments were attached to each division and corps in the Army; in Italy their chief function was the combatting of infiltration by enemy agents. This took the form of strict control of civilians since it was Italian civilians with Fascist leanings rather than native Germans who were used most frequently for such work. The counterintelligence subsection also sought to eliminate leaks in our own security by preventing our troops from inadvertently providing the enemy with military secrets.

The "ears" of the Army G-2 were in the signal intelligence subsection, which

maintained radio listening stations to intercept enemy traffic over the air. These stations constantly monitored enemy broadcasts, concentrating mainly on stations located in the German rear areas. Often codes could be broken and secret messages deciphered; in many cases the mere increase or decrease in the volume of traffic from the German stations gave an indication of movements or troop concentrations.

C. PERSONNEL, SUPPLY, AND GOVERNMENT

1. *The G-1 Section.* The work of the Army personnel section, under Col. Edward M. Daniels, assistant chief of staff, G-1, continued at a steady pace throughout the winter. This section, like the other staff sections, was divided into subsections, one dealing with officer personnel, another with enlisted personnel, a third concerned with morale and miscellaneous matters, and a fourth organized to compile statistics. (*See Annex No. 4A.*)

To the enlisted personnel subsection fell two of the important functions of the section, procurement of replacements and handling of the ticklish rotation and temporary duty problems. Questions pertaining to individuals or small groups of enlisted men were generally answered in lower echelons, so that at the Army level the subsection was concerned primarily with enlisted personnel in large numbers. The most important of such matters was requisitioning of men to fill losses incurred in combat or caused by other reasons. Assignment of enlisted replacements to various organizations of the Army was carried out by the subsection after the new men had been received from the depots. Fifth Army, which contained a great number of veteran troops with long service overseas, was able to send home on a rotation basis approximately 700 to 750 personnel each month throughout the winter. About twice that number received leaves or furloughs in the United States through the temporary duty system, whereby men remained assigned to their units overseas, spent a 30-day period at home, and then returned to their organizations. The subsection handled officers as well as enlisted men in this category.

The officer personnel subsection took charge of all special matters affecting commissioned members of the Army. All transfers within or outside the command were handled by this subsection, which also was responsible for procurement, assignments, temporary duty, detached service, reclassification, and promotions and appointments. Another duty was that of obtaining from or for the War Department and other major commands certain specialist officers or officers mentioned specifically by name.

The morale and miscellaneous subsection was charged with supervision of rest

centers operated by the Army and distribution of post exchange supplies for all units. These two duties continually increased in importance, especially during the long winter stalemate when troops were rested and entertained, as has been previously described. Problems on a wide variety of subjects fell into the lap of the miscellaneous department. Under this category, for example, all applications for marriage of troops were reviewed. The miscellaneous unit handled processing of recommendations for awards and decorations, interpreted uniform regulations, and recommended Army policy on many other matters. The fourth G-1 subsection, that dealing with statistics, compiled all types of strength reports for the Army. It received the reports from subordinate units and published a daily Army report covering battle and nonbattle casualties, prisoners of war, and effective strength of Allied as well as American troops assigned to Fifth Army. (See Annex No. 4A.)

2. *The G-4 Section.* The responsibility for the procurement of necessary supplies and services, the transportation of these supplies, the selection of suitable locations for dumps and depots, the evacuation of salvage and battlefield recovered items, and the provision of medical service to the troops rested with the G-4 section under the assistant chief of staff, G-4, Col. Edward J. O'Neill. The G-4 section as such was the policy-making organization; its directives were carried out by various members of the special staff and for them by the service troops of Fifth Army. Supplies ordered into the theater by PBS were made available to the Army to the extent of availability in accordance with requisitions placed thereon by the Army services and governed by the level of supplies and rate of expenditures as set by G-4.

In order to accomplish its objectives the section was divided into two main divisions, operations and supply; administrative functions of both divisions were taken care of by an administrative division. Augmenting the G-4 section itself was an Italian liaison G-4 from the Italian administrative division, which was in command of the Italian service troops. Liaison officers also operated with the G-4 section from an agency representing the Italian War Ministry and from the Allied Forces Local Resources Boards. The assistant chief of staff, G-4, and a small detachment were situated in the Army forward command post while the bulk of the section remained at the rear command post, working under the direction of the G-4 executive officer. The section chief formulated the broad policy decisions, based on information supplied by G-4 Rear; these decisions were executed by his rear echelon in conjunction with the special staff. Progress of the supply organization and its contribution to the general improvement of the combat efficiency of the Army during the long winter stalemate on the front have been largely described in preceding chapters.

The operations division was charged with carrying out the general broad policies formulated by the G-4 relative to the following general subjects: real estate, review of tables of equipment, issues in excess of authorized allowances, policies on

use of project equipment, reconnaissance for dumps, depots, and truckheads, levels of supply, recommendations for new types of equipment, allocation of items in critical short supply, and supervision over the use of service troops. The supply division was charged with implementing broad policies on the movement of supplies from PBS to Army base depots and from there to truckheads, allocation of vehicles, supervision of the operation of dumps, local resources, issues of expendable supplies in excess of authorized allowances, review of theater policies for application to the Army, and reports of status of equipment. Policies pertaining to supply activities were carried out through the publication of supply, administration, and evacuation bulletins. These directives laid down the routine, standard methods of requisitioning, reporting, and evacuating all types of supplies.

As a part of but operating separately from the G-4 section, the transportation section was in complete operational control of all transportation facilities in the Army area. All quartermaster truck companies, battalions, and groups were assigned to the transportation section for operations and administration. The Army services had merely to bid for transportation on the transportation section, and the latter arranged all details for the movement of supplies. This included movement by air, rail, and water as well as by land transport. The transportation section also supervised movement on the main supply routes and maintained traffic control information, setting up general policies for control of transportation within the Army.

3. *The G-5 Section.* Although the G-5 section had been operating continuously with the Army since the landing at Salerno in 1943, it never before was responsible for governing such a large section of Italy as during this period, when virtually all civilian activity in Allied-held ground north of the Arno River in the Fifth Army sector was directed by the section under Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Hume.

The Army military government section was essentially a small, field edition of the Allied Commission, which administered civil affairs in territory behind the Army boundary. Senior civil affairs officers attached to each corps headquarters were furnished with a small staff to carry out police and supply duties and occasionally engineering, financial, and medical affairs as well. AMG personnel was further attached to each division headquarters, thus providing representation in the most forward areas where civilians were likely to be encountered.

The G-5 section was staffed by Americans belonging to Company G, 2675th Regiment, Allied Commission, assigned to Fifth Army, and by British officers and men attached to the Army. This AMG section was divided into 12 subsections. Touching on all aspects of civilian life, the subsections included those devoted to public safety, engineering, legal matters, agriculture, refugee reception, partisans, finance, supply, labor, monuments and fine arts, public health and welfare, and education. Some idea of the need and scope of the activities of the section could be

obtained by observing the general destruction encountered in almost every area occupied by the Army. When AMG officers moved in behind combat troops, they found fuel supplies taken or destroyed by the enemy, public utilities mostly wrecked, water and sewer systems destroyed, no electricity or gas available, telephone and telegraph networks smashed, critical food shortages, many streets and buildings razed or mined, hospitals barely functioning due to lack of medicines, banks closed, libraries and public monuments missing or demolished, schools closed, and law and order in a general state of confusion.

As quickly as possible the AMG personnel took over the task of restoring public services and administration. The public safety subsection, responsible for the maintenance of civil order, supervised the work of the carabinieri, municipal police, air raid precaution units, and mine clearance squads recruited from civilians. It controlled movement of nonmilitary personnel in the Army area through establishment of a strict pass system and institution of curfews. The engineer, supply, and public health and welfare subsections worked closely together on priority assignments. As soon as a locality was occupied, work was immediately begun on repair of water systems, and at no time during the Italian campaign was any large municipality in danger of a severe water shortage. Longer range work by the engineer subsection included drainage of flooded areas through repair of pumps and canals, gradual restoration of the usually totally destroyed electrical systems, and reconstruction of roads and bridges. The supply subsection provided thousands of tons of food, setting up rationing systems for distribution in many areas where the local supply was virtually exhausted. Scores of Italian trucks were rehabilitated and provided with fuel to augment vehicles of the Allied Commission in transporting foodstuffs. Warehouses were established at critical points. The health and welfare subsection instituted measures to prevent the spread of epidemics, which often occurred in areas of military operations. Water was made safe to drink, civilians and buildings were disinfected, thousands of persons were inoculated, and civilian hospitals were repaired and placed in position to function again. American Red Cross units worked in close liaison with this subsection, taking over a large portion of the work of reconstruction and reactivation of civilian hospitals near the front, and distribution of clothing, medicines, and vaccines.

Refugee and partisan problems were handled by special subsections. Reception centers were organized to take care of persons forced from their homes by the course of the war. At these centers civilians could be accommodated until battle operations made it possible for them to be sent back to their homes or evacuated to areas farther in the rear. A reception center was set up in Florence to care for thousands of Italians brought out of the combat areas in the Apennines. The greatest single operation of this type ever carried out by the Army AMG occurred on the Anzio beachhead


early in 1944 when 20,000 civilians were removed by sea to safety in Naples and southern Italy. Approximately 3,000 partisans were processed during the winter of 1944-45, fed, clothed, and passed on to civilian authorities in liberated portions of Italy. Holding centers for partisans were established at Florence and Pescia. Another subsection dealing with immediate civilian problems was that in charge of labor. This unit served a double purpose, furnishing essential manpower for Fifth Army in the form of thousands of civilian laborers while at the same time providing jobs for these civilians whose normal occupations were disrupted by the war. Work was found for many others outside a strictly military sphere.

The legal subsection carried out enforcement of the laws until such time as Italian civilian courts could be reopened. It continued to maintain military courts to try cases of a military nature, some as serious as espionage and sabotage. Scores of enemy agents were arraigned before these courts during the winter stalemate. A number of executions were carried out against convicted German spies. The finance subsection supervised the reactivation of the public finance structure, reopening banks and supplying them with AMG currency. Both primary schools and universities were reopened under supervision of the education subsection after Fascist propaganda had been eliminated from the curriculum and subversive elements expurgated from the faculties. Wherever possible such schools were reestablished in their original buildings, and additional nutritious food rations for youthful students were made available.


Under direction of the agricultural subsection many tons of seed were brought into the Army area and distributed to farmers to enable them to plant crops. Thousands of head of livestock were evacuated from battle areas and saved from destruction. Other stock was obtained to replace animals killed or commandeered by the combatants. Wheat and olive oil were assembled for civilian use; wood and charcoal were made available for Army as well as civilian needs. Of particular importance in an artistic country such as Italy was the work of the monuments and fine arts subsection, which was charged with protecting and restoring masterpieces in this field. Intelligence was supplied to the Army to prevent as much destruction as possible, while various works of art, books, and scientific material were salvaged from ruins or hiding places and attempts were made to trace many well known items which had been pillaged by the enemy.

D. *SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS*

Under the coordinating supervision of the general staff sections the multitude of regular special staff sections carried out their functions. These sections



White tents and guns huddled on the snowy slopes . . . painted by Captain Edward A. Reep



A winter patrol in the Belvedere sector . . . painted by Technical Sergeant Savo Radulovic

included antiaircraft, artillery, engineer, ordnance, signal, quartermaster, surgeon, adjutant general, inspector general, judge advocate, chemical warfare, finance, chaplain, and provost marshal. All or large parts of the first five of these sections were located in the forward command post; the remainder were in the rear command post. Four other sections, armored fighting vehicle, special service, public relations, and historical, were created for special needs; in addition there were the affiliated headquarters units, such as quartermaster car companies, finance disbursing sections, bands, engineer service troops, WACs, and military police. The special staff sections worked closely with each other and with both higher and lower units to ensure that the orders and policies of the Army commander were carefully executed and applied to the tasks at hand.

